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Like Cases Alike or Asylum Lottery?
Abstract
What determines if an asylum seeker’s appeal of a negative asylum decisionis granted? Do factors other than the merits of the appeal influence itsoutcome? Building on insights from the literature on judicial politics,
group decision making and how immigration shapes citizens’ attitudes, this dis-
sertation draws attention to three extra-legal factors that matter in Swiss asylum
appeal decision making.
The Swiss Federal Administrative Court, which decides all asylum appeals in
Switzerland, exhibits several institutional features that allow for the causal iden-
tification of the impact of extra-legal factors on asylum appeal decisions. Chief
among them is a case allocation system that quasi-randomly assigns judges to
panels of decision makers.
In a nutshell, this dissertation provides evidence that the composition of panels
matters for asylum appeal decisions (Paper 1), that three-judge panels are more
likely to grant appeals than a single judge with the consent of a second (Paper
2) and that judges decide more restrictively when newspapers report more on
asylum and refugee issues (Paper 3).
The first, co-authored study explores the influence of judges’ individual prefer-
ences on appeal decisions and investigates how they play out in panels of judges.
In the absence of information about judges’ individual votes, we estimate both
the best model to explain how judges aggregate their preferences into a joint
panel decision and their individually preferred grant rates. We find that three-
judge panels make decisions according to a mix of chair-as-dictator and simple
majority vote model and that judges’ individual preferences matter, regardless of
the aggregation rule we use. Making use of the fact that Swiss asylum judges are
commonly political party members, we show that judges’ preferred grant rates
iii
and party affiliation correlate in expected ways: judges from left-wing parties
are on average more likely to grant appeals than judges from right-wing parties.
The second study exploits an institutional change implemented in January 2008.
While in 2007 all substantively tried asylum appeals were decided by three-judge
panels, the introduction of a ‘simplified procedure’ in January 2008 has since
entitled chair judges to decide appeals they consider ‘clearly with or without
merit’ in an expedited procedure, with the consent of a second judge. A fuzzy
regression discontinuity design approach reveals that the introduction of the
new procedure led to a decrease in the grant rate for the cases it affected. In
particular, this concerns appeals lodged by Nigerian asylum seekers, of dismissive
asylum application decisions, and those handled by judges affiliated with center-
right parties.
The third paper examines the impact of the frequently high political salience of
asylum and refugee issues. Drawing on a large corpus of newspaper articles that
report on asylum and refugee issues, this paper shows that, like ordinary citizens,
judges are impacted by the salience of asylum issues. Despite—or perhaps due
to—the high political salience of asylum issues, party affiliation is not found
to condition the effect of media coverage: judges of all parties become more
restrictive in times of high asylum issue salience.
Taken together, the three studies provide evidence that asylum appeal decisions
are influenced by several factors that go beyond the legal merits of each case:
the judges who decide them, the structure of the decision-making process that
drives preference aggregation, the number of judges on the panel and the public
salience of the broader political context of judges’ work. Beyond raising serious
concerns about the procedural fairness, the documented disparities also call into
question the consistency of decision making.
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Preface
T his dissertation has two main parts: the first part, the synopsis, providesa comparative perspective on the case of the Swiss Federal AdministrativeCourt, sheds light on the meaning of consistency in judicial decision making
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papers that constitute this cumulative dissertation. The three papers are the
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“Inferring Individual Preferences from Group Decisions: Judicial Prefer-
ence Variation and Aggregation in Asylum Appeals.” Manuscript.
2. Spirig, Judith. 2018. “Do Fewer Judges Reach Different Decisions? Ev-
idence from a Procedural Change in Asylum Appeal Decision Making.”
Manuscript.
3. Spirig, Judith. 2018. “It’s in the News: The Impact of Asylum Issue
Salience on Judicial Decision Making.” Manuscript.
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Part A
Synopsis
3
1
On Inconsistency in Asylum Appeal
DecisionMaking
1.1 Introduction
Asylum adjudication is a very particular area of judicial decision making, but it
is by no means a small one. In many countries, including Switzerland, asylum
appeal decisions comprise the largest share of judgments.1 In terms of absolute
numbers, this translates into 175,000 asylum appeal applications in Germany
and 5,100 in Switzerland in 2016 alone.2
More so than in many other areas of administrative law, making correct deci-
sions in asylum matters is often extremely challenging. Written proof is rare,
and decisions frequently boil down to an assessment of the credibility of asy-
lum seekers’ claims (Thomas 2006; Valluy 2004). Beyond the legal challenges
involved in ensuring the accuracy of decisions, asylum decision makers face an-
other challenge: the (political) divisiveness of asylum issues. The arrival of
asylum seekers and the presence of refugees have caused heated debates and fre-
quently featured prominently in election and referendum campaigns around the
globe. Whereas anti-immigration parties have been growing all over Europe over
recent decades (see, for instance, van Spanje 2010), they have done particularly
well in elections after the 2015 refugee protection crisis.3 For example, the right-
1 See, for example, Thomas (2011) for the U.K., Colaiacovo (2013) for Canada and Jaillar-
don (2016) for France. In Switzerland, asylum appeals account for the largest share of
judgments at the largest court.
2 See http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-zahl-der-asylklagen-nimmt-deutlich-zu-a-
1168436.html.
3 See http://uk.businessinsider.com/map-shows-far-right-growth-across-europe-2016-3.
4
wing anti-immigration party in Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party, increased
its share of seats in the National Council by 2.8 percentage points, reaching a
historical vote share of over 29% in the 2015 Swiss elections.4
It is against this backdrop that I analyze the effects of extra-legal factors on
judicial decision making. More specifically, I investigate whether the outcome
of an asylum appeal is affected by i) which judge handles it, ii) if two or three
judges decide it and iii) how salient asylum and refugee issues are at the time of
decision making. Because decision-making procedures in asylum matters vary
across countries, it is one purpose of this synopsis to briefly situate the Swiss
asylum procedure in comparative perspective (Section 1.2). Its second purpose
is to establish this dissertation’s focus on inconsistency in decision making, as
opposed to accuracy in decision making (Section 1.3). On the basis of these
sections, I will embed and contextualize the main findings (Section 1.4) and
expand on the central contributions of this dissertation (Section 1.5).
1.2 The Swiss Federal Administrative Court AsylumDivisions
in Comparative Perspective
Since 2007, all asylum appeals in Switzerland have been decided by two asylum
divisions within the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (FAC). Between 2007
and 2015, the FAC decided over 40,000 asylum appeals. The FAC is the appeals
court of first and last instance in asylum matters in Switzerland.5 It decides
appeals of decisions in asylum matters by the Swiss Secretariat for Migration
(SEM, previously named the Federal Office for Migration) or, in case of a request
for revision, of decisions by the FAC asylum divisions themselves.
Judicial systems more generally, and asylum appeal decision making more specif-
ically, vary in a number of features across different countries. The judicial se-
lection system is just one of these features: whereas judges are appointed by
royal decree in some countries, they are elected in popular elections, chosen by
4 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/10/24/the-2015-swiss-elections-a-landslide-win-for-the-
right-despite-limited-changes-in-vote-shares/.
5 If an asylum seeker wants to appeal an FAC asylum appeal decision, she has to lodge it
with the European Court of Human Rights.
5
courts themselves or elected to judicial office by the legislative branch of govern-
ment in others. For the purpose of this dissertation, two additional features are
particularly relevant: the number of judges on a panel and the number of court
levels that appellants can appeal to. I will briefly characterize the layout of these
institutional features in Swiss asylum appeal decision making before discussing
some of the differences and similarities with Germany, France, the U.K. and the
U.S.
1.2.1 AsylumDecisionMaking in Switzerland
After an asylum seeker applies for asylum—directly in one of the reception and
processing centers, at the airport or, as was possible until 2013, in one of the
Swiss embassies abroad—her claim is processed, evaluated and decided by the
SEM.6 The SEM can deem an asylum application inadmissible ‘without entering
into the substance of the case’, or, if it examines it in substance, reject or grant it.
If the asylum application is granted, the asylum seeker receives a residence permit
and is recognized as a refugee. If she receives a negative substantive decision, she
is either requested to leave Switzerland or, if removal is deemed inadmissible,
unreasonable or impossible, granted temporary protection (see Figure 1.1 for
an overview). Asylum seekers who are not granted any form of protection are
requested to leave Switzerland within a certain period of time. They are given
between five working days and thirty calendar days (depending on the decision
and, due to changes in asylum law, year) to appeal to the FAC. Most of the
appeals decided by the FAC asylum divisions are of SEM asylum decisions such
as these, but there are a number of additional asylum matters over which the
court has jurisdiction.7 Being the first and last level of appeal in asylum matters,
it also handles requests for revisions of its own decisions.
Before 2007, prior to the FAC’s existence, all asylum appeals were decided by the
Swiss Asylum Appeals Commission (AAC) which was located within the same
6 Until 2005, the responsible unit was the Federal Office for Refugees. After its merger
with the Federal Office of Immigration, Integration and Emigration, it changed its name
to Federal Office for Migration (FOM). It has been called Swiss State Secretariat for
Migration (SEM) since 2015.
7 See the list of competencies of the FAC asylum divisions in Section 1.A for further infor-
mation.
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department as the asylum application adjudicatory body (now called the SEM).
Even though the Swiss AAC was in many respects similar to the later FAC
asylum divisions, the FAC’s specific operations are characterized by a number of
features that are essential for the empirical strategy adopted in this dissertation.
A first crucial feature concerns the assignment of cases to panels of judges. The
software that assigns judges quasi-randomly onto panels and positions within
panels was specifically developed for the FAC (is is named after its initial presi-
dent) and is how the FAC ensures compliance with art. 30 par. 1 of the Federal
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation.8 A judge’s position on a panel is rel-
evant, because a different position implies a different role. The judge that is
assigned to the first position on a panel, the chair judge, is first tasked with
deciding if an appeal is to be dismissed on formal grounds or decided in sub-
stantive trial. Only with a substantive trial does she scrutinize the facts of the
case, possibly acquire additional material, request written submissions from the
SEM and/or the appellant and draft a decision. The complete file including the
draft decision is then sequentially circulated to the second and the third judges,
who can propose major or minor changes. If there are no disagreements, the
chair judge finalizes the decision. In case of minor disagreements (on which the
judges do not make their agreement depend), the chair judge briefly informs the
other judges about the minor proposed changes she adopted, and then finalizes
the decision. However, if there are major disagreements within the three-judge
panel, the chair judge might write a ‘position statement’, and the whole proce-
dure starts again. If the three judges cannot reach a decision after the second
round, they have two options. Either they agree to meet in person, and if no
consensus can be reached, a majority decision is sought. Or, if the disagreeing
judge explicitly renounces a meeting, a majority decision can be taken directly
without a meeting.
A second feature is the transparency of decision making. The FAC publishes
anonymized versions of most substantive decisions on its web site, including
8 Art. 30 par. 1 of the Swiss Constitution stipulates that “[a]ny person whose case falls
to be judicially decided has the right to have their case heard by a legally constituted,
competent, independent and impartial court. Ad hoc courts are prohibited.” For further
information about how the ‘Bandlimat’, as the software is called, randomizes panel as-
signment, see the papers in this dissertation (especially Chapter B 1) and Schuppisser
(2007).
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the names of the judges who contributed to it.9 It is a combination of these
two features that creates the empirical backbone of this dissertation. Only the
quasi-random assignment—or in its weaker form, the exogeneity of assignment—
of judges to asylum appeals, in conjunction with information about which judges
contributed to which decisions, allows me to attribute differences in grant rates
to judges’ behavior.
It is the selection system, however, that renders the case of the FAC asylum
divisions both particularly appealing from a political science perspective and
somewhat exceptional in comparative perspective. Judges are elected by the
United Federal Assembly (the two parliamentary chambers of Switzerland) to
the FAC asylum divisions for a duration of six years. To stand as a candidate, an
aspiring FAC judge is informally required to be member (or at least a supporter)
of a political party (see, e.g., Raselli 2011). The only time that non-partisan can-
didates were elected to the FAC asylum divisions was in 2005, the first election
of asylum judges to the FAC, when non-partisan asylum judges from the AAC
were nominated and elected. Since then, all candidates nominated for judicial
office by the parliament’s judiciary commission have been members or—in one
case—supporters of one of the main political parties in Switzerland.
1.2.2 Asylum Appeal DecisionMaking in Comparative Perspective
Even though the Swiss asylum appeals procedure differentiates itself from the
procedures adopted in other countries in many dimensions (see Table 1.1), it
shares some essential features with those adopted in Germany, France, the U.K.
and the U.S. These features, and the fact that asylum and refugee issues have
9 See https://www.bvger.ch/bvger/en/home/judgments/entscheiddatenbank-bvger.html. Note that in
accordance with an agreement with the FAC, this dissertation refrains from identifying
judges by name.
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become dominant and divisive topics in many countries beyond Switzerland,10
highlight the importance and topicality of the research questions addressed in
this dissertation for asylum adjudication more broadly.
One similarity in all countries is that the courts tasked with deciding appeals
of first instance asylum decisions assign between one and three judges to handle
cases. In Switzerland, Germany, France and the U.S., the share of decisions
that involve fewer than three judges has increased in recent decades (see below).
Whereas the Swiss FAC has single judges decide cases they deem inadmissible,
a single judge with the consent of a second judge has handled all cases ‘clearly
with or without merit’ since 2008.11 Therefore, since 2008, three-judge panels
only handle cases that are not ‘clear-cut’. At the U.S. Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA)(Legomsky and Rodriguez 2005) and German regional administrative
courts (§6 Code of Administrative Court Procedure), single-judge decisions have
become the standard. In 2015, France introduced a similar single-judge pro-
cedure for accelerated and inadmissible cases (Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile
2017). In the U.K., like Germany and the U.S., most cases are decided by single
judges, with the exception of particularly important or complicated ones.12
One important particularity of the Swiss system is that there is no higher court
for asylum appeals. That is not to say that all asylum seekers whose appeal is
rejected on the first level of appeal can have their appeals heard on the second
level in other countries—in Germany and the U.S., for instance, a petition for
leave has to be granted first. It does imply, however, that last-instance decisions
are not made by fewer than three judges in other countries. In addition, court
10 Asylum and refugee issues featured prominently for example during the 2017 German
general election, see http://www.dw.com/en/afd-cdu-spd-where-do-german-parties-stand-on-
refugees-asylum-and-immigration/a-40610988; the 2017 French elections, see http://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/15/immigration-a-consensual-issue-in-the-french-presidential-campaign/;
the 2016 Brexit vote, see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-eu-
immigration-brexit-leave-campaign-alan-duncan-fears-a7981521.html; and the 2016 U.S. pres-
idential elections, see https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/the-syrian-refugee-
crisis-and-the-2016-campaign/406513/.
11 Only when the second judge disagrees with either the proposed decision or the classifi-
cation of the appeal as ‘clearly with or without merit’ is the third judge re-assigned to
the panel. The cases in which the second judge disagrees cannot be identified in the
data. However, as suggested by a scribe at the court, this happens very rarely. In her
experience, it happened in one out of about fifty cases.
12 See http://www.courtandtribunalsolutions.co.uk/what-we-do/immigration/.
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structures are also different in terms of centralization. In Germany and the
U.K., asylum appeals are handled in different (regional) courts, depending on
the asylum seeker’s place of residence. In contrast, the Swiss FAC, the French
National Court of Asylum and the U.S. BIA are centralized courts.
While no country other than Switzerland requires judges to be party members,
politics is also involved in the selection of judges in the U.S. and Germany. Both
Immigration Court and BIA judges are appointed by the U.S. Attorney General.
In Germany, local governments are in charge of appointing judges to the German
regional administrative courts (where judges do not exclusively decide asylum
appeals). In the U.K., an independent commission that selects judges,13 while
in France, it is the (vice-)president of the administrative court (Conseil d’Etat),
the president of the Court of Audit or the Minister of Justice who appoints
the presiding judges to the National Court of Asylum. The three-judge panels
at the French National Court of Asylum consist of a presiding judge and two
‘qualified persons’, one appointed by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and one
appointed by the vice-president of the Conseil d’Etat.14
In sum, there are substantial differences between the lowest asylum appeals
courts in Switzerland, Germany, France, the U.K. and the U.S. Whereas the
Swiss FAC is explicitly politicized in the sense that asylum judges have to be
party members at the time of election, in Germany and the U.S., the judicial
selection procedure is implicitly politicized through the involvement of the exec-
utive branch of government. In France and the U.K., judges’ ideology appears to
play less of a role in judicial selection. Although judges’ individual preferences
can therefore not be directly linked to party affiliation in other countries, they
can still matter for decision making, as a large literature has shown (see, for asy-
lum adjudication, Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007). The second feature by which the
Swiss asylum appeal system differentiates itself from other countries’ systems is
that the Federal Administrative Court is the court of first and last instance and
does not allow for onward appeals in Switzerland.
Despite these differences, all courts covered in this section exhibit strong similar-
13 See https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/commissioners.
14 See http://www.booksandideas.net/Judging-Homosexuality-Granting-Asylum.html for further infor-
mation.
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ities: the number of judges that make asylum appeal decisions, the trend toward
smaller panels and the broader public salience of asylum and refugee issues. I
take this finding to support the relevance of my dissertation beyond the FAC.
While this section explored the comparative relevance of the questions addressed
in this paper, the next section is dedicated to their substantive relevance.
1.3 Accuracy and Consistency in Judicial DecisionMaking
This dissertation’s finding—that asylum appeal decisions are impacted by extra-
legal factors—gains significance from the notion that extra-legal factors should
not matter for judicial outcomes. This notion is expressed, for example, in the
depictions of Lady Justice with a blindfold. In a sense, the blindfold implies
that in order to reach an objective, just decision, Lady Justice has to shield
herself from the influence of extra-legal factors (see, e.g., Spaeth et al. 1972).
But what does ‘shield herself’ mean in the context of asylum appeal decision
making? Are accurate decisions those that are made by two or three judges?
Are those decisions accurate that are made in times when no one worries about
arriving asylum seekers or those that are made when some people are worried?
While the challenge and importance of accuracy in asylum appeal decision mak-
ing inspired this dissertation, it is a consequence of the adopted empirical strat-
egy that I only observe whether decisions become different as a result of extra-
legal factors. Although differences are suggestive of the existence of inaccurate
decisions, I cannot make a clear judgment as to which decisions are accurate and
which ones are not.
This has first of all to do with the difficulty of determining which judicial de-
cisions are accurate, per se. When taking into account that judicial decisions
are influenced by extra-legal factors, such as who makes them (see, e.g., Boyd
et al. 2010; Glynn and Sen 2015; Shayo and Zussman 2011), it becomes clear
how challenging it is to know what a just, accurate judicial decision is. In the
absence of an exogenous rule to identify accurate decisions, both policy-makers
and researchers (see, e.g., Boyd et al. 2010; Hessick and Jordan 2009; Spitzer
and Talley 2011) have alluded to the importance of diversity in judicial decision-
13
making bodies.15 In a way, by ensuring that the composition of the FAC reflects
the relative strength of parties in the parliament, the Swiss judicial selection
system takes note of this idea: it is one of the justifications for the judicial se-
lection procedure that the judicial body is representative of society in terms of
its socio-political views (Raselli 2011). Kornhauser and Sager (1986) provide
theoretical support for the idea that more, not necessarily diverse, judges are
more likely to make accurate decisions: if judges are on average more likely to
make correct than incorrect decisions, if they decide by simple majority vote and
if they are not influenced by other judges on the panel, the more judges vote,
the higher the expected accuracy. Beyond judicial decision making, the findings
in the literature on group decision making in a range of contexts also support
the notion that more and more diverse decision makers reach better outcomes
empirically (Page 2008; Surowiecki 2005), if—thereby confirming the importance
of one of Kornhauser and Sager’s (1986) assumptions—decision makers do not
influence each other (see Lorenz et al. 2011).
Based on these considerations, we would assume that the most accurate decisions
at the FAC are made en banc,16 in a simple majority vote taken in a situation in
which judges cannot influence each other. With regard to the influence of judges’
identity on appeal outcomes, it would therefore be the FAC asylum divisions’
median judge that makes the most accurate decisions. As a consequence, when
estimating the inconsistency that derives from disparities in judges’ preferred
grant rates, we do so based on the median judge’s preference and calculate the
share of decisions that would have been decided differently by the court’s median
judge.
Judges’ identity, however, is not the only relevant extra-legal factor. Even if
we assume that judges are more likely to make accurate decisions than not on
average: does that ability depend on issue salience? More normatively: should
judges decide more restrictively in individual asylum appeals when citizens be-
15 Note that diversity of the judicial bench has not only been suggested in order to improve
the accuracy, but also the representativity of judicial decisions (see Kornhauser and Sager
1986).
16 ‘En banc’ decisions are decisions that are made by all judges at the court together.
14
come more anti-immigrant, or should judges be blind to those influences?17
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to develop a normatively and theo-
retically elaborate understanding of accuracy in the context of asylum appeal
decisions at the FAC. It is nevertheless important to point out that given the
extra-legal factors that influence decisions, it is barely possible to find out what
a decision would be in the absence of them, even if that were desired. What we
can learn from the theoretical considerations in Kornhauser and Sager (1986)
and the findings of the literature on group decision making (Lorenz et al. 2011;
Surowiecki 2005) is, however, that under some conditions, larger groups of judges
make more accurate decisions than smaller groups and that median judges are
more likely to make accurate decisions than judges on the extremes.
Second, our understanding of inconsistency and to what extent it is connected
to accuracy depends on assumptions about the indeterminacy of law. I have so
far assumed that a judicial decision is always either accurate or inaccurate. For
many judicial decisions, especially those that are routine applications of the law
in individual cases such as asylum appeal decisions, many of us (see Kornhauser
and Sager 1986) have the intuition that judicial decisions are correct or incorrect
given the set of rules that apply. Yet, depending on the degree of legal inde-
terminacy, it is possible that there are inconsistencies in decision making that
are a consequence of a lack of clear rules that leaves space for interpretation.
Hence, even if extra-legal factors might lead to seeming inconsistencies, that is
not necessarily a sign of inaccuracy (see Fischman 2013b). Therefore, while dis-
parities point us toward the existence of judicial inconsistency, we have to make
assumptions about the degree of legal indeterminacy to interpret it substantially.
Given these constraints, I will largely refrain from judgments about which deci-
sions are more or less likely to be accurate. The focus on consistency, however—
whether like appeals are decided alike—is not only relevant insofar as it raises
questions about accuracy but also has merit in its own right, as it says some-
thing about the fairness of the procedure and the predictability of decisions. As
Kornhauser and Sager (1986, 104) put it:
17 Note that the FAC Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly states: “Judges shall not allow
their judgments to be influenced by pressures exerted by the general public, by litigants
or by third parties. They shall also avoid any appearance of being influenced in any way.”
See https://www.bvger.ch/dam/bvger/en/dokumente/2016/05/ethikcharta.pdf.
15
Where two legal rules attach different legal consequences to the same
stipulated set of relevant circumstances the rules are inconsistent. So
understood, consistency is not hard to justify as a virtue. It serves
the goal of treating persons subject to the adjudicatory process fairly,
and is essential to the ability of affected persons to anticipate legal
outcomes and plan their affairs accordingly.
The lack of predictability is particularly challenging for asylum seekers. Given
the enormous impact of the final asylum decision on appellants’ lives, being
unable to plan affairs accordingly means that asylum seekers’ lives are essentially
put on hold during the asylum decision-making procedure.18 It is in this context
that my dissertation provides evidence of the effect of extra-legal factors on the
consistency of asylum appeal decision making. While they point toward the
existence of inaccurate decisions, they first and foremost highlight deficiencies in
the equal treatment of appellants before the law.
1.4 Summary of Findings
This dissertation is not the first effort to research inconsistencies in asylum
appeal decision making. Since Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007) documented large
disparities between asylum adjudicators in the U.S., several further studies in
Canada (see, e.g., Rehaag 2007) and the U.S. (Fischman 2011, 2013b) have un-
covered similarly large disparities.19 This dissertation is the first work, however,
to quantify disparities in asylum appeal decision making in a European country.
Even though there were European movements comparable to the American legal
realist movement in the early 20th century (for example, the German Freirechts-
bewegung and Scandinavian Legal Realism) the systematic empirical research
on judicial decision making started by American political scientists in the mid-
twentieth century has only recently begun to emerge in Europe (see Dyevre
18 See Hainmueller et al. (2016) for more details on what that means in terms of labor market
integration.
19 Note, however, that Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007) could not analyze between-judge dispar-
ities for the BIA, the court that comes closest to the FAC asylum divisions.
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2010).20
It is also, to my knowledge, the first study to estimate judges’ individual prefer-
ences based on joint panel decisions that do not report individual votes. Stud-
ies, including some outside asylum appeal decision making, which investigate
whether some judges have a disproportionate influence on a panel’s joint decision—
known as ‘panel effects’—usually rely on courts in the U.S., which provide infor-
mation about judges’ individual votes. In Europe, this is much less common. The
FAC specifies the names of judges on a given panel, but does not give information
about judges’ individual votes. To ascertain judges’ individual preferences, we
leverage the quasi-random allocation of judges onto panels and positions within
panels (see Chapter B 1, co-authored with Dominik Hangartner and Benjamin
E. Lauderdale). By doing so, we shed light on how judges aggregate individual
preferences into a joint decision, which at the same time allows us to estimate
to what extent judges’ individually preferred grant rates vary.
We compare a variety of possible aggregations rules—such as that the median
judge is decisive, or that instead, the chair, second, or third judge is decisive,
or who is the most restrictive or the most liberal judge on the panel—and find
that three-judge panel decisions of appeals submitted in 2007 are best explained
under an aggregation rule that is a mix of median and chair-as-dictator mod-
els. Whereas some cases are determined by the chair judge, others follow the
median judge’s preference. Estimating judges’ individually preferred grant rates
on the basis of the best-fitting aggregation model, we document that it does in-
deed matter which judges are assigned to handle an appeal. While more liberal
judges would grant on average about 50% of substantively tried cases in 2007,
the most restrictive judges would only grant about 10%. Despite considerable
within-party variation, there is a correlation between judges’ party affiliation
and restrictiveness: on average, judges affiliated with the right-wing Swiss Peo-
ple’s Party are more restrictive than judges affiliated with the left-wing Social
20 According to Rehder (2007), the main reason for this is to be found in the very late,
post-World War II, establishment of constitutional courts in Europe. This focus shaped
contemporary European judicial politics literature in such a way that it very rarely exam-
ines judicial behavior as anything other but a mechanical application of the law. Rather,
it focuses on the process of juridification, “the political effects of judicial action” (Rehder
2007, 10). Hence, the skepticism toward the judge as a simple translator of the law that
emerged primarily in the U.S. has only recently started to make its way to Europe (see
Dyevre 2010).
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Democratic Party. Drawing on the whole set of appeals decided between 2007
and 2015, we also show that the differences between parties’ average preferred
grant rates persist over time.
The focus on one particular court, the FAC, not only facilitates the identification
and comparison of judges’ individual preferences, but also provides a backdrop
against which I can gather systematic evidence on the influence of other extra-
legal factors, such as panel size and issue salience. Neither of these factors
have received their deserved attention in judicial politics, particularly not in
asylum appeal research. The second paper (see Chapter B 2) takes advantage
of a new case-handling procedure at the court, introduced because of a partial
revision of the Swiss Asylum Act, to estimate the effect of having fewer judges
decide a case on its probability of being granted. While all appeals that were
tried substantively were decided by (at least) three-judge panels in 2007,21 those
classified as ‘clearly with or without merit’ by the chair judge have subsequently
been handled by just her, with the consent of a second judge.
Because of the temporal variation in whether a case is handled by three judges
or one with the consent of a second, I can compare if similar cases were decided
differently as a consequence of the initiated procedure. To do so, I employ a fuzzy
‘donut hole’ regression discontinuity (RD) design. This design not only allows
me to account for the phasing-in period of the new procedure, but also sheds light
on which appeals are most likely to be affected by the introduction of the new
procedure. I find that the so-called simplified procedure led to an overall decrease
in the grant rate around January 1, 2008 of eight percentage points. For those
cases that were directly affected by the new procedure—the ones that would have
been decided by a three-judge panel had they been submitted before 2008, but
were decided by a single judge with the consent of a second, because they were
submitted after January 1, 2008, and vice versa—the grant rate decreased by
23 percentage points. Among the affected cases were a disproportionate number
from Nigerian appellants, many lodged against first-instance dismissal decisions
and many handled by judges from center-right parties.
21 Note that a small subset of cases is decided by five-judge panels. A five-judge panel can
be requested by any judge assigned to the panel (with the agreement of the president of
the division) at any point during the procedure if she or he considers the appeal to raise
legal questions which induce a fundamental change in practice or a precedent.
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The third paper (see Chapter B 3) assesses the impact of the public and polit-
ical salience of asylum and refugee issues on judicial decision making. More so
than in other areas of the law, asylum judges operate in a field that has caused
divisive discussions among both the public and political elites to varying degrees
over time. Building on the observation that the degree to which voters perceive
asylum and refugee issues to be one of the most important problems varies over
time, I study the effect of asylum issue salience, proxied by the amount of news-
paper coverage devoted to asylum and refugee issues in Switzerland, on asylum
appeals’ grant rate. I find that judges are more likely to reject asylum appeals
in times of high asylum issue salience. This effect is neither restricted to right-
or left-wing judges, nor is it solely driven by higher asylum application numbers.
An exploration of the topics featured in the newspaper articles indicates that
the variation in judges’ behavior is attributable to media coverage of publicly
divisive topics such as the accommodation of asylum seekers, rather than to
federal-level asylum policy debates.
Taken together, this dissertation sheds light on three different sources of dis-
parities in asylum appeal decision making at the FAC. Beyond the merits of an
appeal, it is the identity of the judges that decide it, the size of the panel that
handles it and the prevailing salience of asylum and refugee issues that can make
the difference between whether an asylum seeker can stay in Switzerland or has
to return to her country of origin. These findings raise doubt about the consis-
tency of asylum appeal decision making and suggest that not all like cases are
treated alike. Thereby, they not only highlight deficiencies in the fair treatment
of all appellants, but also call into question the accuracy of some decisions, are
we to believe that Swiss asylum law does not leave judges largely unconstrained
in their decision making (see Fischman 2013b).
In a broader sense, this dissertation has two main implications for the study of
inconsistency in judicial decision making. First, it emphasizes the crucial role of
court structures in the facilitation or containment of inconsistencies. In partic-
ular, the inconsistencies documented in Chapters B 1 and 2 arise on the basis of
decision-making procedures that are far from optimal in terms of the conditions
laid out in the literature on judicial group decision making. Rather, both the
sequentiality of the decision-making procedure and the introduction of the new
procedure promote aggregation rules that are different from a simple majority
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vote with no panel effects. Therefore, it is not the case that inconsistencies at
the FAC exist despite optimal decision-making structures. This is good news,
because it suggests that even (or particularly so) in judicial systems that are
as politicized as the Swiss one, we can turn to the literature on judicial group
decision making for suggestions of optimal decision-making procedures. Accord-
ingly, if the reduction of inconsistency across panels is a goal, procedures that
promote simultaneous and independent instead of sequential decision making in
(larger) groups of judges would be a way forward for the FAC.
Second, this dissertation also shows that while changes in decision-making pro-
cedures could contain inconsistencies that stem from factors that do not affect
the position of the median judge (i.e., are time-invariant and influence judges dif-
ferently), they cannot reduce inconsistencies that arise from factors that change
the court’s median (i.e., that shift the whole distribution of judges’ preferences
and/or are time-variant). Asylum issue salience (see Chapter B 3) is such a
factor. Even if all decisions at the FAC were made in panels of, say, five judges,
who decide independently by a simple majority vote, variation in issue salience
would still lead to inconsistencies, because it increases the restrictiveness of the
court’s median. This suggests that there are different categories of extra-legal
factors that, if inconsistency reduction is a goal, require different approaches.
While the literature on judicial group decision making outlines ways to address
one set of factors (those that do not change the position of the median), it does
not yet provide solutions for the second set of factors. More research is needed
within and beyond the field of judicial politics to address this second category
of factors.
Of course, these findings have to be interpreted within the limitations of this
dissertation. As it focuses solely on one particular court, it cannot provide
straightforward suggestions as to the extent to which its findings are applicable
to other contexts. Given that some of the institutional features of the FAC are
highly distinctive, such as judges’ party affiliation, one should be careful with
broad generalizations. As Section 1.2 illustrates, however, the questions asked in
this dissertation are highly relevant and topical beyond Switzerland. At the very
least, therefore, my findings confirm that there is ample need for more research
on the effects of the studied extra-legal factors on asylum appeal decisions in
other countries.
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An empirical limitation that I would like to note is the existence of leading
decisions. While most decisions of the FAC asylum divisions concern individ-
ual cases, some decisions—those addressing new legal questions, for example—
are decided by five judges and considered leading decisions. These decisions,
once reached, have an impact on the decision of other, similar, cases. It is be-
yond the scope of this dissertation to systematically account for that influence,
particularly with regard to over-time inconsistency. With regard to the differ-
ences between judges’ individual preferences, however, leading decisions should,
if anything, theoretically have a moderating effect. If judges decide cases more
similarly as a consequence of issued leading decisions, this would lead to an
underestimation of the actual differences between judges’ individual preferences.
1.5 Contributions
My findings have implications for several debates and strands of literature. First
of all, they contribute to the literature studying the effect of judges’ identity on
the decisions that they make. Even though a number of studies, especially in
the U.S., have already indicated that judges’ identity matters (Abrams et al.
2012; Boyd et al. 2010; Lauderdale and Clark 2012; Sunstein et al. 2007), the
results from the first paper provide evidence that these effects also exist in a civil
law country like Switzerland. In comparison with the disparities documented at
U.S. immigration courts in Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007), the differences between
FAC judges’ preferred grant rates seem relatively modest.22 This might suggest
that differences between judges’ (preferred) grant rates are smaller in civil law
countries more generally, fitting in well with the perception that the civil law
system favors cooperative as opposed to individualistic behavior (Dyevre 2010).
Given that judges on the FAC are members of political parties and asylum
adjudication is a politically divisive issue, the results might therefore indicate
an upper bound for the effect of judges’ identity on judicial decisions in civil law
countries.
Our finding that it is not always the median, but frequently the chair judge, who
22 Note, however, that the U.S. immigration courts are somewhere between the initial asylum
adjudication body and the first level of appeal and exclusively have single-judge decisions.
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is decisive in three-judge panels is instructive for a variety of fields. It not only
contributes to the literature on panel effects and the interaction of panel members
(Fischman 2013a; Kastellec 2013; Spitzer and Talley 2011) in that it suggests
that we have to pay attention to institutional factors in addition to judges’
ascriptive characteristics, but also to a much broader literature on group decision
making beyond judicial politics (see, e.g., Lorenz et al. 2011). More practically, it
also has implications for the study of courts in comparative perspective through
highlighting the importance of the decision-making procedure for the adopted
aggregation rule.
The second and third papers have implications for the study of judicial politics
more broadly, but especially insofar as they shed light on two determinants of
judicial decisions that have found scant attention as of yet. My finding that fewer
judges are more likely to reject asylum appeals than more judges has implications
for both the theoretical and empirical work on the trade-off between efficiency
and consistency in decision making (Alarie et al. 2011; Kornhauser and Sager
1986). In particular, it highlights that if the average probability of cases to be
granted is relatively low, reducing the number of judges—even if not to one—
leads to a decrease in the grant rate that cannot be explained by differences in
cases’ merits, even if the cases are arguably ‘clear-cut’.
The main contribution of the paper on the impact of asylum issue salience on
judges’ decisions is twofold. On the one hand, it adds evidence to the grow-
ing literature on court-exogenous factors that influence judicial decision making
(Bonneau et al. 2007; Lim et al. 2015). Whereas research has considered long-
term public opinion trends and media coverage of court decisions as relevant
factors, variation in the public and political salience of the broader topic within
which cases are embedded has not been widely studied (see Shayo and Zuss-
man (2011) for an exception). On the other hand, it adds to the literature that
studies the effect of immigration on voters’ attitudes toward immigrants, partic-
ularly in interaction with media coverage (Dustmann et al. 2018; Hopkins 2010;
Steinmayr 2016). So far, this literature has focused on voters, but my results
suggest that similar processes might be at play for expert decision makers such
as asylum judges.
This dissertation also prompts a number of questions and highlights the need for
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more research into judges’ behavior, particularly in asylum appeal adjudication.
For example, given that the effect of extra-judicial factors is much less studied in
Europe than in the U.S., would raising judges’ awareness of these factors lead to
a reduction in disparities? Rachlinski et al. (2008) show that raising awareness of
the existence of implicit biases in decision making among judges can limit those
biases. Is that also possible for factors such as issue salience? Another question
relates to how courts can learn from one another to optimize decision making in a
way that facilitates consistency. My dissertation suggests that under a sequential
decision-making structure, it is not necessarily the median judge who evolves as
decisive for the outcome of a decision. Would a simultaneous decision-making
structure reduce inconsistency by facilitating the emergence of a simple majority
vote rule? Which other, manipulable features of a court’s structure impact on the
consistency of decision making? Finally, research about the impact of panel size
on the accuracy of decisions suggests that the effect of panel size is moderated
by the complexity of a case (Alarie et al. 2011). Because I find that panel size
reduction has a sizable effect on the probability of cases ‘clearly with or without
merit’ to be granted, further research could address empirically whether complex
cases are affected more by changes in panel size.
It is my hope that this dissertation on decision making at the Swiss Federal
Administrative Court illuminates the relevance and significance of extra-legal
factors in asylum appeal adjudication. By providing empirical evidence of dis-
parities in judicial decision making, it raises concerns about the equal treatment
of appellants before the law and aspires to contribute toward a better under-
standing of the mechanisms at work. Thereby, it also aims to inspire further
research on asylum decision making in other countries and contexts.
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Appendix
1.A Competencies of the Swiss Federal Administrative Court
AsylumDivisions
The following list of competencies of the FAC asylum divisions are taken from
Uebersax et al. (2009, 574–576).
The FAC asylum divisions are responsible for adjudicating appeals of decisions
by the Federal Office for Migration (FOM, now: State Secretariat for Migration
(SEM)) regarding:
- Asylum applications in Switzerland (ordinary procedure)
- Asylum applications at the airport
- Asylum applications abroad
- Allocation to a canton of residence for the duration of the asylum procedure
and denial of a request to change cantons
- Precautionary measures ordered by the FOM, provided they may cause
permanent prejudice
- Orders that suspend proceedings of the lower adjudicatory body (the FOM)
- Grants of the suspensive effect of appeal in Dublin proceedings
- Order of detention pursuant to Aliens Act, art. 76, para. 1, let. b(5)
- Rejection or inadmissibility decision of reconsideration requests
- Revocation of asylum or withdrawal of refugee status
- Termination of temporary protection
- Revocation of temporary protection granted during the asylum procedure
- Denial of residence permit requested by the canton of residence due to
“serious personal hardship” 
The FAC is also responsible for the examination of applications for revisions of
its own judgments (art. 45 et seq. ACA). In addition, the FAC asylum divisions
are responsible for adjudicating motions to disqualify a judge, explaining and
correcting their own decisions (art. 48 ACA) and deciding applications to restore
time limits (art. 24 APA) and to resume appeal proceedings. These cases are not
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covered in the dataset used for this dissertation, because they are not considered
asylum matters.
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Inferring Individual Preferences fromGroup
Decisions: Judicial Preference Variation and
Aggregation in Asylum Appeals
Dominik Hangartner, Benjamin E. Lauderdale and Judith Spirig*
R ecent studies of asylum adjudication in the U.S. and Canada havefound sizeable disparities between individual adjudicators. Wecontribute to this literature by focusing on the Swiss Federal Ad-
ministrative Court, a case that is methodologically challenging since
we only observe the decision of the panel, not judges’ individual opin-
ions, and politically relevant, since judges have known party affiliations.
Several features of the Swiss asylum appeal process combine to offer an
unusual opportunity to examine judges’ revealed preferences: asylum
cases are assigned at random (conditional on language) to panels of
judges and have a common, unidimensional structure, as all decisions
typically involve the appeal of an initial asylum decision. As a result,
we can test which of several decision-theoretic models of group deci-
sion making appear to best fit the panel decisions, as well as inferring
the judges’ individual preferences. The analysis of the universe of asy-
lum decisions made between 2007 and 2015 shows that inconsistencies
in decision making due to panel composition are substantial from the
court’s establishment to the end of the study period and that judges’
estimated preferences are strongly correlated with their party mem-
bership in expected ways. In addition, the methodology we propose
to infer individual preferences from repeated group decisions has the
potential for fruitful application in a variety of other contexts.
* Each author has contributed to this paper significantly and participated in the work equally.
Names are listed in alphabetical order. For a more detailed list of author contributions, see
Section 1.B in the Appendix.
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1.1 Introduction
In summer 2007, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (FAC) had to decide
two unrelated appeals of rejected asylum seekers from Afghanistan. Both ap-
pellants were male, of Hazara ethnicity, Shiite Muslims from Kabul and with
family still living there. On July 4, a panel of three judges chaired by a member
of the Social Democratic Party ruled that the current situation in Kabul can-
not be considered ‘reasonable’ for removal and that the asylum seeker had to be
granted subsidiary protection. Two months later, on September 3, another panel
consisting of three different judges chaired by an independent judge rejected the
appeal of the other asylum seeker: the panel wrote in their verdict that removal
to Afghanistan is ‘admissible’ and ‘reasonable’. As a consequence, the rejected
asylum seeker had to leave Switzerland within a few days.
A close reading of the two verdicts1 reveals few differences in the merits of
the cases that could explain the radically different outcomes. This raises two
questions: If cases’ merits do not explain the different outcomes, do the different
judges on the panel? And if so, do such disparities exist in asylum appeal
adjudication more generally?
Consistency in adjudication is central to the legitimacy of the judiciary (see, e.g.,
Kornhauser and Sager 1986). Consistency ensures that like cases are treated
alike, thereby safeguarding the fair treatment of disputing parties and increas-
ing the predictability of the decisions of the court. Only a court that applies
the law consistently can fulfil the promise of ‘equality before the law’—a legal
principle that is fundamental to liberal democracies and frequently enshrined in
the constitution. In Switzerland, for example, Article 8(1) of the constitution
guarantees that “every person is equal before the law.” Since inconsistency in
judicial decision making, that is, different decisions for cases of the same merits
and law, would violate the very essence of this isonomy principle, it has been
the subject of much empirical scholarship—running the gamut from partisan ad-
judication of challenges to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Revesz
1997) to ethnic in-group bias in Israeli small claims courts (Shayo and Zussman
2011).
1 See FAC decisions E-3570/2006 and D-4576/2007.
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In the context of asylum adjudication, a small but focused literature, primarily
focused on the U.S. and Canada, has examined disparities at several stages
of the asylum process, from the initial application to the final appeal at the
highest courts (Fischman 2011; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007; Rehaag 2007). All
these studies find substantial heterogeneity in the decisions of asylum officers,
judges and appeal courts. Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007), for instance, show that
for Columbian cases before the Miami Immigration Court between 2000 and
2004, judges’ grant rate varied between 5% and 88%.
Some of the asylum environments covered by these studies2 feature (quasi-) ran-
dom assignment of cases to asylum officers or judges, which allows the authors
to causally attribute differences in grant rates to the different decision makers.
Most of these studies rely on data obtained (often through Freedom of Infor-
mation requests) from governing institutions, which usually insist on protecting
the identity of the decision maker and replacing it with an anonymous identi-
fier. Thus, correlating discrepancies in asylum appeal adjudication with relevant
characteristics of judges, such as political ideology, is frequently not possible.3
We contribute to this literature and overcome this limitation by focusing on
the universe of all asylum appeals decided by the Swiss FAC between 2007–
2015 (40,506 unique decisions). Like most other countries that are signatories
to the 1951 Refugee Convention (and its amendment), an asylum seeker whose
claim is rejected by the Swiss authorities has the right to appeal the initial
decision. Since 2007, the approximately thirty judges of the FAC centrally decide
on all such appeals, on average totalling about 3,000 decisions per year. Unlike
most countries, judges serving on the Swiss FAC have publicly known party
memberships, are nominated by the national parliament’s judiciary commission
in agreement with the relevant parliamentary faction and are voted into judicial
office by the members of the national parliament. While not written law, there
is an informal agreement that the body of elected judges reflects the relative
seat share of the different parties in parliament. These voluntary party quotas
2 Fischman (2011) focuses on asylum appeals at the U.S. federal circuit court level, which
features random assignment. The U.S. immigration courts studied by Ramji-Nogales et al.
(2007) also use random assignment of cases within courts, but assignment to the 53 courts
is based on residence, which likely confounds comparisons across courts.
3 One exception, focusing on layman judges in Sweden, is Martén (2015).
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(Kiener 2001) ensure that the different political ideologies represented in Swiss
society are also represented on the court. One potential drawback of this heavily
politicized nomination process—and the focus of this study—is that judges might
be selected and incentivized to reach verdicts in line with the preferences of their
counterparts in the parliament.
Several features of the appeal process help us overcome challenges typically as-
sociated with studying disparities in asylum appeal adjudication and judicial
behavior. First, all appeals have a common, unidimensional structure, since
they exclusively deal with asylum issues. While the assumption that judges’
preferences are dominantly unidimensional is often invoked in judicial politics,
there is historical (Greenhouse 2007; Jeffries 2001) and statistical (Lauderdale
and Clark 2012) evidence that judges’ preferences vary across areas of the law.
In the context of our study, however, the unidimensionality assumption seems
much more credible, as decisions typically involve the appeal of an initial asylum
or subsidiary protection decision or a closely related asylum matter.
Second, the FAC processes all asylum appeal decisions lodged in Switzerland. In
other studies (for example, Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007), differences in the average
merits of cases submitted to different regional offices (U.S. Immigration Courts)
frequently undermine the comparability of estimated preferences across offices.
This is not a concern in our context, where all appeals are centrally processed by
the two asylum appeal divisions of the FAC. Third, a bespoke software program
with the objective function of minimizing workload imbalance assigns cases to
panels of three judges. The automated assignment is independent of the merits
of a case and judges’ characteristics conditional on the language of the asylum
decision. This allows us to attribute differences in grant rates to differences in
panel composition.
Fourth, we only observe the aggregate decision of the panel, not the individual
votes of the judges. While this creates some interesting inferential challenges,
we do observe the role (chair, second, or third) of the three judges assigned to
the same panel. This information allows us to formulate a variety of aggregation
rules and test them against one another using data from thousands of randomly
allocated panels. Fifth, judges’ identities and party affiliations are public knowl-
edge. This allows us to correlate differences in grant rates with differences in
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judges’ ideology, proxied by their party membership.
To correlate variation in appeal decisions with judges’ party membership, we
first have to infer their individual preferences from panel decisions. In contrast
to courts in other countries, the verdicts of the FAC do not record judges’ indi-
vidual votes, but only the aggregate panel decision. To overcome this inferential
challenge, we estimate a variety of models using different aggregation rules to
test which fits the data best. We find that the best-fitting simple aggregation
rule is that only the chair judge’s preference matters, closely followed by a model
in which the panel decisions reflect the median judge’s preference. Consistent
with the decision-making procedures at the court, we also show that a (Bayesian)
mixture model of the chair and median models fits better than either of these
simple aggregation rules, indicating that the chair has some latitude to devi-
ate from the median’s preferences. Based on the best-fitting mixture model,
we find that asylum seekers who submitted comparable appeals in 2007 faced
substantially different grant rates, depending on the panel of judges their case
was assigned to.
In addition, we fit models to examine the evolving pattern of decision making
and the associated inconsistency rates over time. While the inconsistency rate,
i.e., the proportion of cases that would have been decided differently according
to the preference of the court’s median judge, fluctuates between 5.5% and 9.4%,
we find no evidence that judges’ preferences converged over time. If anything,
the slightly higher inconsistency rate in the most recent years suggests that the
issue of preference variation in asylum appeal adjudication is a permanent fixture
of this highly politicized court.
Our study makes several contributions. First, our findings have important im-
plications for the comparative literature that studies disparities in asylum adju-
dication. While most studies to date show sizeable disparities in asylum adjudi-
cation between decision makers that potentially face different cases (Fischman
2011; Law 2004; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007; Taylor 2007), our results provide
clear causal evidence that the identity of judges matters when facing cases with,
in expectation, the same merits.
Second, we add new empirical evidence to the growing literature on the effects
of judges’ identity on their decisions. Previous research has shown that charac-
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teristics such as gender (Boyd et al. 2010; Glynn and Sen 2015; Peresie 2005),
ethnicity or race (Abrams et al. 2012; Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010;
Grossman et al. 2016; Shayo and Zussman 2011) and ideology (Ashenfelter et al.
1995; Epstein et al. 2013; Sunstein et al. 2007) all impact judicial behavior. We
provide some of the most direct evidence to date that judges’ political ideol-
ogy, proxied by their party affiliation, shapes preferences over asylum appeals in
expected ways.
Third, our study adds to the growing literature on group decision making (Bon-
neau et al. 2007; Sunstein et al. 2007), preference aggregation (Fischman 2011;
Van Dijk et al. 2014) and the effects of social interactions of panel members
(Fischman 2013; Kastellec 2013). Previous studies (for example, Fischman 2011)
that infer individual preferences using item response theory-type models rely on
the individual votes of decision makers. We explore a context where individual
votes are not reported, and only the group’s joint verdict is observed. Nonethe-
less, by leveraging the random and repeated allocation of judges to panels, we
are able to recover individual preferences from joint group decisions by fitting a
variety of aggregation rules. This framework has the potential for a wide range
of applications, since joint decisions without any recorded information on indi-
vidual votes is the norm in many repeated decision-making environments. In
the conclusion, we discuss promising applications of this methodology outside of
the realm of judicial politics.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides back-
ground information about the structure of decision making at the FAC and the
election of its judges. Section 1.3 describes the proposed methodology based on
the case-space model, how we infer individual preferences from group decisions
and how we estimate the court’s inconsistency rate over time. After summarizing
the data and measures in Section 1.4, we detail the results in Section 1.5. Section
1.6 discusses the legal and political implications of our findings and concludes
the paper.
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1.2 Asylum Appeals and the Swiss Federal Administrative
Court
Like most other countries, Switzerland grants asylum in accordance with the
1951 Refugee Convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol.
Asylum applications are processed by the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM).
Of the 26,000 asylum applications decided in 2012, roughly the mid-point of our
study period, only 15% were granted (UNHCR 2013) and more than 10% were
appealed.4 In the event of a negative substantive decision,5 the applicant has
thirty days to lodge an appeal. (If the asylum request is dismissed without
entering into the substance of the case, the appeal window shortens to only five
working days.) All such appeals are handled by the FAC.6 Since the verdicts of
the FAC are, in general, not appealable to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, the
FAC is effectively the court of last resort in the Swiss asylum process.
1.2.1 Election of Judges by the Swiss Parliament
The approximately thirty judges belonging to the two divisions of the FAC han-
dle, on average, about 3,000 appeals per year. Unlike in other countries where it
is frequently the executive branch that nominates candidates for judicial office,
judges of the FAC are nominated and voted into office by the United Federal
Assembly, i.e., the joint meeting of the two chambers of the Swiss National Par-
liament, for a term of six years, with no term limits. In recent years, with one
exception, all judge candidates had a known party affiliation (in the first elec-
4 Viewed in a comparative perspective, Switzerland received a relatively high share of asy-
lum applications in the last decade (see, e.g., Bansak et al. 2017). Similar to developments
in many other European countries, the increasing number of asylum applications in re-
cent years has made asylum policies, including the appeal process, a heavily contested
issue, with right-wing parties such as the Swiss People’s Party leveraging it as an effective
springboard for rallying their voters. See Chapter B 3 for further information on this.
5 A negative substantive decision is the rejection of an asylum application that the SEM
has tried substantively, i.e., one in which the SEM has ‘entered into the substance of the
case’.
6 Before the court’s establishment in 2007, decisions were handled by mostly the same
judges, but within the Swiss Asylum Appeal Commission, which was part of the Federal
Department of Justice and Police, the same department that also supervises the SEM.
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tion, a few ran as independents, see Chapter B 3 for more information) and were
backed by their party when running for office.7 While not written law, there is
an informal rule that the body of elected judges reflects the relative seat share
of the different parties in parliament. One of the ideas behind this norm is to
select a judiciary that is representative of the people over which it has to rule
(Kiener 2001; Raselli 2011). By establishing a system in which all parties have a
share of judges that is approximately proportional to their strength in the par-
liament, the Swiss “solution” ensures that all political ideologies are ‘adequately’
represented at the court.8
A potential drawback of this system of judiciary election is the threat of a heav-
ily politicized court. If judges see themselves mainly as agents of their party, we
might worry that their verdicts are also influenced by the political ideology of
their party. This could either be the result of the selection process by which as-
piring judges choose parties or of the re-election process that incentivizes judges
to reach verdicts in line with the preferences of their counterparts in parliament.9
In both instances, we would expect to see substantial variation in the adjudica-
tion of asylum appeals across judges from different parties and a correspondence
between judges’ grant rates and their parties’ general stance on asylum issues.
1.2.2 Asylum Appeal Procedure and the Structure of Panel Decisions
When receiving a new asylum appeal, the FAC identifies the language of the
asylum decision (German, French, or Italian) and forwards, on an alternating
basis, the case to one of the chambers of its two asylum divisions. A bespoke
software program called ‘Bandlimat’, named after the first president of the FAC,
assigns the appeal to a three-judge panel and determines judges’ roles as chair,
second and third judge. When sequentially assigning cases to judges, the Ban-
dlimat solely considers (i) the language of the asylum decision, (ii) the urgency
7 The exception is a judge who supports the Green Party, but is not a member.
8 Note, however, that this principle of proportionality is not strictly enforced, if, for exam-
ple, the judiciary commission cannot find candidates with the relevant qualifications for
underrepresented parties. Accordingly, the Swiss People’s Party, which holds the most
seats in the parliament, has been underrepresented at the FAC, in particular in its early
years.
9 Note, however, that re-elections are not competitive.
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of the appeal, (iii) judges’ language skills and (iv) their current workload. The
assignment of cases is completely mechanical, and interference with the soft-
ware’s assignment has to be justified, logged and entered by the president of the
court.10 The objective function of the software is to minimize the imbalance in
workload created by case assignment (each case has an identical weight of one)
under constraints (i)–(iii). With the exception of the language of the appeal,
all constraints are orthogonal to the identity and characteristics of judges, such
that in expectation, the assignment of cases by the Bandlimat is (conditionally
on language) as good as random. We use a series of placebo checks to test this
assumption in the next section.
The court employs two distinct decision-making procedures to decide on asylum
appeals that it tries substantively.11 During the first year of the court’s existence,
all substantively tried cases were handled through the ‘ordinary procedure’ that
is characterized by the following structure: the chair judge receives the case
files, makes additional investigations if necessary, assigns one of her clerks to
draft a decision and forwards all materials to the second judge. The second
judge reads the case files and the draft decision, either agrees or disagrees and
proposes changes and forwards everything to the third judge. The third judge
reads the case files, the draft decision and the comments of the second judge,
and either agrees or disagrees and proposes changes and returns the file and
her comments to the chair. In the event of disagreement, the panel further
circulates and possibly revises the decision. If the three judges are not able to
reach a consensus, the outcome is decided by voting by majority rule.
A partial revision of the Swiss Asylum Law led to the introduction of an alter-
native ‘simplified procedure’ at the court in 2008.12 Since January 1, 2008, the
simplified procedure has allowed the chair judge to classify certain cases that
are regulated by the court’s guidelines as either ‘with or without merit’. In the
vast majority of instances, the simplified procedure is applied to cases that are
‘clearly without merit’. The initial assignment of cases to three-judge panels
10 See, for details, the law guiding the FAC’s standard operating procedure, art. 21, par. 1
ACA.
11 Note that cases that do not fulfill the formal requirements are ‘dismissed without entering
into the substance of the case’ by the chair judge in a single-judge procedure.
12 See Chapter B 2 for further information on the new procedure.
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is the same for both procedures. When the chair judge invokes the simplified
procedure, she only needs the second judge to agree with her classification and
the verdict. If the second judge agrees with both, the decision-making process
ends here, and the file is not forwarded to the third judge. If the second judge
disagrees, the process reverts to the ordinary procedure.
Appeals decided by the simplified procedure are a highly selective subset of all
cases. Furthermore, Figure 1.7 in the Appendix reveals that judges vary consid-
erably in their propensity to invoke the simplified procedure. To circumnavigate
any selection issues arising from these differing definitions of what constitutes
appeals ‘clearly with or without merit’, the following analyses draw on different
samples of appeals. First, we focus on all substantively tried appeals (decided
under the ordinary procedure) submitted in 2007. In subsequent parts, we focus
on all appeals decided at a particular point in time, independent of the procedure
used to decide the case.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Estimating Individual Preferences from Panel Decisions Using the
Case-Space Model
To estimate individual preferences from the observed aggregate decisions of
three-judge panels, we need a framework for modelling preference aggregation.
We adopt a 1D case-space model (Kornhauser 1992), which allows us to the-
oretically describe the preferences of judges and to map different preference
aggregation rules onto likelihood estimators. Each case j has facts that can be
described as a location ψj. We treat smaller values of ψj as indicating stronger
appeals (case facts) and larger values of ψj as weaker appeals. Each judge i has
preferences that can be described as a cutpoint θi. Each judge, if deciding the
case alone, would rule in favor of the appellant if and only if ψj < θi. Thus,
judges with lower cutpoints θi are inclined to grant fewer appeals, and judges
with higher cutpoints are inclined to grant more appeals. An assumption of this
unidimensional model is that all judges agree on the ranking of relative merits of
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appeals and disagree only on the threshold to apply. This has some implications
for interpretation, which we discuss below.
Figure 1.1:Mapping between Preferences andDecisions
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θiψ = 0 ψ = 1
| |
Appeal
Rejected|
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Granted
l| |
θiψ = 0 ψ = 1
| |
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Rejected|
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l l l| |
θ1 θ2 θ3ψ = 0 ψ = 1
| |
Appeal
Rejected| |
Appeal
Granted
Appeal
???
Note: The top two axes illustrate the mapping between preferences and hypothetical single-judge decisions.
The bottom axis illustrates the three-judge decisions that are actually observed, indicating the range of cases
over which decisions depend on which preference aggregation rule most closely matches the court’s decision
making.
The top two axes of Figure 1.1 show two different hypothetical judges and the
decisions they would make if they decided cases alone. However, as described
earlier, the cases we are studying are decided jointly by three judges according
to the procedures described in the preceding section, and so the resolution of
cases in which the three judges disagree (bottom axis of Figure 1.1) depends on
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the aggregation rule that combines their preferences into a decision.
Let i(j) be the indices of the judges hearing case j, so that θi(j) is a three-
component vector, with the first element θi1(j) corresponding to the chair, the
second θi2(j) to the second judge and the third θi3(j) to the third judge. We
consider only those aggregation rules that can be described by a function f(θi(j))
that maps the preferences of the three judges into an effective preference of the
panel.13 This allows us to define a generic likelihood function for the observable
votes:
L(θ) = ∏
j
p
(
ψj < f(θi(j))
)yj · p (ψj > f(θi(j)))1−yj (1.1)
1.3.2 Decision-Theoretic Aggregation Rules
We consider a range of decision-theoretic preference aggregation models in our
analysis. While other aggregation rules are certainly possible, we believe that our
set of rules comprises the most likely candidates—not just for this application,
but also for other contexts where the researcher only observes the group’s joint
decision, not the individual votes.
If we imagine the panel voting by majority rule internally, we expect the median
judge, θmed, to determine the outcome. If we imagine the panel voting with a
requirement of a unanimity rule to grant an appeal, θmin, i.e., the most restrictive
judge, determines the outcome. If instead unanimity is required to reject an
appeal, θmax, i.e., the most liberal judge, determines the outcome. Lastly, if the
chair’s preferences dictates the outcome, we would expect θ1(j) to be decisive.
We fit models corresponding to these, as well as three additional and less plausi-
ble aggregation functions, in our empirical analysis. In addition to a null model
that serves as a baseline, we also specify an aggregation rule where the second,
θ2(j), and third judge, θ3(j), respectively, dictate the outcome. We do not expect
these last two aggregation rules to fit the data well but include them as plausi-
13 It is difficult to make a substantive argument for the kinds of non-monotonic preference
aggregation functions that could not be described as a mapping of the three judges’
preferences into a single effective preference on the same scale.
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bility tests. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the different simple aggregation
rules:
Table 1.1:OverviewDecision-Theoretic Rules
Notation Aggregation Rule
θmin Most conservative judge decides
θmax Most liberal judge decides
θmed Median judge decides
θ1(j) Chair judge decides
θ2(j) Second judge decides
θ3(j) Third judge decides
Note: This table displays the decision-theoretic rules used to
aggregate individual preferences of panel members.
Note that for three-judge panels, we cannot point identify, but only bound, the
preferences of certain judges under certain models. For example, if we assume
the median judge’s preference determines the outcome, we cannot point identify
the preferences of either the judge with the lowest or the highest threshold for
asylum appeal cases. Similarly, for the minimum and maximum models, we
cannot identify the two highest and the two lowest preferences, respectively.
However, we can identify which judges these are and bound their θ with the
next most extreme judge’s position. Because the preferences of the judges are
estimated conditional on the aggregation rule and the fit of the model depends on
the predictive performance of the preferences and the aggregation rule jointly,
our preference estimates do depend on the aggregation rule we assume. For
this reason, we test a variety of models, compare their statistical fit and try to
focus on those empirical relationships that are robust to reasonable choices of
aggregation rule.
In that spirit, we also consider a mixture model of two of the simple aggregation
rules. We do so because the mixture model might better reflect the sequentiality
of decision making and the constraints that judges are facing than either of the
simple aggregation rules alone. As noted above, the chair of the panel initially
receives the case files, reviews them and sets out a draft decision. Then, the
second and third judges get the opportunity to review the file and the draft
decision in turn, and only if there are unresolvable disagreements after another
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round of circulation (and a potential discussion) is a decision by majority rule
taken. This is clearly a costly process in terms of time and effort for all judges
involved. Yet, whereas the chair judge gets to frame the decision and has to
invest time and effort to draft it, there is an incentive for the second and third
judges to follow the chair’s draft decision, rather than engaging in the effort
necessary to determine if they disagree, let alone formulating an alternative to
the chair’s provisional decision.
One way of thinking about the incentives set up by this process is to consider
the cost in terms of time and effort to determine the case facts ψj that each
judge has to pay. Because the chair judge must pay the cost in any case, but the
second and third judges do not, we can expect that some decisions taken by the
chair may be at odds with those of the median judge, but the other two judges
do not know that, if they do not pay the cost of review.
More precisely, we assume that the review costs are sufficiently high such that for
some cases for which the second or third is the median judge, they cannot afford
to learn ψj, but are also not so exceedingly high that they would never learn
ψj. Under these assumptions, there are some cases where the chair is sufficiently
close, but not identical, to the median judge, such that the second and third will
not pay the review costs. For those cases, the chair will dictate the outcome. In
all other cases, the median judge decides the outcome.
While we abstain from formulating (or estimating) a complete game-theoretic
model here, we note that this simple sketch of how the sequence of decision
making coupled with review costs affects the judges’ behavior is sufficient to
highlight an important dynamic. This dynamic enables the first judge to more
strongly influence the outcome of some but not all cases, with the fraction of
cases dictated by the chair increasing in the review costs.
To translate the essence of this idea into a statistical model, we estimate a
mixture model of the chair and median aggregation rules.14 Let λ1(j) and λmed be
the probability of the chair and the median judge deciding the case, respectively,
14 We also tested other mixture models, for example between the median and second judge,
but all of these fitted, as expected, significantly worse.
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such that λmed = 1− λ1(j). The corresponding mixture of aggregation functions
f(θi(j)) = λ1(j)f(θ1(j)) + (1− λ1(j))f(θmed) (1.2)
is then plugged into the likelihood function (Equation 1.1) above. Since the
likelihood function of this mixture model is by definition more complex than the
simple aggregation rules and the risk of exploring only local maxima is corre-
spondingly higher, we resort to Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
sampling, rather than maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), for estimation.
1.3.3 Measuring the Consistency of DecisionMaking
Given the case-space model, we can also calculate the extent to which random
assignment of judges leads to inconsistency in the decisions that the court makes.
Let θ˜j be the consensus of the court, let f(ψ) be the distribution of case facts and
let θj be the effective preferences of the judges hearing case j. Then, on average,
the fraction of cases decided differently than how they would if the consensus
were consistently applied is
E = 1
M
M∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ θ˜
θj
f(ψ)dψ
∣∣∣∣∣ (1.3)
To compute this quantity, we need a benchmark for what decisions an entirely
consistent court ought to make. We use the expected grant rate conditional on
covariates Cj, such as language or country of origin, but excluding the informa-
tion which judges heard the case. We then take the mean absolute difference
between the predicted probabilities of granted appeals for each judge, pˆij, and
this benchmark to estimate the inconsistency rate:
E = 1
M
M∑
j=1
|pˆij − E [pi|Cj]| (1.4)
In analyses that do condition on covariates Cj, E [pi|Cj] reduces to the mean
appeal grant rate over all cases, and the inconsistency rate reduces to the mean
absolute error of the fitted values. This offers some intuition into why this
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measure captures inconsistency. If the set of judges hearing the case does not
matter, then the fitted values, i.e., the predicted probabilities of granted appeals,
given the identities of the judges should not vary at all. To the extent they do,
this indicates that the judges matter and cases are being decided differently
depending on which judges hear those cases. This measure E assumes again that
judges only disagree about thresholds, not the relative merits of cases, but that
means that E provides a lower bound on the court’s inconsistency. If judges also
disagree about merits, the true inconsistency of the court will be higher than
what our estimate of E suggests.
1.3.4 Case Facts Varying by Judges, Case Language and Country of Origin
In the previous section, we discussed how the automated case assignment takes
the language of the appeal and the language skills of the judges into account.
This feature of the assignment has implications for our statistical analysis. For
example, French-speaking asylum seekers from Côte d’Ivoire, with typically low
asylum grant rates, might be likely to submit their asylum application in French-
speaking Switzerland (rather than the German-speaking part), which in turn
determines the language of both the asylum decision and the appeal. If this
is indeed the case, we would worry that the judges operating in the different
official Swiss languages (French, German and Italian) face cases from different
origin countries and therefore of different case strength. In order to account for
this possibility, we include the language of a case as a covariate for predicting
the strength of the case ψj, since cases are only assigned to judges as-good-as
randomly conditional on case language.
To fully understand the constraints imposed on the random allocation of cases
to judges, we conducted extensive background research and interviews with the
general secretariat of the FAC and the software company that was hired to write
the randomization code for the Bandlimat. All parties involved assured us, that
conditional on language and the time when an appeal is submitted, cases are
indeed randomly assigned to judges. Yet, when we conducted our own placebo
tests and regressed the appellant’s country of origin on a series of judge fixed ef-
fects (and the language of the case), the results, displayed in Figures 1.8 and 1.9
in the Appendix, show that the distribution of p-values from these joint F -tests
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deviate from the uniform distribution we would expect if cases were indeed (con-
ditionally) randomized. While we note that some of the strongest imbalance
comes from countries with few cases, this is nonetheless a concern when we aim
to attribute differences in grant rates to differences in judges’ ideology. If, for ex-
ample, restrictive judges could somehow influence the allocation such that they
only see weak cases with high ψj, we would overestimate the heterogeneity in
preferences and their correlation with judges’ party membership.
Figure 1.2:Distribution of Expected Case Strength
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Note: Each graph shows the average case strength ψj based on the appellant’s country of origin and year of
appeal submission for each judge who was on the court in a given year and decided at least 20 cases. Since
cases are allocated based on case language and judges’ language ability, we note each judge’s main language
(G for German, F for French, I for Italian).
Figure 1.2 shows that the latter is unlikely to be a major concern. For this test,
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we predict the case strength ψj based on the appellant’s country of origin and
year of appeal submission. We find that the average strength of cases allocated
to judges is very similar across parties and that there is no indication that
judges from center-right to right-wing parties (Free Democratic Party and Swiss
People’s Party) are allocated weaker cases than judges from left-wing (Social
Democrats and Greens) or centrist parties (Christian Democrats). Hence, we
believe that the small imbalance remaining after adjusting for the language of
the appeal is unlikely to impact our analysis.
In the second part of the analysis, we explore changes in judges’ behaviour for
the years 2007–2015. In order to adjust these dynamic estimates for changes
in case composition and strength over time, we control for country of origin of
the appellant instead of the language of the case. We expect that controlling
for country of origin adjusts for a sizeable part of the unobserved variation in
case strength, and, at the same time, blocks any confounding introduced by the
non-random assignment of judges by language.
1.4 Data: Sample, OutcomeMeasure and Covariates
We obtained the data that form the basis of our analysis directly from the FAC,
which is obliged by Swiss law to inform the public about its jurisdiction.15 The
key dependent variable measures the outcome of the verdict. While the FAC
employs a relatively fine-grained measure of full and partial granting of appeals,
we collapse this information into a binary measure, where an appeal is coded as
‘granted’ if the verdict potentially leads to an improvement of the appellant’s
situation (independent of the appeal being fully or only partly granted) and
‘rejected’ otherwise.
In addition to the outcome measure, the data obtained from the FAC contains the
following information that we leverage in our analysis: the unique case id, date
of submission, date of decision, the panel composition and the role of the judges,
the language of the appeal and the appellant’s country of origin. For the subset
of published decisions, this information is also available on the court’s online
15 Art. 29, par. 1 ACA.
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database.16. Where possible, we cross-checked the two data sources to make
sure we obtained the complete set of cases. We complement this database with
personal information about the judges, most importantly their party membership
(or support), which we compiled from judges’ CVs on the official website of the
FAC.17 As part of the data-sharing agreement reached with the FAC, we agreed
to abstain from revealing the judges’ names. In the following, we replace the
name of each judge with a unique ID and an indicator of her political affiliation.18
Overall, the dataset contains the universe of all 40,506 unique decisions made
by a total of 38 judges between January 1, 2007, and December 31, 2015.19
Of the full set of cases, we dropped 13.5% that were either ‘written off’ or
received ‘another’ decision that can be considered neither as in favor nor against
the appellant. Employing our binary measure, Table 1.2 shows for the 35,033
appeals that remain in our sample, 14% of appeals are granted, and 86% are
rejected. As previously discussed, the language of the case is likely correlated
with the appellant’s country of origin and might also be one of the drivers for
the differences in acceptance rates across language.
Table 1.2:Descriptive Statistics
Subset Cases Acceptance Rate
All 35,033 13.9%
German 22,095 15.5%
French 10,988 12.2%
Italian 1,950 5.5%
Note: Descriptive statistics for all cases with a bi-
nary outcome, subsetted by language of the verdict,
decided between January 1, 2007 and December 31,
2015.
16 See http://www.bvger.ch/publiws/pub/search.jsf.
17 See https://www.bvger.ch/bvger/en/home/about-fac/judges-and-court-clerks/judges.html for short
bios of the active judges.
18 We, the researchers, as well as the FAC, are well aware that this partial anonymization is
incomplete at best, and that it would be fairly straightforward to figure out the identity of
the judges using publicly available information. We do believe, however, that some level
of anonymization is helpful in focusing the discussion of our findings on structural issues
of the court, rather than on the behavior of individual judges.
19 If several appeals were unified and received a joint decision, we recorded it as one and not
several observations (this concerns 451 decisions).
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The following analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we test different aggrega-
tion rules on substantively tried cases submitted in the first year of the court’s
existence, as only those were always decided with three-judge panels.20 Since
some judges employed the simplified procedure even for cases submitted toward
the end of 2007 but decided in 2008, we narrow the database to cases submitted
during the first three quarters (January 1st to September 30th) of 2007 to ensure
a consistent composition of cases. In the second part, we follow the dynamics
of judges’ preferences and the court’s consistency over the years 2007–2015. For
this year-by-year analysis, we focus on the year of the decision of the appeal to
increase the comparability of cases over time. Because of the difference in how
we code the submission or decision year of an appeal, the preference and incon-
sistency rate estimated for 2007 will likely differ between the first and second
part.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Which Aggregation Rule Fits Panel Decisions Best?
In order to understand how individual preferences are aggregated into a joint
panel decision, we focus on substantively tried cases submitted during the first
three quarters of 2007, which were all decided by panels of three. We begin
by fitting a series of models to these data using the simple aggregation rules
described in more detail in the previous section: preference of the most restric-
tive judge (min), median preference, preference of the most liberal judge (max),
chair’s preference, second judge’s preference, third judge’s preference and the
null model. As explained above, the last three of these rules are intended as
plausibility tests, and we do not expect them to fit well. Therefore, they provide
us a check that our estimation approach has power against implausible alterna-
tives. All of these models have one degree of freedom per judge, except for the
null model, which only fits a constant.
20 Note that the cases that do not fulfill the formal requirements are dismissed ‘without
entering into the substance of the case’ by the chair judge in a single-judge procedure.
Since these cases are decided by single judges and not panels of judges, they are excluded
from this part of the analysis, where we focus exclusively on substantively tried cases.
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Table 1.3: Table of Fit Statistics forMLE Estimates (2007)
LL df AIC
Chair -581.4 28 1218.9
Median -585.7 28 1227.3
Max -587.8 28 1231.5
Min -598.5 28 1253.0
Null -636.3 1 1274.7
Second -609.4 28 1274.8
Third -620.6 28 1297.1
Note: Table of fit statistics for MLE esti-
mates of judges’ preferences in 2007 under
different aggregation rules, sorted by AIC.
LL = log likelihood; df = degrees of free-
dom; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
As Table 1.3 indicates, the best-fitting simple aggregation rule is the chair judge,
followed by the median model. The difference in the log likelihood between these
two non-nested models with the same number of parameters is 4.3, indicating
that the chair model clearly outperforms the median model. All of the other
models fit worse than these two, with the second and third judge model even
ranked below the null model, according to the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC).
That the best-fitting model posits that the chair judge decides as dictator is
a theoretically compelling result, given the structure of the decision procedure
followed by the court. Because the chair sees the case first and writes the initial
draft of the decision, she has an opportunity to frame the decision, while the
second and third judges have an incentive to not investigate the case as thor-
oughly as they would if they were the chair. However, the results also indicate
that the preferences of the second and third judge matter to some extent. If the
other judges exerted no constraint on the chair, we would expect an even larger
difference between the chair and the median model in terms of log likelihood and
AIC.
To more explicitly investigate the trade-off, faced by second and third judge
between paying the cost for review and letting the chair decide, we turn to
the results from the mixture model. As discussed earlier, the mixture model
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is by construction more demanding to estimate than the simple aggregation
rules. Because the maximum likelihood estimates have proven to be somewhat
dependent on the starting values in our test runs, indicating that we might only
find local, not global maxima, we now turn to MCMC sampling, which is better
suited to explore the entire posterior density.
Making full use of the advantages of Bayesian methods, we run a series of mod-
els with different prior specifications. We first estimate a mixture model with
flat priors and no covariates so that we can compare the model fit to the MLE
estimates. For the second model—our preferred specification—we add hierar-
chical random effects priors for each judge. In order to facilitate a qualitative
comparison of model fit between the mixture models and the best-fitting simpler
aggregation rule, we also estimate the corresponding Bayesian variants for the
chair and median models. The comparison between the Bayesian mixture and
chair or median model is facilitated by the fact that the chair model is a special
case of the mixture for which λchair = 1, and the median model with λchair = 0,
respectively.
Table 1.4: Table of Fit Statistics for Bayesian Estimates (2007)
Model Priors df λchair DIC
Mixture flat 29 0.34 1185.8
Mixture hierarchical 29 0.43 1186.3
Chair flat 28 1.00 1216.1
Chair hierarchical 28 1.00 1218.3
Median flat 28 0.00 1219.7
Median hierarchical 28 0.00 1221.4
Note: Table of fit statistics for Bayesian estimates of judges’
preferences in 2007 under the mixture, chair and median mod-
els.
Table 1.4 summarizes the models, sorted by the DIC, a hierarchical model gen-
eralization of the AIC. The considerable difference in DIC suggests that even
when penalizing for higher model complexity, a mixture of the chair and judge
models outperforms an aggregation rule in which the chair acts as dictator or all
cases are decided by the median judge, and that this result also holds up with
random effect priors.
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The estimated mixing parameter λchair varies slightly across models, with values
ranging between 0.34 and 0.43. This indicates that even though a majority
of verdicts in 2007 reflect the preferences of the median judge, a significant
minority of up 43% is decided by the chair alone. If we add to these 43% the
approximately 19% (= 57%/3) of cases in which the chair judge happens to be
the median, we see that the chair effectively decides the majority of cases. It is
therefore not surprising that among the simple aggregation rules, the chair, and
not the median model, exhibits the slightly better model fit.
1.5.2 Heterogeneity in the Preferences of Judges and Inconsistency of the
Court
Based on the best-fitting models, this section explores the heterogeneity in
judges’ grant rates in 2007 and how they lead to inconsistent decision making at
the court. Figure 1.3 shows the estimated preferences of the judges under our
preferred specification, the mixture of chair and median models that controls for
language and uses hierarchical priors on the judges. Table 1.5 in the Appendix
shows the underlying numerical estimates.
Figure 1.3 reveals two striking features. First, there is substantial heterogeneity
in the preferences of judges, both within and across parties. Second, there is a
clear association in the expected direction between the preferences of judges and
their political affiliation. Judges affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (SP)
are, on average, among the most favorable toward asylum seekers. Non-partisan
judges and those affiliated with the centrist Christian Democracts (CVP) exhibit
the most intra-party variance, but both groups are on average close to the court’s
median. Judges affiliated with the center-right Free Democratic Party (FDP)
are, on average, the second most restrictive, while judges affiliated with the
right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) are the least favorable toward asylum
seekers. Thus, judges’ estimated preferences are entirely consistent with their
parties’ general stances on asylum and immigration issues.21
21 See Figure 3.9 in the Appendix of Chapter B 3 for an illustration of parties’ stances on
asylum and immigration policy.
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Figure 1.3: Judges’ Preferences (2007), MixtureModel
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Note: The estimated preferences of the judges in 2007, under the mixture of chair and
median models. Mixture probability λchair = .43. Posterior means alongside with 95%
credible intervals. Full party names: Christian Democrats (CVP); Free Democratic Party
(FDP); non-partisan (Indep); Social Democrats (SP); Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
The most liberal judge (SP, 0.55) had, in cases that s/he could decide alone, a
grant rate that is 7.9 times higher than the most restrictive judge (SVP, 0.07).
More generally, the differences in preference estimates for the five most liberal
and restrictive judges are substantively large and estimated with sufficient preci-
sion to be statistically meaningful. Tables 1.6 and 1.7 in the Appendix show the
corresponding preference estimates from the Bayesian chair and median model,
respectively. While there are some differences with regard to the point estimates
for the preferences and the implied ordering of judges from liberal to restrictive,
the general findings of a substantial variation in preferences, and their associa-
tion with party membership, are also evident in those simpler models. In sum,
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we find across a variety of models that the political ideology of judges, proxied
by their party affiliation, is a robust predictor of their preferred grant rate.
What does this heterogeneity in the preferences of the judges imply for the
consistency with which the court applies the law? To answer this question,
we predict the probability of a successful appeal for each composition of judicial
panels, as observed in 2007, and based on the preference estimates from the main
mixture model. If panel composition had no effect on the success of appeals, we
would predict a constant probability for all cases.
Figure 1.4: Predicted Probability of Successful Appeal
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Note: This graph shows the predicted probability of successful appeal
for each case under the mixture model, given the empirical compositions
of the judicial panels of cases submitted during the first three quarters
of 2007.
Figure 1.4 shows that this is clearly not the case. By contrast, we find consider-
able variation in the predicted probabilities solely due to different judges serving
on panels. Overall, this heterogeneity in adjudication results in an inconsistency
rate of 8.9%, indicating that one in eleven cases is decided differently than how
it would be if the court’s consensus were consistently applied. Figure 1.10 in the
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Appendix shows very similar distributions of predicted success and inconsistency
rates of 8.4% and 8.3% for the Bayesian chair and median models, respectively.
1.5.3 Does the Court BecomeMore Consistent Over Time?
Several questions emerge from the substantial preference variation reported in
the previous section concerns the possible convergence of these preferences over
time: is the inconsistency rate observed in 2007 merely an artifact of the first year
of the court’s existence and do judges’ preferences converge over the following
years? Or is the substantial variation in preferences and their correlation with
judges’ ideology rather a permanent feature of a politicized court whose judges
are affiliated with political parties and voted into office by the parliament?
In order to answer these questions, we leverage the universe of all unique asylum
appeal decisions between 2007 and 2015.22 As discussed earlier, on January 1,
2008, the court introduced the simplified decision procedure that has since al-
lowed the chair judge to avoid three-judge panels for appeals that she deems, with
the approval of the second judge, ‘clearly with or without merit’. Among other
things, this means that we do not observe the identity of the third judge for this
highly selective subset of cases over the entire study period.23 Methodologically,
the non-observance of the third judge is an issue if the chair’s classification of
cases clearly with(out) merit also depends on the preferences of the third judge.
For example, a restrictive judge might be more likely to rule that an appeal is
clearly without merit if the third judge is liberal, and thereby avoid the more
complex procedure of determining the case’s merits in a full panel, and running
the risk of having to grant it against her preferences.
We see two principled ways to deal with those cases for which the third judge
is not observed. First, we can impute the missing third judge with the court’s
average preferences (computed without the preferences of the chair and second
22 December 31, 2015 is the end point of our study period because the FAC changed again
its decision-making procedure, making comparisons over time more difficult.
23 We actually do observe the third judge even for cases decided under the simplified proce-
dure or the single-judge procedure since January 1, 2011, when the FAC implemented new
software that saves the initial assignment of all three judges, independently of whether or
not they were actually involved in the final decision.
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judge serving on the particular case) and then apply the Bayesian mixture model.
The imputed average is a consistent estimator of the preference of the unobserved
third judge and will therefore not bias the estimates for the other judges. We
expect, however, that this procedure would lead to an underestimation of the
weight of the median model (relative to the chair model), since the preferences
of the actual third judge will typically be further away from the median than
the imputed mean suggests. The second, and preferred, option is to focus on
the second best-fitting Bayesian chair model, for which the identity of the third
(or second) judge is by definition not relevant. When comparing the estimates
from this model over time, recall that the majority of cases is effectively decided
by the chair of the three-judge panel in 2007. Hence, we would not expect a
major increase in the inconsistency rate due to the introduction of the simplified
procedure in 2008. In addition, the Bayesian chair model allows us to include
appeals that were dismissed by a single judge (the chair judge) before entering
into the substance of the case.
Another caveat concerns the estimation and interpretation of dynamic prefer-
ences across time. While the random assignment of judges to panels (conditional
on language) allows us to attribute differences in grant rates to differences in
judges’ ideology at any given point in time, it does not allow us to causally
attribute changes in grant rates of the same judge over time to changes in her
ideology, since we cannot rule out that the average strength of asylum appeals
also varies. To adjust these dynamic estimates for changes in case composition
and strength over time, we control for the appellant’s country of origin. We ex-
pect that controlling for country of origin blocks any confounding introduced by
the non-random assignment of judges by language and also adjusts for some, but
not all, of the unobserved variation in case strength. Without further and strong
assumptions about constancy of case merits conditional of country of origin, we
cannot make absolute comparisons of judges’ preferences across years. In effect,
this means that we are not able to distinguish the hypothesis that cases become
systematically easier (harder) to decide consistently from the hypothesis that the
judges converge (diverge) in their behavior. Nonetheless, a flexible model where
the preferences of the judges, and the distributions of cases from each country,
vary from year to year enables us to determine, without invoking any further
assumptions, whether overall consistency improved or worsened over time.
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Figure 1.5:Year-by-Year Preference Estimate (2007–2015)
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Note: Year-by-year preference estimates for all judges serving on the court between 2007 and 2015,
with party mean trajectories. Judges’ preferences for a given year are estimated based on the cases
decided in that year, except for 2007 (shaded in gray), for which only cases submitted and decided in
2007 are used. Full party names: Conservative Democrats (BDP); Christian Democrats (CVP); Free
Democratic Party (FDP); Green Liberal Party (GLP); Green Party (GPS); non-partisan (Indep);
Social Democrats (SP); Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
Figure 1.5 shows the trajectories of the judges’ preference estimates over time.
While there is some variation in the preferences of judges over time, the overall
pattern is very clear: the average success rates of cases chaired by judges from the
same party, as well as the differences across parties, are remarkably constant over
time. There is one exception, however: the centrist Christian Democrats started
out close to the court’s average in the first year, but became more restrictive over
time, even surpassing the right-wing Swiss People’s Party in 2012. In sum, the
overall trends in judges’ preferred grant rates do not suggest that they converged
in more recent years.
Next, we explore the trends in inconsistency rates more explicitly. Since all
estimates are based on the chair model, we can directly compare the inconsis-
tency rate of cases decided in 2007 to those in later years. This also means, as
discussed, that we would not expect a substantial increase in the court’s inconsis-
tency solely due to the introduction of the simplified procedure in 2008, since the
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chair already had considerable power to impose her preferences on three-judge
panels in 2007.
Figure 1.6: Inconsistency Rate over Time
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Note: The inconsistency rate in a given year is estimated based on the cases decided in that year, except
for 2007 (shaded in gray), for which only cases submitted and decided in 2007 are used.
Figure 1.6 shows the trends in inconsistency rates and confirms the pattern
apparent in the previous graph. While there is some fluctuation in the incon-
sistency rate from year to year, ranging from a minimum of 5.5% in 2012 to
a maximum of 9.4% in 2015, we find no evidence that the judges preferences
converged over time.24 If anything, the inconsistency rate slightly increased in
most recent years, indicating that the issue of preference variation in asylum ad-
judication on the FAC is by no means confined to the early years of the court’s
existence, but rather a permanent fixture. The last section explores the legal
and political implications of this finding.
24 Note that, as opposed to the inconsistency rate calculated for 2007 above, the estimates
here include single-judge dismissals (before entering into the substance of the case).
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1.6 Conclusion
Several studies of asylum adjudication show considerable variation between deci-
sion makers (see, e.g., Fischman 2011; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007; Rehaag 2007).
One limitation faced by existing studies is that researchers typically only have ac-
cess to anonymized information about the identity of the decision maker, which
renders inferences between the estimated preferences and the decision-makers’
characteristics, such as ideology, challenging. We overcome this challenge by
focusing on asylum appeal decisions of the Swiss FAC, where judges’ identity
and ideology, proxied by party affiliation, is public knowledge. Our analysis of
the universe of all appeals decided between 2007 and 2015 demonstrates that
judges’ preferences vary substantially with regard to grant rates and that those
preferences correlate strongly with judges’ political ideology in expected ways.
In particular, we show that similar appellants faced significantly different grant
rates, depending on the panel of judges their case was assigned to. Since cases
are, conditional on language, randomly assigned to judges, the disparities be-
tween judges cannot be explained by differences in case merits. This disparity
violates the very essence of article 8(1) of the Swiss Constitution that stipulates
that “[e]very person is equal before the law.”
Our paper has important implications for several audiences. For the compar-
ative literature on disparities in asylum adjudication, our paper provides some
of the most direct evidence to date that judges’ political ideology influences
their preferences over asylum appeal, even in the context of a high-stakes appeal
court of last resort. While there is within-party variation, the disparity between
the expected grant rate of judges affiliated with the most liberal and the most
restrictive parties, are both statistically significant and substantially relevant.
The magnitude of the variation in expected success rates by panel composition,
however, is smaller than what has been found in previous studies in the U.S. and
Canada (see Fischman 2011; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007; Rehaag 2007).
Our study also has direct policy implications for the Swiss FAC. Our background
research and interviews with members of the court revealed that the court is
well aware of, and concerned by, the rumours of sizeable heterogeneity that we
quantitatively confirm here. The FAC implemented two institutional features
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that are explicitly designed to increase consistency in decision making. If new
legal questions arise, five-judge panels issue leading decisions that have stare
decisis-like implications for subsequent decisions on similar appeals. In addition,
judges from different chambers are assigned to serve together on panels in non-
urgent cases to facilitate exchange and consistency. While our analysis of the
inconsistency rate over time cannot disentangle the success or failure of these two
measures, the overall trend gives little reason for optimism: the inconsistency
rate fluctuated between 5.5% and 8.1% within the first five years of the court
and has increased to 9.4% in most recent years.
If the goal is to minimize the variation in grant rates within the current judi-
cial selection procedure that fosters the dependency of judges on their parties,
the FAC would have to look at the design of the decision-making procedure.
Abolishing the simplified procedure would likely have only minor effects on the
overall inconsistency rate (while significantly increasing the workload), since the
structure of the ordinary decision-making procedure already grants considerable
power to the chair judge. Based on the findings of this study, we believe that
panels are only able to effectively moderate the inconsistencies if judges have
to simultaneously review the appeal and independently draft a verdict. While
considerably more work than the existing procedure, only such a redesigned
decision-making procedure promises to unleash the full power of Condorcet’s
jury theorem, as applied to groups of judges by Kornhauser and Sager (1986).
Lastly, our study also has broad methodological implications for models con-
cerned with inferring individual preferences from group decisions. We show that
in a context where decision makers are repeatedly and randomly allocated to
groups, our framework can recover both individual preferences from group deci-
sions without observing individual votes and the aggregation rule (or mixture of
aggregation rules) that best fits the decision-making process. We expect that this
framework can also be fruitfully applied in a variety of other contexts of repeated
group interactions, where joint decisions or performance indicators without any
information on individual votes or contributions are the norm. Beyond judicial
behavior, particularly promising examples for future applications are inferring
the preferences of hiring committee members that repeatedly interview large
numbers of candidates and students’ ability from group projects with rotating
group membership.
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Appendix
1.A Additional Figures
Figure 1.7: Probability of Deciding Case by Simpliﬁed Procedure
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Note: The graph displays the probability that a chair judge handles a case under the simplified
procedure as opposed to the ordinary procedure. It includes judges that chaired at least 50 sub-
stantively tried cases between 2008 and 2015. Full party names: Christian Democrats (CVP); Free
Democratic Party (FDP); Green Liberal Party (GLP); Green Party (GPS); non-partisan (Indep);
Social Democrats (SP); Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
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Figure 1.8:Distribution ofP -Values fromF -Tests (2007–2010)
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Figure 1.9:Distribution ofP -Values fromF -Tests (2011–2015)
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Table 1.5: Judges’ Preference Estimates, MixtureModel (2007)
Judge Point Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
SP_1 0.55 0.33 0.83
CVP_4 0.45 0.26 0.72
SP_4 0.43 0.26 0.68
Indep_6 0.43 0.23 0.72
SP_6 0.36 0.18 0.62
Indep_2 0.36 0.18 0.57
SP_2 0.34 0.16 0.58
FDP_5 0.28 0.16 0.45
Indep_4 0.27 0.10 0.52
Indep_1 0.26 0.09 0.53
SP_5 0.23 0.05 0.46
CVP_2 0.22 0.11 0.37
FDP_1 0.22 0.07 0.47
SP_7 0.21 0.04 0.44
CVP_5 0.19 0.05 0.43
Indep_7 0.16 0.03 0.36
FDP_6 0.16 0.06 0.29
SVP_1 0.16 0.04 0.30
FDP_4 0.16 0.02 0.45
Indep_5 0.15 0.02 0.38
FDP_2 0.13 0.01 0.31
CVP_3 0.11 0.01 0.30
SP_3 0.11 0.02 0.24
SVP_3 0.10 0.01 0.25
CVP_1 0.10 0.02 0.19
FDP_3 0.09 0.02 0.22
Indep_3 0.08 0.01 0.19
SVP_2 0.07 0.01 0.17
Note: This table presents estimates for judges’ individual
preferences based on the mixture of chair and median models
that controls for case language and uses hierarchical priors
on the judges.
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Table 1.6: Judges’ Preference Estimates, ChairModel (2007)
Judge Point Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
SP_1 0.41 0.28 0.55
CVP_4 0.36 0.26 0.48
Indep_6 0.34 0.24 0.45
SP_4 0.32 0.22 0.44
Indep_2 0.29 0.18 0.42
Indep_4 0.29 0.15 0.47
Indep_1 0.28 0.14 0.46
FDP_1 0.28 0.13 0.47
FDP_5 0.26 0.17 0.37
SP_6 0.26 0.15 0.40
SP_2 0.25 0.13 0.39
CVP_5 0.24 0.11 0.40
Indep_5 0.23 0.10 0.40
CVP_2 0.22 0.13 0.32
SP_7 0.22 0.10 0.37
Indep_7 0.21 0.10 0.37
FDP_6 0.21 0.13 0.31
SVP_1 0.21 0.12 0.32
CVP_3 0.20 0.07 0.38
SP_5 0.19 0.09 0.32
FDP_4 0.18 0.05 0.40
SVP_3 0.18 0.07 0.33
SP_3 0.16 0.07 0.26
FDP_3 0.14 0.07 0.23
CVP_1 0.13 0.07 0.21
FDP_2 0.13 0.04 0.25
Indep_3 0.12 0.06 0.19
SVP_2 0.09 0.03 0.19
Note: This table presents estimates for judges’ individual
preferences based on the chair model that controls for case
language and uses hierarchical priors on the judges.
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Table 1.7: Judges’ Preference Estimates, MedianModel (2007)
Judge Point Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
SP_1 0.49 0.31 0.78
Indep_2 0.46 0.25 0.76
SP_4 0.44 0.25 0.75
SP_6 0.41 0.18 0.71
CVP_4 0.39 0.22 0.67
SP_2 0.37 0.20 0.70
Indep_6 0.34 0.18 0.69
CVP_2 0.31 0.15 0.60
SP_5 0.31 0.11 0.61
FDP_5 0.29 0.17 0.49
Indep_4 0.28 0.13 0.53
Indep_1 0.26 0.10 0.59
SP_7 0.25 0.06 0.51
FDP_1 0.23 0.05 0.52
FDP_2 0.23 0.06 0.42
Indep_7 0.22 0.05 0.48
FDP_4 0.18 0.04 0.49
Indep_5 0.17 0.03 0.36
Indep_3 0.17 0.05 0.29
CVP_5 0.17 0.03 0.39
FDP_6 0.14 0.03 0.28
SVP_3 0.13 0.03 0.27
SVP_2 0.12 0.03 0.25
CVP_3 0.11 0.02 0.27
FDP_3 0.11 0.02 0.28
SP_3 0.10 0.02 0.24
CVP_1 0.10 0.02 0.20
SVP_1 0.10 0.02 0.22
Note: This table presents estimates for judges’ individual
preferences based on the median model that controls for case
language and uses hierarchical priors on the judges.
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Figure 1.10: Predicted Probability of Successful Appeal
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Note: This graph shows the predicted probability of successful appeal for each case under the chair model,
given the empirical compositions of the judicial panels of cases submitted during the first three quarters of
2007.
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2
Do Fewer Judges Reach Different Decisions?
Evidence from a Procedural Change in
Asylum Appeal DecisionMaking
Judith Spirig
One of many dimensions along which courts differ is panel size.Whereas some courts hear cases en banc, others do so in panels ofbetween nine and three judges or even have two or one judge(s) de-
cide cases. Fueled by pressures to organize procedures more efficiently,
one strategy adopted by policy-makers has been to reduce judicial panel
size. Yet, we have only very limited empirical evidence as to if and how
that affects judicial decisions.
This paper investigates whether the introduction of the so-called simpli-
fied procedure that effectively reduced the number of judges on a panel
from three to two in cases ‘clearly with or without merit’ led to sig-
nificantly different appeal decisions. Drawing on the experience of the
Swiss Federal Administrative Court and a dataset of all asylum appeals
that were decided in Switzerland between 2007 and 2015, I show that
fewer judges make more restrictive asylum appeal decisions. A fuzzy
regression discontinuity design approach suggests that appeals lodged
after the introduction of the new procedure and thus decided by one
judge with the consent of a second instead of a three-judge panel were
much less likely to be granted than comparable cases lodged before the
introduction of the simplified procedure. Though perhaps particularly
consequential in the field of asylum law, this finding draws attention
to the importance of decision-making procedures for the consistency of
judicial decisions more broadly.
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2.1 Introduction
The number of judges deciding a case varies dramatically across courts. Whereas
on average higher courts have larger panels or even handle cases ‘en banc’,1 there
is no standard as to how many judges this involves. In the U.S., for example,
the Supreme Court hears cases en banc, state supreme courts have between five
and nine-judge panels, courts of appeals decide most cases in panels of three (see
Halberstam 2015) and trial courts usually have single judges make decisions (see
Kornhauser and Sager 1986). In some courts, panel size also varies across cases:
there are many courts where court presidents or chief justices not only choose
which judges serve on a given panel but also how many. Others have differently
sized panels as a function of case importance or difficulty (see, e.g., Alarie and
Green 2017).
If anything, it appears that (panels of) higher courts have historically become
larger,2 while lower courts exhibit a trend toward having smaller groups of judges
make decisions. Since 2000, for example, the New Hampshire State Supreme
Court has allowed three-judge panels to decide cases “unlikely to generate legal
precedent” (Halberstam 2015, 103); since 2002, single judges (instead of three-
judge chambers) decide most cases within the civil sections of German regional
courts (§348 German Code of Civil Procedure); and in Switzerland, experts see
a trend toward an expansion of the jurisdiction of single judges (Freiburghaus
2012; Reiter 2015).
As many courts have struggled with increasing workload and a backlog of cases,3
it might come as no surprise that some have implemented a reduction in panel
size to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of decision making. Reduc-
tions in panel size appear to be particularly frequent in the context of asylum
and immigration matters, where a reduction in the duration of decision-making
processes has also been sought for further reasons: quicker decisions reduce the
1 All judges at a court decide cases together.
2 Take, for example, the U.S. (see Hessick and Jordan 2009) or the Canadian Supreme
Court (Alarie and Green 2017).
3 See, for instance, Barger (2002) or a Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC)
report about a 28% increase in the number of criminal and civil filings in U.S. federal
district courts between 1993 and 2014: http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/364/.
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time until rejected asylum seekers can be deported (see Benson 2006; Legomsky
and Rodriguez 2005; Thomas 2005), thereby also lowering incentives to lodge
frivolous claims in order to delay deportation. Such changes have taken place
in several European countries and in the U.S. While the United States Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) handled all appeals en banc until 1988, it sub-
sequently adopted a three-judge panel system and, in 1999, saw regulations
introduced that have allowed the chair of the BIA to authorize single-member
decisions for designated categories of appeals.4 In 2002, among further revi-
sions, the use of single-judge decisions was substantially expanded and became
the norm (see Legomsky and Rodriguez 2005).
In 2008, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (FAC), which decides all appeals
pertaining to asylum matters in Switzerland, experienced a similar procedural
change. As part of the partial revision of the Swiss Asylum Act that was passed
by the Swiss parliament in 2005 and affirmed in a national referendum in 2006, it
was decided that starting on January 1, 2008, the court should use a ‘simplified
procedure’ for asylum appeals that are ‘clearly with or without merit’.5 As
a consequence, since January 1, 2008, three-judge panels no longer handle all
cases that fulfill the formal requirements. Instead, cases ‘clearly with or without
merit’ are decided directly by the chair judge, with the consent of a second judge.
The focus on ‘clear-cut’ cases for smaller panels is not exceptional. Cases as-
signed to fewer judges are often those considered clear-cut, obvious, unlikely
to generate precedent and/or of less importance (see Alarie and Green 2017;
Freiburghaus 2012; Halberstam 2015; Legomsky and Rodriguez 2005). Implicitly
underlying these provisions assigning effectively less complicated or important
cases to fewer judges is the assumption that panel size potentially matters more
for more difficult and wide-ranging cases, but it does not, or at least matters
less, or with negligible consequences, for clear-cut cases.
This paper addresses the second implicit assumption and tests empirically whether
fewer judges reach different decisions, even if they do so in cases they deem
‘clearly with or without merit’. The case of the Swiss FAC asylum divisions
4 The designated cases were affirmations of appeals of immigration judges’ decisions other
than asylum appeals (see Legomsky and Rodriguez 2005).
5 See art. 111 par. 1 let. e of the Asylum Act (https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/19995092/index.html).
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lends itself to the analysis of the impact of panel size on judicial outcomes not
only because of the new decision-making procedure introduced by the revised
Swiss Asylum Act but also because of the court’s quasi-random allocation of
judges to panels and positions within panels.6 Against the backdrop of the exo-
geneity of case allocation, this institutional change is an intervention that allows
for the causal identification of the effect of a reduction in panel size on appeals’
chances to be granted. In this paper, I do so by employing a fuzzy regression
discontinuity (RD) design. Exploiting the temporal distance of appeals’ sub-
mission dates to January 1, 2008, I estimate whether comparable cases received
different decisions as a result of whether they were handled by a three-judge
panel or a single judge with the consent of a second. The appeals submitted
closest to January 1, 2008 are excluded, creating a so-called donut hole, because
the simplified procedure could also be applied retrospectively and only reached a
stable level of application after a few weeks. As a consequence of this approach, I
can directly compare the grant rate of appeals that were decided by three judges
instead of a chair judge with the consent of a second judge, simply because they
were submitted before January 1, 2008 rather than afterward.
I find that the introduction of the simplified procedure led to a 23 percentage
point decrease in the grant rate of compliers—those cases that were handled
by three judges because they were lodged before the new procedure existed but
would have been decided by a chair judge with the consent of a second judge,
had they been lodged after the introduction of the new procedure (and vice
versa). As a consequence, roughly 300 of the 1451 cases submitted in 2008 and
handled under the simplified procedure received a different decision than they
would have under the ordinary procedure. In terms of the overall grant rate, the
introduction of the simplified procedure translates into a reduction of the grant
rate of about eight percentage points.
These findings raise considerable concern about consistency in asylum appeal
decision making. Even though asylum adjudication is an area of law where
inconsistency is perhaps more likely to occur than in other areas—not only be-
6 The court’s quasi-random allocation procedure ensures the FAC’s compliance with art.
30 par. 1 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation stipulating that “[a]ny
person whose case falls to be judicially decided has the right to have their case heard
by a legally constituted, competent, independent and impartial court. Ad hoc courts are
prohibited.”
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cause asylum policy has been among the most ideologically salient issues in
recent years, but also because cases often boil down to whether a claim(ant)
is credible (see Thomas 2006)—the criterion for the application of the simpli-
fied procedure (‘clearly with or without merit’) does suggest that inconsistencies
such as the ones documented were not explicitly intended by legislators. Conse-
quently, there is ample need to know more and understand better the effects of
certain structures and procedures of judicial decision making, especially in the
context of asylum and immigration law.
This paper is structured as follows. After the existing literature on judicial
decision making is explored in the next section, Section 2.3 elaborates on the
institutional background of the FAC, thereby providing the context for the em-
pirical strategy of this study (Section 2.4). Section 2.5 presents the main finding,
followed by a series of robustness and placebo tests. Section 2.6 discusses com-
plier characteristics and possible mechanisms, before Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review andTheory
A relatively large literature investigates the impact of various parameters of
judicial decision-making processes on case outcomes. Perhaps most prominent
among them are the decision makers themselves. Several recent analyses show
that the identity of the judges that hear a case matters (see, e.g., Abrams et al.
2012; Boyd et al. 2010; Glynn and Sen 2015). Exploiting the random assignment
of cases to judges, these studies illustrate that verdicts vary in response to the
judges assigned to a case. There is some evidence that in particular the aspect
of judges’ identity that is in some way connected to or made salient by the
case (i.e., gender in sex discrimination cases or race in racial discrimination
cases) is relevant (see, e.g., Boyd et al. 2010; Kastellec 2013). Beyond ascriptive
characteristics, judges’ ideological preferences are frequently studied in terms of
their influence on judicial decisions (see, e.g., Lauderdale and Clark 2012; Law
2004; Sunstein et al. 2007). Similar to ascriptive characteristics, judges’ ideology
seems particularly important for decision making in politically salient areas of
the law such as asylum adjudication (see, e.g., Shapiro and Murphy 2011).
In the context of asylum law, several studies document rather large disparities in
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grant rates between asylum adjudicators in the U.S. and Canada (Ramji-Nogales
et al. 2007; Rehaag 2007). As shown in Chapter B 1, considerable between-
asylum judge disparities also exist at the Swiss FAC. Like the connection between
a judge’s gender and her vote in sex discrimination cases, Hangartner et al.
(2018) find that asylum judges’ party affiliations correlate with their preferred
grant rates in expected ways: whereas right-wing Swiss People’s Party judges
are on average less likely to grant appeals, judges from the left-wing Green or
Social Democratic parties are more likely to.7
Another branch of the literature perceives of judges as strategic actors that
display behavior that is best analyzed if understood, as Epstein et al. (2013,
26) put it, as “self-interested behavior [...] in a labor-market setting.” From
this perspective, it is less judges’ characteristics and ideological preferences than
their aim to maximize re-election chances (Lim et al. 2015), reduce workload,
avoid effort and increase leisure time (Epstein et al. 2013) that influences their
behavior.
Both of these perspectives on judges’ behavior inform the research on how judges
make decisions in groups. Since in many contexts judges do not decide cases in-
dividually but in panels, the literature on judgment aggregation and panel effects
analyzes how judges aggregate their individual judgments into joint panel deci-
sions and which factors influence that process. Fischman (2011), for instance,
shows that there is a ‘norm of consensus’ among U.S. federal circuit judges that
leads judges to vote against their true preferences (i.e., to agree with other judges
on the panel instead of dissent), because dissent comes with a cost. A paper by
Kastellec (2013) on the effect of having a single black judge on U.S. courts of ap-
peal’s three-judge panels documents that a panel is more likely to decide in favor
of affirmative action programs if a single black judge is present.8 These ‘panel
effects’ have not only been researched with regard to judges’ ascriptive charac-
7 In Switzerland, most judges are implicitly required to become party members (or at least
supporters), at the latest before standing for elections. One of the ideas behind this
requirement is to have a judiciary that is representative of the Swiss population in terms
of its socio-political views (see Raselli 2011). Accordingly, when electing federal judges
to courts, the Swiss parliament respects so-called voluntary party quotas (Kiener 2001)
to have the bench approximately reflect parties’ strength in the parliament. For further
information, see Raselli (2011) or Chapter B 3.
8 Boyd et al. (2010) and Farhang and Wawro (2004) find similar effects of having a woman
on panels (deciding sex discrimination cases).
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teristics, but also related to their position or role on the panel. Bonneau et al.
(2007), for instance, have shown that the majority opinion writer’s judgment is
decisive for judicial outcomes.
Even though this literature indicates that both judges’ identity and panel and
decision-making procedures matter, the impact of the size of a judicial panel on
a case’s outcome has so far received relatively little attention. Maybe this is
not surprising, because traditionally, under the assumptions of simple majority
vote and sincere voting, studying the effect of panel size on judicial outcomes
seems relatively straightforward. Applying Condorcet’s jury theorem to judicial
panel decision making, Kornhauser and Sager (1986) theorized this insight. If
we assume that i) judges are more likely than not to choose the correct outcome,
ii) vote independently and iii) in a simple majority vote, the more judges there
are on a panel, the more likely it is that the case is decided accurately.9
Yet, as seen above, insights from recent research in judicial politics and group
decision-making challenge the assumption that there are no panel effects. If
there are panel effects—some judges might have more influence than others due
to ascriptive characteristics (see Boyd et al. 2010; Kastellec 2013) or their po-
sition on the panel (Bonneau et al. 2007)—more judges might not necessarily
reach different or more accurate decisions.10 Empirical analyses of panel size
effects that could inform these debates, however, are scant.11 And, due to the
inherent difficulty in measuring the accuracy of a decision, the empirical work
studying the causal effect of panel size on the accuracy of judicial decisions stems
from an experiment: Van Dijk et al. (2014) had social science students decide
simulated criminal law cases on the basis of probabilistic evidence and show that
having groups of three rather than individuals make decisions reduces the error
9 The question whether large groups make more accurate decisions has of course also been
studied in many other contexts; see Kerr et al. (1996) and Lorenz et al. (2011) for a short
overview of the ‘wisdom of crowds’ literature.
10 Halberstam (2015), for instance, argues that larger panels at U.S. state supreme courts
reverse more cases and are more likely to be wrong.
11 There is a growing literature studying optimal panel size in courts where chair justices
can determine panel size (see, e.g., Alarie et al. 2011; George and Guthrie 2009; Hessick
and Jordan 2009), which is beyond the scope of this paper.
78
rate.12 For the same reason, observational studies focus instead on consistency
in decision making. Relying on essentially correlational evidence, Halberstam
(2015) suggests that larger panels at U.S. state high courts are more likely to
reverse lower court decisions than smaller panels. To the best of my knowledge,
there are no studies that leverage a natural experiment to analyze whether hav-
ing fewer judges on a panel has an effect on case outcomes, even though this
is crucial for understanding how different court structures and decision-making
procedures affect judicial decisions.
Applying the insights from the literature to the case of the FAC asylum divisions
yields two potential hypotheses. On the one hand, under Condorcet’s jury the-
orem, we would expect the accuracy of decisions to decrease with fewer judges.
Given that Hangartner et al. (2018) find a correlation between judges’ party
affiliation and their preferred grant rates (Chapter B 1), some decisions could
turn out more lenient and others more restrictive, but the average probability
of a case to be granted should not change (only the variation would). On the
other hand, perceiving of judges as strategic actors sheds light on changes in the
incentive structure created by the simplified procedure. In addition to effectively
allowing the chair judge to decide the case herself, decisions under the simpli-
fied procedure are generally less work intensive (a summary of reasons suffices),
especially if they are rejections (see Epstein et al. 2013).13 Since the average
grant rate of asylum appeals is relatively low—around 15% for cases submitted
in 200714—it is not surprising that cases deemed ‘clearly with merit’ are rare,
even among the more liberal judges. Accordingly, if the simplified procedure is
mainly an option for cases with a lower probability of being granted, the average
grant rate of cases could drop after the introduction of the simplified procedure
for two reasons: first, because judges deem cases ‘clearly without merit’ to re-
duce workload, and second, because judges use the new procedure in situations
in which they fear a three-judge panel decision could turn out differently. There-
fore, I hypothesize that the grant rate of asylum appeals decreases in response
12 See Lorenz et al. (2011) for experimental evidence beyond judicial group decision making.
They find that social groups make pretty accurate decisions if members have no knowledge
of one another’s individual decisions.
13 This was also revealed in a personal communication with a scribe at the court, 2014.
14 Note that this number includes cases dismissed before the substantive trial.
79
to the introduction of the simplified procedure. To contextualize this hypothesis
and pave the way for the empirical strategy, the next section delves into the
institutional background of the court and asylum appeal decision making.
2.3 Background and Data
2.3.1 Institutional Background
The case of the FAC lends itself to the analysis of the effect of panel size reduc-
tion on judicial decisions for several reasons. First, the FAC is the only court
that handles asylum appeals lodged in Switzerland. Second, it assigns appeals
quasi-randomly to judges and third, it implemented a policy change that creates
temporal variation in panel size. To lay the foundation for the empirical strategy
of this paper, I will elaborate briefly on these features below.
FAC AsylumDivisions
Established in 2007, FAC Divisions IV and V decide all appeals of federal ad-
ministrative decisions in the field of asylum law.15 Between 2007 and 2015, this
includes about 40,500 unique decisions of which by far the largest share are ap-
peals of negative or dismissive asylum application decisions. The appeals are
lodged by asylum seekers or their legal representatives against the Swiss State
Secretariat for Migration (SEM, in the case of an appeal) or the FAC (in the
case of requests for revisions). Prior to 2007, asylum appeals were decided by
the Swiss Asylum Appeals Commission (AAC) that was part of the Swiss Justice
and Police Department, as is the SEM. When asylum appeal decision making
was moved to the FAC, judges that had previously worked within the AAC had
to be confirmed by the Swiss parliament, which is responsible for the election of
15 Accordingly, not all appeals are of negative asylum decisions. Smaller shares of cases are
appeals of other asylum decisions, such as those granting subsidiary protection but not
asylum or allowing deportation to another Dublin country under the Dublin Regulation.
Collectively, these will be referred to as ‘asylum appeals’ in the remainder of the paper.
A complete list of legal matters can be found in Section A 1.A.
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judges to federal courts. Even though there is an informal requirement that fed-
eral judges need the support of a political party to get elected (see, e.g., Raselli
2011), an exception was made for asylum judges in the elections to the first FAC.
Due to their expertise, judges that had already worked as asylum judges within
the AAC were nominated and elected even if they chose not to join a party. The
two asylum divisions encompass about thirty judges, some of which have been
replaced since 2007.16 Replacement judges are also elected by the United Federal
Assembly, as are serving judges in uncompetitive retention elections every six
years.
Decision-Making Procedure
Since its establishment, the FAC has employed software specifically designed for
the court to allocate judges to panels (see Schuppisser 2007). The assignment
is conditional on a number of criteria such as the language of the first-instance
decision and judges’ language abilities (German, French or Italian, the official
Swiss languages) and whether the judge has additional functions and tasks at
the court.17
After the court’s software assigns three judges to a case—chair judge, second
judge and third judge—the chair judge receives all files from the first instance,
usually the SEM. If all formal requirements are fulfilled, the chair judge, together
with a scribe, processes the case and drafts a decision. All files, together with
the draft decision, are then forwarded to the second judge who can propose
minor or major changes and agree or disagree with all or parts of the verdict
16 Judges who left the FAC asylum divisions have done so either when they retired or to
switch to another FAC division. Over the course of the years 2007 and 2008, four judges
switched to FAC Division III that deals with public health and social policy. Through
2015, fourteen judges left the FAC asylum divisions. Replacement judges are nominated
by the parliament’s multi-party judicial commission in accordance with the respective
party factions in the parliament. Since it is an implicit goal of the selection procedure
to have the parties’ strength in the parliament reflected in the judicial body (see, e.g.,
Kiener 2001; Raselli 2011), nominated judges are usually members (or at least supporters)
of underrepresented parties at the time of election—if suitable candidates, i.e., those with
the necessary qualifications, can be found. Accordingly, the share of judges from the
initially underrepresented Swiss People’s Party (SVP), for instance, increased from three
in 2007 to six in 2015.
17 See Chapter B 1 for more details.
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and subsequently forwards everything to the third judge. The third judge goes
through the same process and returns all files to the chair judge. In case of
major disagreements, the chair judge produces a new draft, and the circulation
takes another turn. If the panel cannot reach a consensus, the final decision is
made by a simple majority vote. If the proposed changes are minor, the chair
judge produces a new draft decision, informs the second and third judges about
the adopted changes and finalizes it. This sequential, paper-based decision-
making procedure in a three-judge panel is referred to by the court as ‘ordinary
procedure’. Cases that do not fulfill all formal requirements, such as when an
advance on costs is demanded and not paid by the appellant, are dismissed
directly by the chair judge, without the involvement of any other judge. For
the purpose of this paper, I will refer to these decisions as ‘true’ single-judge
decisions.18
Institutional Change
In September 2006, Swiss voters decided on a partial revision of the Swiss Asy-
lum Act and accepted the changes the parliament had proposed. Among other
revisions—most of which went into effect on January 1, 2007—was a procedural
change in asylum appeals decision making.19 Whereas the FAC asylum divi-
sions handled all asylum appeals that chair judges considered to fulfill formal
requirements in three-judge panels in 2007, the introduction of the ‘simplified
procedure’ has allowed chair judges to invoke a shorter procedure in which they
only need the consent of a second, but not of a third, judge for cases ‘clearly with
or without merit’, since January 1, 2008 (AsylA art. 111 let. e). In addition
to the effective reduction in panel size, under the simplified procedure judges
only have to provide a summary of reasons and “may dispense with an exchange
18 A note on terminology: For the purpose of this paper, the following terms are used
interchangeably, all referring to the procedure introduced on January 1, 2008: simplified
procedure, new procedure, single+ decision. Whereas ‘true’ single-judge decision refers to
cases decided exclusively by the chair judge in a non-substantive trial, single+ decisions
are, like three-judge decisions, substantive decisions. Because both ‘true’ single-judge
decisions and single+ decisions are not panel decisions, I will also refer to them as ‘non-
panel decisions’, as opposed to panel decisions that include all decisions by three or more
(the few leading decisions are made in panels of five) judges.
19 For a list of changes in asylum law that were implemented on January 1, 2008, see Section
2.A.
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of written submissions” (AsylA art. 111a, par. 1 + 2).20 As opposed to the
ordinary procedure in which the second and third judges can propose minor or
major changes, the second judge in a case that is handled under the simplified
procedure can essentially only consent. If he disagrees either with the verdict or
the classification as ‘clear-cut’, he triggers the ordinary procedure in which the
third, previously excluded, judge is put back on the panel. According to a scribe
at the court, however, this happens very rarely.21
The idea behind this change was—as is the rationale behind many other judicial
reforms—to reduce the cost of the asylum determination procedure and shorten
the time that people who will not be allowed to remain stay in Switzerland.22
Even though the introduction of the simplified procedure for clear-cut cases was
subject to discussion in the parliament and criticized by a number of Social
Democrat and Green MPs, it was not among the most controversially discussed
changes in the public debate leading up to the referendum vote in September
2006.23
While the simplified procedure was introduced on January 1, 2008, judges were
given some leeway: it was also applicable to pending proceedings that were gen-
uinely only at the beginning of being decided. Judges were, however, discouraged
from using it for cases lodged before 2007, because, realistically, cases that were
submitted in 2006 or before could hardly be considered clear-cut, given that they
had not been decided within over a year.24 As a consequence, instead of a dis-
continuity in cases’ probability of being handled under the simplified procedure,
20 These additional provisions also apply to ‘true’ single-judge decisions. See Section 2.A in
the Appendix for the full legal text of the relevant law.
21 As revealed in personal communication, this happens in about one of fifty cases.
22 See, for example, the statement of the Social Democrat MP Maria Roth-Bernasconi in the
parliamentary debate about the partial revisions of the Swiss Asylum Act in the fall of
2005: “The goal of these dispositions is to accelerate asylum procedures, which comprise
the asylum appeal procedure, and to reduce the duration of stay of people who are not
recognized as refugees.” (Originally in French: “Ces dispositions ont pour but d’accéleérer
les procédures d’asile y compris durant la procédure de recours, et de réduire la durée
de séjour des personnes qui ne sont pas reconnues en tant que réfugiés.”) See https://www.
parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=9387.
23 See, for instance, the list of revisions that Amnesty International was most op-
posed to at https://www.amnesty.ch/de/laender/europa-zentralasien/schweiz/asylsuchende/
asylgesetzrevision2006/asylgesetzrevision.
24 Personal communication with a scribe at the court, 2014.
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Figure 2.1: Share of Non-Panel Procedure byWeek of Appeal Submission (First Stage)
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Note: The upper graph displays the probability of cases lodged in a given week to be decided under a non-panel
procedure (‘true’ single judge or single judge with the consent of a second (single+ decisions)). The lower graph
focuses on substantive decisions (‘true’ single-judge decisions were dropped from the analysis) and displays the
probability of substantively tried cases lodged in a given week to be decided under the simplified procedure. The
lines in both graphs indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dots in gray represent the disregarded observations
within the donut hole.
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the ‘treatment’ probability starts increasing before January 1, 2008 and only be-
comes relatively stable in March 2008 (see Figure 2.1). This phasing-in provides
a challenge to estimating the effect of the institutional change on the probability
of an appeal’s being granted, because it blurs the discontinuity needed in RD
designs: Rather than a jump in the probability of treatment assignment on the
day of the introduction of the simplified procedure, there is a continuous increase
between late 2007 and early 2008. To deal with this challenge, I will employ a
so-called donut hole approach, as discussed in greater depth in Section 2.4.
2.3.2 Data
To analyze the effect of the simplified procedure on asylum appeal decisions, I
draw on a dataset that covers all decisions in asylum matters by Divisions IV
and V at the FAC between 2007 and 2015. The dataset was obtained from the
FAC and contains information as to which judges decided a case, the country of
origin of the appellant, the appeal submission and decision dates, the verdict, the
legal matter and the procedure applied (‘true’ single-judge decision, simplified
procedure (single+ decisions), ordinary procedure (panel decisions)). About
two thirds of all decisions are published and publicly available on the court’s web
page. For these decisions, it was possible to expand the dataset, for example with
the date of reception of the first-instance decision. All decisions are handled and
written in one of the three official Swiss languages, German, French or Italian.
The language of the decision is generally determined by the language used in
the first-instance decision and cannot be determined by the judge. Because not
all judges speak all three languages, case language is one of the variables that
influences the assignment of judges to cases.
The main outcome of interest—the verdict—is coded as ‘granted’ or ‘rejected’.
Partly granted appeals are considered ‘granted’ rather than ‘rejected’ because
they potentially bring about an improvement for the appellant. For most of
the analyses, appeals that are dismissed by the chair judge in a single-judge
procedure ‘without entering into the substance of a case’ (i.e., are not tried
substantively) are considered ‘rejected’. To study the effect of the introduction of
the simplified procedure, I combine both ‘true’ single-judge decisions and single+
decisions, as opposed to panel decisions, because these are both procedures in
85
which the chair judge is explicitly in charge. However, as a robustness test (see
Section 2.B.2), I drop all cases that were decided by a ‘true’ single judge and
therefore did not receive a substantive trial, and focus entirely on substantively
decided cases for the analysis. Cases that were ‘written off’ by the chair judge are
disregarded altogether, because they are arguably neither against nor in favor of
the appellant. Of the cases submitted in 2007 and 2008 that inform the analysis
in this paper, 1,179 were written off, 3,981 were rejected, 1,897 were dismissed,
931 were granted and about 100 received ‘another’ decision (i.e., their file was
forwarded to the correct addressee). 1,596 were handled under the simplified
procedure, 3,064 by a ‘true’ single judge, 3,407 by a panel of three and 24 by a
panel of five judges.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Identification
The co-occurrence of several institutional features at the FAC discussed above
allows for the identification of the causal effect of the simplified procedure on
appeals’ grant rate with a fuzzy RD design that facilitate the identification of
causal effects in settings, in which a ‘treatment’ is assigned according to an
observable variable (the running variable) that is unconnected to the outcome
in the vicinity of a threshold (see Cattaneo et al. 2018a; Imbens and Lemieux
2008). In a sharp RD setting, the probability of a unit to be assigned to the
treatment group jumps from zero to one at a quasi-random value of the running
variable, whereas in a fuzzy RD, it is sufficient if the probability jumps at all,
even if not from zero to one (Van der Klaauw 2002). The continuous inflow of
appeals, the exogenously determined assignment of judges onto panels and the
comparatively sudden introduction of the simplified procedure for cases ‘clearly
with or without merit’ pave the way for a temporal fuzzy RD with distance
(in days) to the threshold (the cutoff date of January 1, 2008) as the running
variable, the non-panel procedure as the treatment and a case’s verdict as the
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outcome.25
As Figure 2.1 shows, the probability of a case to be assigned to the treatment
group (non-panel procedure) increased rather continuously than discontinuously
around the cutoff date (January 1, 2008). Since chair judges were also allowed to
apply the simplified procedure to appeals that had been lodged before January 1,
2008, some cases were, even though lodged earlier, handled under the simplified
procedure. In addition, the continuation of the increase in the probability of
treatment assignment after the cutoff date also suggests that judges needed some
time to get accustomed to the new procedure.26 This continuity around the
cutoff date presents a challenge for the fuzzy RD approach because it leads to a
relatively weak identification and violates the assumption that the expectation of
treatment assignment probability at the cutoff date differs depending on whether
it is approached from the left- or the right-hand side (see, e.g., Cattaneo et al.
2018b). Thus, to deal with this challenge, I apply the donut hole approach
discussed in Eggers et al. (2018) and applied in Almond and Doyle (2011) and
Barreca et al. (2011). The donut hole approach disregards observations directly
around the threshold, thereby leaving a donut hole around it. As elaborated
in more detail in Section 2.4.2, this approach addresses the phasing-in of the
new procedure and at the same time brings about a discontinuity, which is one
of the main conditions for a fuzzy RD. The benefit of the proposed strategy is
twofold. First, in contrast to other studies, I can directly compare how similar
appeals are decided under different procedures and therefore do not have to rely
on different courts that decide not only in differently sized panels, but might
also differ in terms of the cases they hear. Second, not only the cases, but also
the decision makers remain the same, allowing for a comparison of the behavior
of the same judges under different procedures. The next section will briefly
elaborate on the donut hole approach, after which I will delve into testing the
essential assumptions underlying the fuzzy RD design to support the validity of
my research design.
25 Note that the non-panel procedure includes both cases handled by a ‘true’ single judge and
those handled by a single judge with the consent of a second (the simplified procedure).
26 It is a consequence of the phasing-in of the simplified procedure that there is no clear
discontinuity at the threshold.
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2.4.2 Donut Hole Approach
The donut hole approach is essential for the identification of the effect of the
simplified procedure on asylum appeals’ grant rate, but also introduces some
challenges of its own. The main downside of the donut hole is the resulting lack
of observations directly around the cutoff date, which not only necessitates more
extrapolation (Eggers et al. 2018), but also increases the potential for a violation
of the continuity assumption that is necessary to ensure that cases on either side
Figure 2.2:Donut Hole Selection
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Note: The first graph (left) shows predicted probabilities for being handled under a non-panel procedure based
on date of appeal submission, using a spline regression. The second graph (right) displays the first derivatives
of the predicted probabilities on the left. The gray dots indicate the period between the maximum in the second
derivative in the year 2007 and the minimum in the second derivative in the year 2008—where the increase
in the probability of being handled under a non-panel procedure changed disproportionately around the cutoff
date (between −47 days and +78 days from January 1, 2008).
of the cutoff date are comparable. I address these concerns in three ways. First,
I propose a strategy that estimates the optimal size of the donut hole in a data-
driven way. As the lower graph in Figure 2.1 shows, the share of cases handled
under the simplified procedure is relatively stable for cases submitted during
most of the years 2007 and 2008, with the exception of those that were submitted
in the vicinity of January 1, 2008. To identify the period during which the
probability of a case’s assignment to the treatment group (non-panel decisions)
changes disproportionately, I use a spline regression to predict daily probabilities
of treatment assignment for each day between January 1, 2007 and December
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31, 2008 and take the maximum of the second derivative of the spline function in
the year 2007 and the minimum in the year 2008 to identify the ‘change points’,
as displayed in Figure 2.2. To further illustrate that the identified optimal donut
Figure 2.3:Histograms of Standard Deviation and Increase in Predicted Treatment Assignment
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Note: Histograms of the standard deviation of (left) and the increase in (right) predicted probabilities of being
handled under a non-panel procedure within windows of 125 days (the size of the optimal donut hole suggested
by the change points). Increase was calculated based on the difference in the predicted treatment assignment
of the first and the last appeal submission date in the window. The gray line indicates the position of the
optimal donut hole.
hole captures the period during which the probability of treatment assignment
changes disproportionately, I calculate the standard deviation of and increase in
the predicted treatment assignment probabilities from above within all windows
of equal size as the optimal donut hole (125 days) between January 1, 2007
and December 31, 2008 and compare the distribution of these statistics to those
of the optimal donut hole. As Figure 2.3 indicates, the optimal donut hole
indeed captures a window with disproportionate dispersion of daily treatment
assignment probabilities.
Second, as discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.3, I perform covariate balance
tests to explore the validity of the continuity assumption across the donut hole,
and, in addition, on either end of it (see Section 2.B.1 for the latter). Finally, I
include a sensitivity analysis not only of the window (bandwidth) that I use for
the fuzzy RD, but also of the size of the donut hole (see Section 2.5.1).
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2.4.3 Sorting and Continuity Assumption
One crucial assumption in order for the fuzzy RD to be valid is that there is no
sorting around the cutoff date, i.e., that appellants cannot strategically endeavor
to have their appeals handled before or after the introduction of the simplified
procedure. Even though there is relatively little space for appellants to sort
around the cutoff date due to strict closing dates for appeal submission,27 I
provide three sets of evidence suggesting that there is no strategic sorting.
First, I graphically illustrate that the variation in the number of appeals lodged
around the cutoff date is not out of the ordinary (lower graph in Figure 2.4). Sec-
ond, I show that the average duration between first-instance decision reception
and appeal submission on either side of the cutoff date is similar (upper graph
in Figure 2.4). If appellants sorted around the cutoff date, we would expect to
see that, on average, they take more or less time to lodge an appeal after having
received a first-instance decision. If they anticipated that the introduction of the
simplified procedure leads to lower grant rates, we should see a shorter duration
between first-instance decision and appeal submission before January 1, 2008.
Yet, as Figure 2.4 shows, the number of appeals received at the beginning of Jan-
uary 2008 is slightly lower—as we would expect due to the lack of first-instance
decisions over the Christmas and New Year holiday period—, but not different
from other years.
Finally, I conduct the McCrary (2008) density test, one of the standard tests in
RDs to check for manipulation of the running variable and find that the density
of the running variable (appeal submission date) prior to the cutoff date is not
significantly different from that afterward (McCrary test statistic of −0.12, with
a p-value of .9).28
A second crucial assumption in order for the estimation to be valid is that cases
on either side of the cutoff date are continuous in terms of all unobservable
27 Depending on the first-instance decision—more time is given to appeal substantive deci-
sions than dismissals ‘without entering into the substance of the case’—asylum seekers
have to lodge appeals within a period that is relatively short (between five working days
and thirty calendar days). There are appeals that are accepted after a longer period,
many of which were lodged by asylum seekers who are still in their countries of origin and
had claimed asylum through a Swiss embassy abroad.
28 As in the fuzzy RD estimation, I set the bandwidth to 365 days.
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Figure 2.4: Frequency and Average Submission Duration Distribution
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Note: The first graph (above) displays weekly averages of the number of days that passed between reception
of the first-instance decision and appeal submission, with 95% confidence intervals. Note that this information
exists only for cases that received a substantive trial (i.e., not for cases decided by a ‘true’ single judge). The
second graph (below) presents weekly numbers of lodged appeals (all cases). The red dashed line denotes the
cutoff date (January 1, 2008), and the black dashed lines denote January 1 in subsequent years. The gray
colored areas are those within the donut hole.
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factors (Hahn et al. 2001). The most important (unobservable) factor that has
to be continuous in order for this study to be valid is the merit of appeals. If, for
some reason, appeals that are lodged after January 1, 2008 generally have lower
merit and are less likely to be granted than cases lodged in 2007, this assumption
would be violated. Even though there is no straightforward relationship between
the date of appeal submission and a case’s merit,29 case characteristics change
over time, for a variety of reasons: The situations in asylum seekers’ countries
of origin may change over time, as might the first instance’s decision making.
In any event, if the average merit of cases suddenly changed between 2007 and
2008, it would bias the results. In the absence of a direct measure for a case’s
merit, an indirect test of the continuity assumption is to look at whether the
distribution of observable covariates is continuous around the cutoff date. The
covariates that are most closely related to the merit of a case and that are not
endogenous to the decision-making procedure are appellants’ countries of origin.
To test whether countries of origin are balanced across the cutoff date, I create
binary indicators for all countries of origin of appellants who lodged cases in
2007 and 2008 and use them as outcomes in the same specification as the one
employed in the main fuzzy RD analysis—including the donut hole—instead
of the dummy for whether a case was granted (see, e.g., Eggers et al. 2018).
In addition, I perform the same analysis for the legal matter of a case. The
results of both analyses are displayed in Figure 2.5. Both graphs in Figure
2.5 present the distributions of p-values that indicate the probability that a
particular covariate (country of origin or legal matter) is unbalanced across the
cutoff date. If covariates were truly randomized, the p-values would have a
uniform distribution, and we would therefore see them follow the dashed diagonal
lines. Even though the p-values in the graphs do not exactly follow the dashed
line, they approximate it and suggest only slight imbalances. Accordingly, to
address potentially remaining imbalances, I also estimate a version of the main
29 Note that in many other (fuzzy) RDs, that is the case. Studies that look at awards or
scholarships assigned based on school test scores (see, for example, Van der Klaauw (2002),
or Lee and Lemieux (2010) for an overview) and their effect on educational outcomes or
enrollment, for example, have to deal with a clear trend: all else being equal, better test
scores are related to better school performance. Accordingly, a very narrow bandwidth
around the threshold is critical in order to be able to compare treatment and control
groups and not to violate the assumption that treatment is as-good-as randomly assigned
in the vicinity of the threshold.
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Figure 2.5:Covariate Continuity
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fuzzy RD that includes controls for appellants’ countries of origin and the legal
matters of cases. As the estimates from Model (2) in Table 2.1 show, the results
are very robust to controlling for both covariates.
As a consequence of the donut hole approach, in addition to the assumption
that cases are continuous in their merit across the cutoff date, I also need to
assume that the continuity assumption holds across both ends of the donut hole,
to ensure that the extrapolations to the cutoff date are valid. To address this
additional assumption, I perform the same balance tests for the same covariates
not only across the donut hole, but also on either end of it. As Figure 2.9 in
Section 2.B.1 in the Appendix illustrates, observable covariates (legal matter
and country of origin) are balanced across both donut hole ends. In sum, these
indirect tests of the continuity assumption lend credibility to the validity of the
fuzzy RD approach with a donut hole around the cutoff date.
2.4.4 Estimation
In order not to have to make assumptions about the functional form of the re-
gressions for both the relationship between the running variable and treatment
assignment (decided by fewer than three judges), as well as between treatment
assignment and outcome (probability of a case to be granted), I use local lin-
ear regressions to estimate the causal effect of the introduction of the simplified
procedure on cases’ grant probability.30 Since the fuzzy RD can be reframed as
an intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis—in which the cutoff date is used to instru-
ment for the treatment—I will present separate estimates for the first stage (the
increase in the probability to receive the treatment at the cutoff date), the ITT
effect (the effect of the introduction of the simplified procedure on the average
grant rate) and the local average treatment effect (LATE) for compliers; in other
words, the causal effect of the introduction of the simplified procedure on the
grant rate of cases that are decided under a non-panel procedure, if lodged after
30 In comparison to other semi-parametric regression approaches (e.g., kernel regression),
local linear regression has the advantage that it does better at estimating the boundary
points. This is crucial in an RD design, since the treatment effect is estimated based on
the difference between two boundary points. In RDs with a continuous running variable,
the local linear regression design estimator has become the standard estimator (see, e.g.,
Cattaneo et al. 2018b; Li and Racine 2007).
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the cutoff date, but would be decided under the ordinary procedure, if lodged
before the cutoff date. Note that in all specifications, I include two covariates:
the case’s chair judge and language. I do so because assignment to the sim-
plified procedure (‘treatment assignment’) is quasi-random near the cutoff date
only conditional on the chair judge and, indirectly, the language of a case, be-
cause the chair judge determines treatment assignment on the case level and
case language influences the allocation of judges to cases (see, e.g., Eggers et al.
2018).
2.5 Results
For the main results, I estimate the first stage, ITT and LATE for compliers
effects based on a sample of 5,564 asylum appeals that were lodged between
January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008, disregarding those submitted within the
optimal donut hole specified in the previous section (between November 15, 2007
and March 19, 2008). As Figure 2.7 in Section 2.5.1 shows, the point estimates
of these effects are reasonably insensitive to different bandwidths and donut hole
sizes. Note that all specifications include controls for the chair judge and the case
language, as discussed in the previous section. In a second specification (Model
2 in column 2 of Table 2.1), I additionally employ controls for the appellant’s
country of origin and the legal matter of the case.
I begin by investigating the first stage, i.e., the relationship between an appeal’s
submission date and its probability of being decided under a non-panel proce-
dure. The first stage is crucial for a valid fuzzy RD because it ensures that there
is a discontinuity in terms of the application of the non-panel procedure that
can be exploited. As Figure 2.1 shows, there is a clear pattern of a case’s prob-
ability of being handled under a non-panel procedure. The first stage regression
confirms this visual: regressing an indicator for non-panel procedure on a case’s
distance (in days) to the cutoff date (the instrument), interacted with a binary
indicator for before/after the cutoff date, I find that the probability of being
assigned to a non-panel procedure increases by about 40 percentage points on
January 1, 2008 (see Row 1 in Table 2.1). An F -Test confirms the strength of
the first stage: testing against the null hypothesis that cutoff distance had no
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effect on the probability of treatment assignment, reveals an F -Test statistic of
over 80, which can be considered very strong (see Feir et al. 2016).31
Table 2.1:ResultsMain Speciﬁcation
Dependent variable:
granted
Fuzzy Donut Hole RD
Model Model
(1) (2)
First Stage 0.401 (0.044) 0.400 (0.040)
ITT -0.079 (0.033) -0.080 (0.030)
LATE -0.235 (0.090) -0.240 (0.090)
Chair Judge ✓ ✓
Case Language ✓ ✓
Country of Origin ✓
Legal Matter ✓
Optimal Donut Hole ✓ ✓
First Stage F -Test Stat 82.48 89.25
Observations 5,564 5,564
Note: This table presents the results for the main specification with a
donut hole between −47 und +78 days around January 1, 2008. The
bandwidth is 365 days on either side of the cutoff date. Both models
include controls for chair judge and decision language and have clus-
tered standard errors (in brackets) on the chair judge level. Model (2)
additionally includes controls for the appellant’s country of origin and
the legal matter of the case.
In a second step, I estimate the ITT effect by instrumenting for the non-panel
procedure with the cutoff date. The ITT measures the impact of the introduction
of the simplified procedure on the average grant rate of all cases, not only the
compliers. As column 2 in Table 2.1 shows, there is a substantial and statistically
significant negative effect of the simplified procedure on the grant rate, which
31 As displayed in Table 2.3 in Section 2.B.2 of the Appendix, the first stage is even stronger
when focusing exclusively on cases that received a substantive trial.
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is reduced by about eight percentage points. Figure 2.6 illustrates this effect
graphically.
Figure 2.6: Intention-to-Treat Effect
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Note: The graph displays the ITT effect for the main specification with a donut hole between −47 and +78
days around January 1, 2008 and a bandwidth of 365 days. The lines are fitted with loess.
Finally, by dividing the ITT effect by the share of compliers—i.e., the first
stage—I get the complier average treatment effect.32 In other words, the cutoff
date (January 1, 2008) is used to instrument for treatment assignment in a two-
stage least squares regression. The result is displayed in row 3 of Table 2.1. Cases
that are decided under a non-panel procedure as a result of their submission date
(i.e., the simplified procedure) are about 23 percentage points less likely to be
granted than comparable cases that were decided by three-judge panels. Since
the share of appeals that were submitted in 2008 and were granted under the
32 Also referred to as the LATE for compliers.
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simplified procedure is below 5%, this constitutes a dramatic reduction in the
average grant rate of compliers.
In sum, these results document a large negative effect of the simplified procedure—
having one judge with the consent of a second judge decide a case—on a case’s
probability of being granted. In contrast to the expectation that the grant rate
is not affected by a reduction in panel size, they provide evidence of a significant
decline. And, as the next section indicates, they are also robust to sensitivity
checks and a placebo test.
2.5.1 Robustness
The main results presented above are fairly robust to bandwidth choice and
donut hole size, especially with regard to the point estimates. The graph on the
left-hand side of Figure 2.7 shows both point estimates and confidence intervals
for bandwidths between 90 and 365 days around the cutoff date. The point
estimate is always negative and relatively stable between a bandwidth of 200
and 365 days. In terms of significance, as expected, power declines with band-
width and fewer observations: the smaller the sample, the larger the confidence
intervals.
The right-hand side graph in Figure 2.7 depicts the point estimates and con-
fidence intervals for different sizes of the donut hole around the cutoff date.
Realistically, if there is no discontinuity in treatment assignment probability
around the cutoff date (for very small or inexistent donut holes), the LATE for
compliers point estimates are small and insignificant. However, with an increas-
ing donut hole size and a consequently stronger first stage, the point estimates
become relatively stable.
A second test of the validity of the findings is a placebo test. The placebo test
puts the findings into perspective by asking how likely I am to find similar results
if we pretend that the policy change took place on another day. Thus, it tests for
whether the results are likely to have occurred by chance and not because of the
policy change itself. I implement this placebo test by taking the first day of each
month between March 1, 2008 (toward the end of the donut hole) and January
1, 2015 as the placebo cutoff date and estimate both the first stage effect and
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Figure 2.7: Sensitivity Check: Different Bandwidths andDonut Holes
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Note: These graphs display LATE point estimates for compliers for different bandwidths (left) and differently
sized donut holes (right). On the left, the donut hole remains fixed between −47 and +78 days around the
cutoff date, as in the main specification. On the right, the bandwidth remains fixed at 365 days, as in the
main specification. The light gray shade represents 95% confidence bands, and the dark gray shade denotes
90% confidence bands. For all estimates, I include controls for chair judge and decision language and cluster
standard errors on the chair judge level.
the ITT effect and compare them with the estimates based on the actual cutoff
date.33
Figure 2.8 presents histograms for the distribution of the first stage and ITT
effect point estimates for all placebo cutoff dates. They illustrate that both the
first stage effect based on the actual cutoff date (left graph, two-sided empirical
p-value of .01) and the ITT effect point estimate based on the actual cutoff date
(right graph, two-sided empirical p-value of .08) are exceptionally large.
To sum up, both the sensitivity checks and the placebo tests provide support for
the credibility of the main results.
33 I focus on ITT and first stage, and not the LATE for compliers, because without a first
stage, the LATE for compliers is invalid.
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Figure 2.8: Placebo Test: Point Estimate Distributions
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Note: These graphs illustrate the distribution of the first stage effect of cutoff distance on the application of
the simplified procedure (left) and the ITT effect of the introduction of the simplified procedure on a case’s
probability of being granted (right) based on the first day of each month between March 2008 and January
2015 as placebo cutoff date. The gray lines represent the corresponding estimates for the actual cutoff date
(January 1, 2008).
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Complier Characteristics
While the ITT effect provides an estimate of the causal effect of the introduction
of the simplified procedure on the average probability of all cases to be granted,
this does not mean that the introduction of the new procedure had a direct ef-
fect on all cases’ probability of being granted. Rather, it has a direct impact
on compliers, but not on those cases that were handled under a non-panel pro-
cedure no matter when they were lodged (the so-called always-takers, mostly
‘true’ single-judge decisions) or those cases that were handled by three judges,
irrespective of when they were lodged (so-called never-takers).34 Accordingly,
(only) about 40% of cases—the proportion of compliers as indicated by the first
stage—are directly affected by the introduction of the new procedure.
34 Note that the specification (in the Appendix) that disregards all cases without a substan-
tive decision (those decided by ‘true’ single judges) is a case of one-sided non-compliance,
with almost no always-takers. In this case, we have a situation where the LATE for
compliers is also the average causal effect on the treated.
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To understand better what is different about the cases that experience a decline
in the probability of being granted as a consequence of the new procedure, I draw
on Abadie’s (2003) kappa-weighting scheme as outlined in Angrist and Pischke
(2008). This scheme allows me to compute the mean of the distribution of a
given covariate for compliers, always- and never-takers, to the effect that I can
profile each group with regard to which cases are more likely to be assigned to
it. The results of the profiling are shown in columns (1)-(3) of Table 2.2.
Table 2.2:Complier Characteristics
Compliers Always-Takers Never-Takers All
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Nigeria 0.22 0.07 0.02 0.11
Serbia 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09
Iraq 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.07
Sri Lanka 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.05
Turkey 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05
country missing 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.04
Afghanistan 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04
Ethiopia 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04
DRC 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Eritrea 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03
Asylum & Return 0.24 0.44 0.61 0.42
Dismissal & Return 0.64 0.26 0.14 0.37
Non-Partisan 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.22
FDP 0.19 0.28 0.16 0.20
CVP 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.19
SP 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.19
SVP 0.17 0.21 0.11 0.16
GPS 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03
Note: This table provides information about the compliers. Columns (1)-(4) provide the
share of cases with a given characteristic among compliers (1), never-takers (2), always-
takers (3) and all cases (4). Calculations for columns (1)-(3) are using Abadie’s 2003
kappa-weighting scheme as laid out in Angrist and Pischke (2008). Parties: CVP = cen-
trist Christian Democratic Party, GPS = left-wing Green Party, non-partisan = judges
without party affiliation, SVP = Swiss People’s Party, FDP = center-right Free Demo-
cratic Party, SP = left-wing Social Democratic Party.
As displayed in column (1) of Table 2.2, non-partisan chair judges and chair
judges from the centrist Christian Democratic Party (CVP) are more likely to
handle compliers (i.e., are more likely to invoke the simplified procedure) than
judges affiliated with the left-wing Social Democratic Party (SP). While CVP
judges handled 19% of all cases, they handled 22% of compliers, a larger relative
share than SP judges, who decided 19% of all cases, but only 14% of compliers.
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A case that is decided by at least three judges no matter when it was submitted
(never-taker), however, is most likely handled by an SP judge, and a case that is
always decided by fewer than three judges (always-taker, i.e., mostly ‘true’ single-
judge decisions) is most likely handled by a judge affiliated with the center-right
Free Democratic Party (FDP).
The cases that chair judges are most likely to handle under the simplified pro-
cedure are those lodged by asylum seekers from Nigeria and those appealing
dismissive asylum applications decisions. More specifically with regard to ap-
pellants’ countries of origin, Table 2.2 shows while appeals from Nigerians make
11% of all cases submitted in 2007 and 2008 (with the exception of the period
in the donut hole), they make up 22% of the compliers. In reverse, appeals
lodged by appellants from Afghanistan are less likely to be among the compliers
than among those cases always decided by three judges (never-takers). Similarly,
the average share of appeals of first-instance asylum application dismissals (Dis-
missal & Return) is 37%, but it is much larger among compliers (64%). In other
words, appeals of first-instance dismissals are much more likely to be handled
under the simplified procedure than appeals of negative substantive first-instance
decisions (Asylum & Return).
Taken together, the results in Table 2.2 suggest that cases from Nigeria, cases
that appeal first-instance dismissals and those handled by non-partisan or Chris-
tian Democratic (CVP) judges are those most likely to be affected by the intro-
duction of the simplified procedure. What does that tell us about why judges
reject more cases under the simplified procedure than the ordinary procedure?
2.6.2 Interpretation
Several aspects discussed in Section 2.2 might be relevant to an explanation
as to what causes the negative effect of the simplified procedure on a case’s
probability of being granted. First of all, previous research has shown that
judges’ individual preferences matter.35 Focusing on judges’ party affiliation, the
shares in columns (1)-(4) of Table 2.2 provide suggestive evidence that judges’
preferences might partly be responsible for the negative effect of the introduction
35 Specifically for the case of the FAC asylum divisions, see Chapter B 1.
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of the simplified procedure on cases’ grant rate: While judges from the left-wing
Social Democratic Party (SP) handle a relatively larger share of never-takers,
those cases that are decided by three-judge panels and have on average the
longest duration and the highest grant rate (compared to compliers and always-
takers), non-partisan and CVP judges decide relatively larger shares of cases
under the simplified procedure, compared to both SVP and SP judges. This
pattern correlates with party preferences in expected ways (see Chapter B 1)
and provides an insight into the incentives created by the introduction of the
new procedure: judges with a preference for lower grant rates could use the
simplified procedure as an opportunity to reject more appeals, with less potential
opposition.
Yet, if judges’ individual preferences play a role, why do left-wing judges not
invoke the simplified procedure and grant cases ‘clearly with merit’? Drawing
on the literature that perceives of judges as strategic actors sheds light on why
judges might reject more cases as a result of the introduction of the simplified
procedure, even in the absence of a preference for a lower grant rate. As discussed
in Section 2.2, one benefit from employing the simplified procedure is a reduction
in workload: judges only have to provide a summary of reasons for the decision
and may dispense with an exchange of written submissions. The reduction in
workload is larger for rejections, because they mean lower costs in terms of time
commitment and effort (Epstein et al. 2013; Halberstam 2015). In addition,
given the relatively low average grant rate (about 15% for cases submitted in
2007) a case is, in expectation, always more likely to be rejected than granted.
Accordingly, a chair judge can expect the second judge to affirm a rejection,
but potentially look very closely through a case deemed ‘clearly with merit’.
The fact that only very few cases are considered ‘clearly with merit’ and thus
granted under the simplified procedure—even by left-wing judges—implies that
either only very few cases are in fact clearly with merit and/or that it is extremely
difficult to get consent from a second judge to grant such an appeal. In either
case, if workload reduction is desired by judges, it seems that rejecting cases
under the simplified procedure is the only possibility.
A particular feature of the court’s institutional structure might also be at play
in this phenomenon. The court’s software that assigns judges onto panels and
positions within panels quasi-randomly does not take into consideration the dif-
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ficulty or complexity of a case. However, if some judges start deciding more
cases under the simplified procedure, which is by definition less work intensive,
workload imbalance across judges increases. Those judges that make use of the
ordinary procedure more often create comparably more work for themselves and
for other judges, because the third judge is not taken off those cases. This could
create pressure on all judges to apply the simplified procedure more often.
Considering all its effects, the introduction of the simplified procedure might
have facilitated the expression of some judges’ preference for a lower grant rate
by effectively letting chair judges decide substantively tried cases on their own.
At the same time, given that cases are on average much more likely to be rejected
than granted and judges aim for (relative) workload reduction, the new procedure
created incentives to reject more appeals for all judges.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of an institutional change in judicial decision
making on appeal outcomes. The change—a shorter procedure with fewer judges
to decide cases ‘clearly with or without merit’—was included in the partial re-
vision of the Swiss Asylum Law to increase efficiency and reduce cost, without
affecting the accuracy of decisions. By having the chair judge decide whether a
case is clear-cut and can therefore be decided by her with the consent of only
a second judge, rather than in a three-judge panel, cases can be decided faster
and with the involvement of fewer judges. The focus on cases ‘clearly with or
without merit’ thereby implies that, for cases’ outcomes, it should not matter
under which procedure they are decided: because those handled under the new
procedure are necessarily clear-cut, whether a chair judge decides it with the
consent of a second judge or a panel of three judges handles it, should not lead
to different outcomes.
Yet, as this paper shows, there is an effect of having two instead of three judges
decide an asylum appeal: as a result of the introduction of the simplified pro-
cedure on January 1, 2008, the average probability of an asylum appeal to be
granted, declined by about eight percentage points (ITT effect). Since neither
cases that were decided by a three-judge panel nor cases that were handled by
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a single chair judge in a non-substantive trial, regardless of whether they were
submitted before or after the introduction of the new procedure, were affected
by it, the change in the average grant rate does not give the full picture. In fact,
for those cases that were handled under a different procedure simply because
they were submitted shortly before or after January 1, 2008, the effect is much
larger: among the compliers, the simplified procedure led to an erosion of the
grant rate, which was reduced by 23 percentage points.
The cases affected by the new procedure (the compliers) are a particular subset
of asylum appeals. Those lodged by appellants from Nigeria and against first-
instance asylum application dismissals are much more likely to be among com-
pliers, especially if handled by judges from center, center-right and right-wing
parties. These complier characteristics point to a potential mechanism: the new
procedure is used by all judges to reduce (relative) workload, but arguably more
so by judges with a preference for a lower grant rate.
These findings raise serious concerns about consistency in asylum appeal deci-
sion making. Comparable cases had significantly different chances to be granted,
simply as a result of whether they were handled under the ordinary or the simpli-
fied procedure. Although asylum adjudication is an area in which inconsistencies
are perhaps more expected than in other areas of the law, the focus on clear-
cut cases implies that no effects are to be expected. While consistency is an
important quality of judicial decisions per se, the lack thereof can be particu-
larly consequential in asylum matters. If we take inconsistency to mean that
some cases are not decided correctly, the findings of this paper suggest that a
substantial share of compliers—among them many appeals of dismissive asylum
decisions that, if enforced, oblige asylum seekers to leave Switzerland—received
an inaccurate decision. Thus, they highlight the need for a closer look at the
accuracy of asylum appeal decisions in Switzerland, but, given the dearth of em-
pirical evidence on this issue more broadly, they are also valueable for research
on the effect of judicial panel size in other contexts and countries.
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Appendix
2.A 2005 Asylum Law Revision
The 2005 partial revision of the Swiss Asylum Act that included the introduction
of the simplified procedure also led to a number of other changes to Swiss asylum
law. Most of them, however, were implemented on January 1, 2007 and/or did
not concern factors that could affect the distribution of cases at the FAC, which
would be a potential threat to identification. According to the implementation
provisions of the partial revision of the Asylum Act of December 16, 2005, “The
[...] implementation provisions of the partial revision of AsylA, which will come
into force on January 1, 2008, mainly pertain to the implementation of the
procedural, administrative and financially relevant regulations.”36 Note also that
the Dublin Regulation was only implemented on December 12, 2008.
Changes in the field of procedures and return:
- The financial responsibility of the Confederation for social assistance is
limited to seven years
- New description of the reasonableness of return
- New third-country regulations (easier to return people to safe third coun-
tries, replacement of precautionary return with a final decision of inadmis-
sibility)
- The complete asylum procedure can now also be implemented at the air-
port
- The Federal Council shall regulate the access to legal advice and legal
representation at reception and processing centers and airports.
- The Federal Office for Migration (now: SEM) shall interview all asylum
seekers
- The Confederation shall provide return assistance
36 See the provisions at https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/migration/rechtsgrundlagen/
gesetzgebung/asylg-aug/20070328_ber_vvwaasylv-d.pdf. For an exhaustive list of changes
(not only those coming into force on January 1, 2008), see https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/
data/sem/asyl/asylgesetz/teilrevision_asylgesetz/ausbildungsunterlagen/handout_asylgesetz-d.pdf or
https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/aktuell/gesetzgebung/archiv/teilrev_asylg.html
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- New regulations with regard to the accommodation in subsidiary facilities
in extraordinary situations
Changes in the field of financing:
- New regulations regarding the financing system between cantons and the
federal government
- Social benefits must be refused if the asylum seeker received a negative
asylum decision
- Asylum seekers and persons in need of protection without a residence per-
mit who are gainfully employed must pay a special charge to cover the
overall costs of the asylum procedure generated by them
The full legal text of the simplified procedure (single+ decision) is the following,
of which letter e was implemented on January 1, 2008, as part of the partial
revision of the Asylum Act:
Art. 111 Competence of a single judge
The following cases may be heard by a single judge:
a. the dismissal of appeals due to irrelevance;
b. summary dismissal of manifestly unlawful appeals;
c. the decision relative to the preliminary denial of entry at the airport and
the allocation of a place of stay at the airport;
d. a detention order under Article 76 paragraph 1 letter b number 5 or Article
76a FNA3;
e. with the consent of a second judge: appeals that are clearly with or without
justification.
Art. 111a Procedure and decision
1. The Federal Administrative Court may dispense with an exchange of writ-
ten submissions.
2. Appeal decisions in accordance with Article 111 need only be summarily
substantiated.
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2.B Additional Figures
2.B.1 Covariate Balance
Figure 2.9:Covariate Continuity: Donut Beginning and End
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Note: Both panels of graphs display p-values of point estimates of the effect of the introduction of the simplified
procedure, instrumented by the cutoff date, on the probability of a case to be from a specific country of origin
(upper panel) and in a specific legal matter (lower panel). The left-hand graphs test the balance of covariates
at the beginning of the donut (47 days before January 1, 2008), while the graphs on the right-hand side do
so for the end date of the donut (78 days after January 1, 2008). Truly randomized covariates would produce
p-values that follow the dashed diagonal line.
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2.B.2 Analysis with Substantive Decisions Only
Instead of focusing on the increase in a case’s probability of being handled by
fewer than three judges (which included ‘true’ single-judge decisions that did
not involve a substantive trial, as well as single+ decisions), as examined in the
main analysis of this paper, all analyses in this section focus exclusively on cases
that received a substantive trial. Thus, all cases handled by a ‘true’ single judge
are dropped from the sample and only cases that were either treated by a panel
of three judges (ordinary procedure) or by the chair judge with the consent of a
second judge (simplified procedure) remain.
Figure 2.10: First Stage: Substantive Decisions Only
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Note: The graph displays the probability of cases lodged in a given week begin decided under the simplified
procedure (by a single judge with the consent of a second (single+ decisions)). The lines indicate 95% confidence
intervals. The dots in gray represent the disregarded observations within the optimal donut hole (between −40
and +78 days from January 1, 2008).
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Figure 2.11:Covariate Continuity I: Substantive Decisions Only
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Figure 2.12:Covariate Continuity II: Substantive Decisions Only
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Note: Both panels of graphs display p-values of point estimates of the effect of the introduction of the simplified
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(upper panel) and in a specific legal matter (lower panel). The left graphs test the balance of covariates at the
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the dashed diagonal line.
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Figure 2.13:Donut Hole Selection: Substantive Decisions Only
lllllllllllllllllllllll
llllll
lll
ll
lll
ll
lll
ll
lll
lll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
lll
lll
ll
lll
lll
llllllllllllllll
lll
lll
ll
ll
ll
ll
−200 0 200
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
Distance to Cutoff Date
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
Tr
e
a
tm
en
t A
ss
ig
nm
en
t
lllllllllllllllll
llllllll
lll
ll
ll
ll
lll
lll
lll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
lll
ll
lll
ll
lll
ll
ll
ll
ll
lll
lll
llllllllllll
llllllllllllll
l
lllll
lll
lll
llllllllllllllllllllllllll
lll
lll
ll
ll
ll
lll
ll
ll
ll
ll
lll
lll
lll
lllll
−200 0 200
−
0.
00
1
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
Distance to Cutoff Date
Fi
rs
t D
er
iva
tiv
e
Note: The first graph (left) shows predicted probabilities of a case’s being handled under the simplified pro-
cedure based on date of appeal submission using spline regression. The second graph (right) displays the first
derivatives of the predicted probabilities on the left. The gray dots denote the period between the maximum in
the second derivative in the year 2007 and the minimum in the second derivative in the year 2008—indicating
where the increase in the probability of being handled under the simplified procedure changed disproportion-
ately around the cutoff date (at −40 days and +78 days from January 1, 2008).
Figure 2.14:Histograms of Standard Deviation and Increase in Predicted Treatment Assignment: Substantive
Decisions Only
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Note: Histograms of the standard deviation of (left) and the increase in (right) predicted probabilities of being
handled under the simplified procedure by day of appeal submission within windows of the same size as the
optimal donut suggested by the change points. The increase was calculated based on the difference in the
predicted treatment assignment of the first and the last appeal date in the window. The gray line indicates the
position of the optimal donut.
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Table 2.3:ResultsMain Speciﬁcation: Substantive Decisions Only
Dependent variable:
granted
Fuzzy Donut Hole RD
Model Model
(1) (2)
First Stage 0.397 (0.044) 0.410 (0.040)
ITT -0.104 (0.039) -0.100 (0.040)
LATE -0.253 (0.094) -0.250 (0.090)
Chair Judge ✓ ✓
Case Language ✓ ✓
Country of Origin ✓
Legal Matter ✓
Optimal Donut Hole ✓ ✓
First Stage F -Test Stat 93.35 111.64
Observations 4,087 4,087
Note: This table presents the results for the main specification with a
donut hole between −40 und +78 days around January 1, 2008. The
bandwidth is 365 days on either side of the cutoff date. Both models
include controls for chair judge and decision language. Standard errors
(in brackets) are clustered on the chair judge level in both specifications.
Model (2) additionally includes controls for the appellant’s country of
origin and the legal matter of the case.
117
Figure 2.15: Intention-to-Treat Effect: Substantive Decisions Only
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Note: The graph displays the ITT effect for the main specification with a donut hole between −40 and +78
days around January 1, 2008 and a bandwidth of 365 days. The points represent average grant rates of appeals
binned by submission week with 95% confidence intervals. The lines are fitted with loess, and the dots represent
average grant rates of appeals binned by submission week, with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.16: Sensitivity Check: Different Bandwidths andDonut Holes (Substantive Decisions Only)
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Note: These graphs display LATE for compliers point estimates for different bandwidths (left) and differently
sized donut holes (right). On the left, the donut hole remains fixed between −40 and +78 days around the
cutoff date, as in the main specification. On the right, the bandwidth remains fixed at 365 days, as in the main
specification. The light gray shade represents 95% confidence bands, and the dark gray shade denotes 90%
confidence bands. In all specifications, I control for chair judge and case language and cluster standard errors
on the chair judge level.
Figure 2.17: Placebo Test: Point Estimate Distributions (Substantive Decisions Only)
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Note: These graphs illustrate the distribution of the first stage effect of cutoff distance on the application of
the simplified procedure (left) and the ITT effect of the introduction of the simplified procedure on a case’s
probability of being granted (right) based on the first of each month between March 2008 and January 2015
as the placebo cutoff date. The gray lines represent the corresponding estimates for the actual cutoff date
(January 1, 2008). The empirical two-sided p-values are .01 for the first stage point estimate and .06 for the
ITT point estimate.
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3
It’s in the News: The Impact of Asylum Issue
Salience on Judicial DecisionMaking
Judith Spirig
While many governments around the globe are struggling to dealwith processing relatively high numbers of asylum seekers, asy-lum and refugee issues have also become one of the top concerns
among citizens. This is reflected in the extensive media coverage that
asylum policy, refugee arrivals and many other topics pertaining to
asylum seekers have received over the last years. How does this high
level of attention affect decision makers who are involved in the asylum
procedure?
A large volume of literature argues normatively and shows empirically
that policy-makers react to public opinion. It is less clear—empirically
and normatively—whether judicial decision makers do, too. Using a
natural experiment, this paper analyzes empirically whether the extent
of media coverage of asylum and refugee issues in Swiss newspapers—
taken as a proxy for the extent to which ‘asylum’ and refugees are
considered a (salient) issue among the public—affects Swiss asylum ap-
peal judges’ decision making and investigates whether particular topics
affect grant rates more than others.
Based on all asylum appeals decided in Switzerland between 2007 and
2015, I show that the effect of newspaper coverage on judges’ grant
threshold is consistently negative: judges of all parties become more
restrictive in times of high media coverage of asylum issues, as do non-
partisan judges. This effect is at most partly driven by higher numbers
of arriving asylum seekers and, as a topic model approach suggests,
more attributable to the coverage of topics that feature citizens’ voices
(accommodation of asylum seekers) than federal-level asylum policy-
making. These findings suggest that issue salience presents a challenge
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to the consistency of partisan judges’ decisions, especially in times when
asylum issue salience and the number of newly arriving asylum seekers
are consistently high.
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3.1 Introduction
In recent years, millions of Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis have fled their homes
in search of safety and security—mostly in neighboring countries, but also in
Europe. There, the arrival of asylum seekers has caused a stir and led to heated
debates. Concurrently with the public salience of asylum seekers and refugees,
asylum and immigration issues have become dominant political topics across
Europe. Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, has described the 2015 “im-
migration crisis” as “the biggest challenge I have seen in European affairs in
my time as chancellor,”1 and UKIP (the United Kingdom Independence Party)
claimed during the Vote Leave campaign that only Brexit would allow the U.K.
to take back control of its borders.2
However, even before what Merkel called the immigration crisis, asylum and
refugee issues featured prominently in political discourses across Europe. Com-
bating ‘illegal’ immigration was a central topic during the 2012 French elections.3
In 2013, then-U.K. Home Secretary Theresa May piloted a campaign aimed at
advising ‘illegal immigrants’ to leave the U.K.4 In Switzerland over the last
decade, the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) has launched several popular
initiatives and referenda to curtail immigration and render the asylum system
more restrictive.5 Asylum and immigration policy has also been extremely preva-
lent during election campaigns. Representative polls taken at different times in
the months leading up to the 2015 Swiss federal elections, for example, show
that the issue voters were most concerned about was—by a constant and large
margin—‘migration, foreigners, integration, asylum and refugees’ (Longchamp
and Mousson 2015).
Research shows that the simultaneity of the public and political salience of issues
1 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/eu-leaders-hash-out-voluntary-system-to-
address-mediterranean-migrant-crisis.
2 See, for example, UKIP Leader Nigel Farage speaking at the European parliament in
Strasbourg on January 19, 2016: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqdxODwO0oo.
3 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/french-election-blog-2012/2012/apr/19/immigration-
forefront-french-election.
4 See https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/22/go-home-billboards-pulled.
5 See, for example, https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/abstimmungen/2014-02-09.
html.
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is often not a coincidence (see, e.g., Vliegenthart et al. 2016). Rather, it is not
only the case that political debates lead to media coverage, but also that parties
and policy-makers respond to public opinion and media coverage (see, e.g., Page
and Shapiro 1983; Steinmayr 2016). But what about judges? Do they also
respond to issue salience? A small number of studies shed light on the effect
of media coverage (Lim et al. 2015; Lim 2015) and public opinion (Epstein and
Martin 2010) on judicial decisions, but focus on coverage of judges’ decisions
or long-term public opinion trends, respectively. Research that investigates the
short-term effects of the salience of an issue on judges’ decisions is scant. This
paper analyzes the effect of newspaper coverage of asylum issues on judges’
asylum appeal decisions and thereby addresses this gap in the literature.
Several features of the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (FAC) asylum divi-
sions render it a suitable and interesting case for the analysis of the effect of
issue salience on judicial outcomes. At first glance, we might not expect asylum
judges to be influenced by asylum issue salience. They are experts in asylum
law, are experienced in deciding vast numbers of low-salience asylum appeals
and are required by law to do so “independently”, “bound only by the law”6 and
treat everyone “equal[ly] before the law”7.
Yet, a closer look reveals that there are a number of institutional particularities
that combine to create a context in which judges’ reactions to asylum issue
salience are likely to occur. First, in the Swiss system, federal (administrative)
judges are elected by the United Federal Assembly (the two houses of the Swiss
parliament), and their candidacies are supported by their respective MPs. It
is an informal requirement to join (or at least support) a party before running
for judicial office.8 Party affiliation is one of the factors determining whether
someone will be proposed for election and is thus one of the most salient aspects
of a candidate’s profile. Even beyond the election, judges’ party affiliations are
noted on the court’s web site. Due to the high political salience of asylum issues
6 Cf. Article 2 of the Swiss Administrative Court Act. The full article is: “The judicial
authorities are independent in the exercise of their judicial powers and are bound only by
the law.”
7 Cf. Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation.
8 Section 3.3.2 will elaborate more on judicial elections and on why not all judges are party
members.
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and the judicial selection system are central factors in the analysis of the effect
of asylum issue salience on judicial decision making.
Second, the FAC is the court of first and last instance for asylum matters in
Switzerland. As a consequence, with very few exceptions, only the European
Court for Human Rights can reverse decisions made by FAC asylum judges. This
implies that asylum judges are therefore largely unconstrained by a higher court.
Third, the selection of judges for panels and positions within panels is conducted
by software specifically developed for the FAC.9 The assignment is, conditional
on a few observable criteria, as-good-as random and thus independent of a case’s
merit. This allows for a credible identification of judges’ grant rates as a reflection
of their preferences relative to other judges. Finally, unlike other contexts and
areas of law, newspaper coverage of asylum issues is largely exogenous to appeal
decisions. Accordingly, asylum issue salience is unlikely to be caused by judges’
actions. As a consequence of these factors, the temporal variation in asylum
issue salience facilitates a credible estimation of the effect of issue salience on
judges’ decision making in a context where it is more likely to occur than in
others.
The data used in this study stem from two main sources. The asylum appeals
dataset was obtained from the FAC and covers the complete set of asylum appeals
decided in Switzerland between January 2007 (when the court was set up) and
December 2015. It includes information on the verdict, the judges on the panel,
the date of the decision, the appeal date and several other variables. This dataset
was merged with information on judges (most importantly party affiliation) that
was obtained from the court’s web page for active judges.10 The asylum issue
salience dataset details newspaper coverage of asylum and refugee issues. By
measuring issue salience with media coverage, it builds on previous research
(Epstein and Segal 2000; Grossman 2015). However, rather than restricting
the analysis to one newspaper, I collected all articles on asylum issues from 18
major Swiss newspapers. The dataset consists of about 36,900 newspaper articles
published between January 2007 and December 2015 and includes, among other
9 This software, called ‘Bandlimat’, is how the FAC ensures compliance with art. 30 par.
1 of the Swiss Constitution. For more information, see Schuppisser (2007).
10 Note that in agreement with the FAC, which provided the data, judges will not be iden-
tified by name.
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information, the full text of the article, publishing date and the newspaper it
was published in.
Using a series of logistic regression, generalized additive logistic and linear prob-
ability models, I gather robust evidence that higher asylum issue salience leads
judges to decide asylum appeals less favorably. Depending on the specification,
the average grant rate drops by between two and seven percentage points when
median media coverage increases by one standard deviation. Despite the im-
portance of party membership in the judicial selection procedure, there are no
statistically significant differences between judges of different parties and non-
partisan judges.
This effect is at most partly driven by higher asylum application numbers and, as
a structural topic model analysis of the German-language asylum coverage sub-
set suggests, is actually related mainly to topics that frequently feature citizens’
voices (such as the accommodation of asylum seekers and refugees) rather than
asylum policy-making and election campaigns. Although documented in a con-
text in which they are perhaps likely to occur, these findings have implications
for the consistency of judicial decision making and point toward the power of
the media and voters in shaping judicial outcomes in the asylum appeal context.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After Section 3.2 situates
this study within existing research and elaborates on the focus on judges’ party
affiliation, Section 3.3 outlines the asylum coverage dataset and introduces rel-
evant aspects of the Swiss asylum appeal system. Sections 3.4 to 3.6 constitute
the empirical part of the paper. They present the empirical strategy, which
relies on over-time variation in the salience of asylum issues as the main inde-
pendent variable, and show that higher issue salience leads to more restrictive
asylum appeal decisions. In a second step, an analysis of the topics covered in
newspaper articles on asylum issues lends credibility to the interpretation that
the salience effect could be mediated by a (subconscious) short-term hardening
of judges’ attitudes toward asylum seekers. Finally, the conclusion (Section 3.7)
highlights the importance of these findings in times of consistently high asylum
issue salience and asylum request numbers. The Appendix provides additional
information on robustness checks, the media coverage corpus and further sup-
porting tables and figures (Sections 3.A – 3.C).
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3.2 Judges and DecisionMaking
Issues pertaining to asylum seekers and refugees have often triggered heated
debates among voters. After the attacks in Paris in November 2015, for exam-
ple, British voters appear to have become less favorable toward refugees from
Syria.11 In Switzerland, local opposition to the reception of asylum seekers in
Swiss municipalities has frequently been intense and outspoken.12 Past research
has shown that political elites respond to issue salience (see, e.g., Epstein and
Segal 2000) and public opinion (Page and Shapiro 1983), and has considered ac-
countability of policy-makers to voters an important criterion for the quality of
politicians and government (see, e.g., Adsera et al. 2003; Key 1961). Accordingly,
politicians’ reactions to asylum issues in times of high salience are expected. Yet,
whether judges react to issues that are highly (publicly and politically) salient
and which factors mediate such an effect, remains largely unknown. This paper
investigates the impact of issue salience on judges’ decisions and thereby pays
attention to the (institutional) context of judicial decision making. In this re-
spect, both the judicial selection procedure and the field (here asylum issues)
within which the cases are embedded play a role.
What research has shown, however, is that judges are not simply ‘the mouth of
the law’.13 Rather, there are different sets of factors beyond the merit of cases
that interact with each other and affect judges’ decisions. A sizable number of
studies show how judges’ identities influence case decisions (Boyd et al. 2010;
Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010; Glynn and Sen 2015; Grossman et al.
2016; Kastellec 2013; and, with regard to asylum adjudication, Ramji-Nogales
et al. 2007; Taylor 2007). In sum, they suggest that, at least under some circum-
stances, the decision makers matter to a case’s outcome: whether it is that black
judges vote differently than white judges in affirmative action cases (Kastellec
2013) or female judges differently from male judges in sex discrimination cases
(Boyd et al. 2010), a consensus has emerged that aspects of a judge’s identity
11 November 2015 YouGov poll: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/11/18/brits-less-accepting-syrian-
refugees-wake-paris-at/.
12 See, for example, here: http://www.weltwoche.ch/ausgaben/2014_34/artikel/die-grillparty-
bewegung-die-weltwoche-ausgabe-342014.html.
13 Originally in French ‘la bouche de la loi’, quoted, for example, in Dyevre (2010).
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that are somehow connected to the case at hand can play a role in the decision
of the case. Due to the high political salience of asylum and refugee issues,
judges’ ‘political’, ideological identity is particularly relevant for the purpose of
this study. Like other aspects of judges’ identity, past research suggests that
judges’ ideology matters for case outcomes—arguably more so in ideologically
contested areas of the law (see, e.g., Sunstein et al. 2007).14
Yet, at the same time, judges are not exclusively driven by their identities in the
sense that they always vote according to their personal, ideological preferences
or with people of their own race or gender.15 Rather, like ordinary citizens,
they have also been found to be strategic actors who are embedded in a specific
set of institutions (see, e.g., Epstein et al. 2013). Research shows that they
aim at reducing workload (Epstein and Knight 2013) and the probability of
reversal (Songer et al. 1994) and respond to incentives created by the judicial
selection procedure (see Lim et al. 2015). Whereas many of these factors can
influence judges’ decision making either consciously or subconsciously, several
studies document the impact of subconscious processes. Beyond being more
lenient after food breaks (Danziger et al. 2011), judges tend to avoid long strings
of identical decisions (Chen et al. 2016) and can be influenced by their implicit
racial biases in the absence of measures guarding against them (Rachlinski et al.
2008).
Past research also suggests that judges do not operate in isolation from public
life. A number of studies shed light on courts’ or judges’ relationships with the
public and investigate the influence of the media, public opinion or issue salience
on judicial outcomes. On the one hand, this strand of research includes studies of
whether U.S. Supreme Court decisions reflect (and influence) broad, long-term
trends in public opinion (Casillas et al. 2011; Epstein and Martin 2010; Giles
et al. 2008; Hall 2014; Hoekstra 1995). On the other hand, it focuses on how
judges change their decision making when the court’s decisions are more exten-
14 Note that ideology and other aspects of judges’ identity often cannot be analyzed com-
pletely separately from each other since certain characteristics and preferences often cor-
relate strongly with judges’ ideology.
15 There is a long debate in judicial politics as to whether judges’ decisions are driven purely
by their personal attitudes, by their ideology, solely by the legal facts of a case or by
their strategic behavior, which I will not delve into for the purpose of this paper. For an
overview, however, see for example Segal and Spaeth (2002).
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sively covered in the media (Lim et al. 2015). While causal effects of public
opinion on courts’ decisions (and vice versa) are challenging to estimate, Lim
et al. (2015) provide causal evidence that more coverage of judges’ decisions in-
fluences their decision making in criminal law cases, if judges are non-partisan
and elected in popular votes. Taken together, these studies suggest that judicial
decision making is not completely detached from long-term public opinion trends
and that, under certain conditions, media coverage has an impact on judges’ de-
cisions. In addition, specifically with regard to issue salience, there are—to my
knowledge—two papers that investigate its effect (in the sense of exogenous vari-
ation of public attention toward a broader issue) on judicial outcomes: Epstein
et al. (2005) find that during times of war, Supreme Court Justices curtail rights
and liberties in cases unrelated to war, but not in those related to war, and
Shayo and Zussman (2011) show that higher local terrorism intensity in Israel
leads to an increase in judicial in-group bias.
What implications do these insights from the literature on the impact of extra-
legal factors on cases’ outcomes yield for the context of asylum appeal decisions
in Switzerland? Where documented, the effects of media coverage on judicial
decisions at lower courts were restricted to jury members (Lim 2015) and elected
non-partisan judges (Lim et al. 2015).16 Whereas jury members are not legal
experts and might thus rely on any information available to them, the effect of
media coverage on elected non-partisan judges is explained by the interaction
between the judge selection system and media coverage. When judges are elected
in non-partisan elections, the harshness of judges’ decisions (in criminal sentenc-
ing) provides relevant information for voters. However, in partisan elections, the
party cue is so strong that it outshines other information and thus neither has an
influence on voters’ choices nor constrains judges. Thus, both of these findings
suggest that asylum issue salience does not influence judicial decision making in
the Swiss context, where asylum judges are predominantly partisan, elected by
the national parliament and experts in asylum law.
Shayo and Zussman’s (2011) study, however, highlights another relevant di-
16 Even though the Swiss FAC is not a lower court, it shares several aspects with typical
lower courts, most importantly, that most of its asylum appeal decisions do not display a
high legal salience and are often very similar in terms of the legal aspects that they deal
with.
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mension. By providing evidence that higher local terrorism intensity increases
in-group bias in judicial decisions in Israel, they point to judges’ social group
membership as a mediating factor. Combined with insights from the literature on
effects of judges’ identities, these findings imply that higher asylum issue salience
could amplify judges’ political identities. As illustrated in Chapter B 1, judges’
political preferences arguably play a role in asylum appeal decision making at
the FAC, irrespective of the short-term intensity of asylum issue salience. This
might not be surprising given both the generally rather high political salience
of asylum issues and the politicization of the judicial selection procedure: when
running for office, judges’ candidacies generally have to be supported by a party
that is represented in the Swiss parliament. In practice, this also means that
judges are normally party members (or at least supporters). The situation at the
FAC asylum divisions is a bit different from that of other divisions, in that the
asylum divisions have (or at least once had) a considerable share of non-partisan
judges. This particularity is due to an informal agreement in the election of
judges to the first FAC. Judges employed at the Swiss asylum appeal commis-
sion (AAC) were nominated and elected, even if they decided not to become
party members.17
The implicit rule, however, to elect judges approximately proportionately to the
strength of parties in the federal assembly is in a sense a tribute to the fact that
judges’ identities matter. Rather than being a byproduct of Switzerland’s federal
judges selection system, judges’ party membership is seen as a way to make the
bench representative of the broader ‘socio-political forces’ in Switzerland (Raselli
2011, 5). As Chapter B 1 shows, Swiss asylum judges’ individual preferences
correlate with their party affiliation in expected ways, with the left-wing Social
Democrats (SP) and Green Party (GPS) judges being more favorable toward
appellants and the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) judges displaying more
restrictive asylum preferences.18 This suggests at a minimum that judges do not
randomly select into parties when running for office, and taking into account
17 The AAC was the entity tasked with deciding asylum appeals before the FAC came into
existence in 2007. Since the commission was organized bureaucratically, judges were
employed within the Federal Department of Justice and Police and not elected by the
federal assembly.
18 Figure 3.9 in the Appendix displays MPs’ preferences aggregated into party ideal points
and illustrates these ‘expected ways’.
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that asylum issues are one of the most relevant dimensions along which parties
differentiate themselves from one another, that judges’ party membership can
be considered a crucial aspect of their judicial identity. Thus, despite judges’
expert knowledge of asylum law, the political salience of asylum issues and the
relevance of party affiliation in the judicial selection procedure provide a context
in which we can expect judges to respond to issue salience.
Beyond the importance of the institutional setting, taking seriously that “judges
are people, too” (Clark et al. forthcoming) necessitates the consideration of in-
sights from the literature studying the effects of immigration—and the arrival of
refugees more specifically—on the general public’s attitudes toward immigrants.
The consensus emerging from this literature is that natives become on average
more anti-refugee when the number of refugees increases (Dustmann et al. 2018;
Hangartner et al. forthcoming; Steinmayr 2016), especially if personal contact is
rare. In addition, findings from Dustmann et al. (2018) also support the notion
that judges’ party affiliation might be a crucial factor in moderating the effect
of asylum issue salience on decision making: They find that pre-existing politi-
cal attitudes moderate the effect of refugee arrival on attitudes toward refugees
(Dustmann et al. 2018).19 Hopkins (2010) investigates issue salience as a mod-
erator for attitudes toward immigrants in response to an increase in the number
of local immigrants. Studying the case of the U.S. after 9/11 and the resulting
sudden increase in media attention toward immigrants, he finds that high issue
salience leads to more negative attitudes toward immigrants in response to an
increase in the number of immigrants (Hopkins 2010, 44):
at times when rhetoric related to immigrants is highly salient na-
tionally, those witnessing influxes of immigrants locally will find it
easier to draw political conclusions from their experiences.
Accordingly, research on the effects of immigration on natives’ attitudes suggests
not only that an increase in the number of refugees but also in issue salience lead
to more restrictive attitudes with regard to immigrants—potentially moderated
by pre-existing political attitudes.
19 Danish municipalities with a larger share of people who pay church tax and cities exhibit
lower shifts in votes for anti-immigration parties in response to an increase in the share
of refugees.
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In sum, a vast literature has shown that judicial decision making is influenced
by factors that go beyond the merit of a case. Both conscious and subconscious
processes lead judges to reach decisions that are affected by who made them and
the context within which they are reached. Thus, on the one hand, whether or
not judges respond to issue salience depends on a variety of factors, among them
potentially the judicial selection process. Another strand in the literature has
shown that voters often become more anti-immigrant in response to an increase
in immigration, moderated—among other factors—by pre-existing political pref-
erences and issue salience. At the intersection of these research avenues, several
gaps remain: Do judges respond to issue salience, even if they are experts in
their field? Are pre-existing political beliefs a moderating factor in the effect
of issue salience on judicial decisions? By connecting the exogenous variation
in issue salience to the larger debate on judicial behavior, this study adds to
the literature on the effects of court-exogenous factors and provides insights into
the study of the effects of judges’ identity on case outcomes, particularly in po-
litically salient fields of law. In addition, it bridges the gap between the work
on judicial behavior and natives’ immigration attitude formation by studying a
particular sub-group of citizens who are expert decision makers.
One of the reasons why the questions above have gone largely unanswered thus
far is the empirical challenge involved in researching the effects of issue salience.
In order to provide reliable estimates, high-frequency data for both issue salience
and outcome are key. Drawing on a large dataset of newspaper articles and
individual-level asylum appeal decisions, this paper addresses some of these chal-
lenges and analyzes the effect of newspaper coverage of asylum issues on asylum
appeal decisions.
3.3 Setting and Data
This section provides background about the Swiss asylum appeals system, the
broader political context and the measurement of asylum issue salience. In
addition, it presents information about the two sets of data used in this paper:
data on newspaper coverage of asylum issues and a dataset of all asylum appeal
decisions made at the Swiss FAC between 2007 and 2015.
131
3.3.1 Newspaper Coverage of Asylum Issues
Issue salience has become associated with several concepts in judicial politics.
On the one hand, it is used as a measure of the legal salience of a case—how
judicial decision makers view the legal importance of the case they are deciding,
whether at the time when they are making the decision or retrospectively (see,
e.g., Epstein and Segal 2000). On the other hand, and not restricted to judicial
politics, it refers to how important voters think a certain issue is (Wlezien 2005;
Collins and Cooper 2012) or how concerned they are about a certain issue.20
In this paper, issue salience refers to how much public attention is devoted
to an issue, thereby following closely the definition laid out in Wlezien (2005)
and Collins and Cooper (2012). To measure it, this study uses the amount of
newspaper coverage of asylum issues. In the case of asylum, a highly politicized
issue in Switzerland, I argue that this captures both how important an issue is to
voters and how it can also be understood as an expression of concern about an
issue.21 Unlike other research on the effect of media coverage on judicial decision
making that focuses on newspaper coverage of courts and judges’ decisions (see,
e.g., Lim et al. 2015), newspaper coverage of asylum issues is not driven by
asylum judges’ decisions, but rather is a reflection of the public salience of the
issue (see Figure 3.1).
Newspaper articles—instead of TV reports or social media, for example—were
chosen for several reasons. First, newspapers are still a crucial means of infor-
mation and entertainment in Switzerland: according to a study from 2010, 97%
of residents read the newspaper have at least once in 2008 (Vanhooydonck and
Moeschler 2010). Politicians arguably also attribute a high political relevance to
newspapers: who is in charge of which newspapers and how they are connected
to parties and politicians have been contested and received widespread attention
20 For a more in-depth discussion about how to measure this based on public opinion and
the challenges emerging from using the ‘most important problem’ question, see Wlezien
(2005).
21 This interpretation is supported by pre-election surveys that suggest a jump in the pro-
portion of voters that consider ‘migration, foreigners, integration, asylum and refugees’
the most pressing problem in Swiss politics between June 2015 and August 2015 (from
34% to 46%)—while a large increase in the number of newspaper articles (in the collected
dataset) occurred: from 275 articles in June 2015 to 447 articles in August 2015.
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in Switzerland in recent years.22 Second, media coverage of a given issue has
been used as a measure for issue salience in the context of judicial politics before
(initially suggested by Epstein and Segal (2000)), though that was in regard to
the salience of a particular case to Supreme Court judges. Third, representative
public opinion polls that cover asylum issue salience are not carried out on a
daily, weekly or monthly basis, but mainly only in months leading up to na-
tional elections. In contrast, media coverage of asylum issues can be measured
on a daily basis. Yet, while public opinion polls cannot be used to measure
issue salience on a high-frequency level, they support the interpretation of issue
salience as indicating both the importance of an issue and the extent to which
it is perceived as a problem: the correlation between the share of people who
understand asylum and refugees to be one of the top five problems,23 and the
yearly number of newspaper articles on asylum issues is 0.73. Finally, through
global news databases, it is possible to access and download the digital version
of articles of a sizable fraction of Swiss newspapers during the study period.
The newspaper articles that form the corpus were collected via Factiva. Factiva
covers an extensive set of Swiss daily and weekly newspapers, from the Ger-
man, French and Italian parts of the country. I searched the database with the
string ((‘asylum*’ OR ‘refuge*’) AND ‘Swi(tzerland|ss)’ OR ‘canton’)) in Ger-
man, French and Italian and downloaded all articles that contained the string
between January 1, 2007 (the first day of the court’s existence) and Decem-
ber 31, 2015. I then narrowed the sample down to articles from newspapers
that were completely available over the study period. The final dataset covers
eighteen newspapers, of which five are in French and thirteen are in German.
Among them are seven of the ten most widely circulated daily newspapers, the
three most widely circulated Sunday newspapers and two influential weekly news
magazines. To account for the relative influence of newspapers, the trimmed
sample that consists of about 36,900 articles was merged with 2009 circulation
22 The former president of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and federal councillor (Christoph
Blocher), for example, owns a third of the Basler Zeitung, one of the larger daily Swiss
newspapers. Roger Köppel—publisher of the conservative-right weekly magazine Die
Weltwoche—was elected as MP for the SVP in 2015 after having just entered politics.
23 The exact question is: “On these cards you see several topics that have been frequently
discussed and written about. Please look at all of them and take the five that you person-
ally think are the five biggest problems in Switzerland.” (Golder and Longchamp 2016).
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Figure 3.1:Monthly Circulation-Weighted Number of Articles on Asylum Issues
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Note: The graph displays the number of published articles on asylum issues in selected Swiss newspapers (see
above) per month during the study period. These numbers are weighted by circulation (data from 2009). Data
on the share of respondents mentioning asylum and refugee issues as one of the most important five problems
in Switzerland is taken from Golder and Longchamp (2016).
data from WEMF AG für Werbemedienforschung (2010). The topic model anal-
ysis draws on the German-language subset of this corpus, which covers around
25,000 articles.24 Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the temporal distribution
of the articles over the study period and shows that there is sizable variation in
asylum issue salience over time. It also shows that the coverage of asylum issues
is not driven by judges’ decisions: the subset of articles that include the word
‘federal judge’, ‘asylum judge’ or ‘federal administrative court’ is small. This
supports the assumption that the number of articles published on asylum issues
is orthogonal to judges’ decision making.
24 Note that the correlation between the monthly number of newspaper articles in the whole
dataset and the German subset is .99. See Appendix Section 3.B for further information
on how the corpus was assembled and processed.
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3.3.2 Asylum Appeals Procedure and Data
The Swiss Federal Administrative Court
The Swiss FAC, including its two asylum divisions, has existed since January
2007.25 Ever since, all appeals lodged against the Swiss Secretariat for Migration
(SEM)—the government’s migration agency that decides asylum requests—with
regard to asylum issues have been handled by the FAC asylum divisions. The
appeals deal with a variety of questions (denied entry to Switzerland to request
asylum, initial asylum decision, removal, cancellation of asylum status, procedu-
ral issues during asylum process, etc.), but are exclusively about asylum matters
and of SEM decisions or previous FAC rulings. Thus, the approximately thirty
judges within the FAC asylum divisions have solely and exclusively handled all
Swiss asylum appeals since 2007. The FAC asylum divisions’ judgments are
generally not appealable to a higher court in Switzerland.26
FAC judges are elected into judicial office by the United Federal Assembly, a
joint assembly of both houses of the Swiss parliament (the National Council
and the Council of States). The federal assembly’s judicial committee screens
and interviews potential candidates for the position of federal (administrative)
judge.27 Selected candidates are then presented to the relevant parliamentary
factions and usually only nominated if backed by the party of which they are
members or (rarely) supporters. Even though a number of non-partisan candi-
dates were elected into office in the first-ever FAC judge elections in 2005 because
of their previous appointment to the Swiss Asylum Appeal Commission, almost
all judges are members (or at least supporters) of the larger parties represented
in the parliament. This is not uncommon in Switzerland and is connected to
the idea that courts should be representative of Swiss society in terms of its
socio-political views (see, e.g., Raselli 2011). In practice, with regard to the
25 Before 2007, appeals lodged against the SEM’s predecessor were handled by mostly the
same judges, but at the Swiss Asylum Appeal Commission, a government agency embed-
ded within the Federal Department of Justice and Police.
26 The next higher instance is the European Court of Human Rights, which takes on only
an extremely limited number of cases.
27 The only requirement is that the candidate has the right to vote at the national level (i.e.,
is a Swiss citizen over the age of 18). However, only candidates with legal expertise have
ever been considered (Marti 2010).
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election of federal judges, this translates into the informal rule that the relative
strength of the parties in the federal assembly is reflected in the composition of
the court.28 Judges are elected for terms of six years and can be reelected for
an unlimited number of times until the age of 68. Reelections are essentially
uncompetitive retention elections—no federal judge has ever not been reelected,
and there are no alternative candidates.
TheAppeal Procedure
Once an asylum appeal is lodged and received by the FAC, the court’s central
chancellery assigns it to one of the two asylum divisions. Conditional on a
few criteria that are exogenous to the merit of the appeal,29 software randomly
chooses judges for positions on a three-judge panel: chair, second and third judge.
In other words, conditional on a few criteria, judges are as-good-as randomly
assigned to positions on three-judge panels—in expectation, independently of an
appeal’s merit. The chair judge’s role is similar to the role of an opinion writer,
as she is the one who receives the complete case file first.30 In a first step, she
decides whether the appeal fulfills the formal requirements and should receive a
substantive decision. If not, she rejects it ‘without entering into the substance of
the case’. If it does fulfill the formal requirements, she then potentially acquires
additional material and finally produces a draft of the panel’s decision. This
draft is then circulated—together with the case file—to the second and the third
judge, who can note disagreements and propose changes; however, they cannot
come up with a dissenting opinion. In case of disagreements, the draft is amended
and circulated again. If a consensus cannot be reached, the panel resorts to a
simple majority vote. Against the backdrop of this system, it is perhaps not
surprising that we find that the best simple aggregation rule to explain how
judges combine their individual preferences into a joint panel decision is the
28 The relative underrepresentation of the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) at the
FAC asylum divisions, for example, has been criticized by SVP politicians repeatedly,
although the underrepresentation is more likely due to a lack of SVP candidates than to
their candidates not being elected (see, e.g., Odermatt 2007).
29 Without going into too much detail—see Chapter B 1 for a more detailed description
of the procedure—the criteria are language of the appeal document (German, French,
Italian), the judges’ working language(s), urgency of the appeal and judges’ workload.
30 Note that each judge has several clerks at her or his disposal.
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‘chair-as-dictator’ model (see Chapter B 1). While a mixture model of ‘chair-as-
dictator’ and ‘median-is-decisive’ is the best-fitting aggregation rule overall, this
paper relies on the best simple model for two reasons: first, because the chair-
as-dictator model constitutes a reasonable approximation of the best-fitting, but
more complex, mixture model, and second, due to missing second and third
judge data in some years.31
Since 2008, as a consequence of a change in the Swiss asylum law, the chair
judge is not only the one who drafts the decision, but also the one to decide
whether a case is handled under the ordinary procedure described above or by
a simplified procedure. If the chair judge finds the appeal to be ‘clearly with
or without merit’, she invokes the simplified procedure. As a consequence, the
third assigned judge is released from duty and the case is decided by the chair
judge with only the consent of the second judge.32
Appeals and Judges Data
As stipulated by article 6 of the Informations Regulations of the Federal Admin-
istrative Court, the FAC publishes anonymized versions of almost all substantive
decisions (i.e., most cases processed under the ordinary or simplified procedure)
online on its web page.33 Appeals that were dismissed ‘without having entered
into the substance of the case’ (for example, because an advance on costs was re-
quested and not paid in time) or that were ‘written off’ do not enter the publicly
accessible web page. To construct a dataset of all publicly available decisions,
Hangartner et al. (2018) collected all asylum appeal decisions from the FAC’s
online database and extracted the key variables of the decisions: the unique case
id, the date of appeal submission, the names of the judges on the panel, the date
and the language of the appeal decision, the appellant’s country of origin, (pos-
sible) legal representation and the verdict itself. They then merged this dataset
with the complete set of cases obtained from the FAC. The data obtained from
31 See Chapter B 1 for more information about aggregation rules.
32 If the second judge substantially disagrees with either the draft or the fact that the case is
‘clearly with(out) merit’, the ordinary procedure is invoked. For more detailed information
about the procedures, see Chapter B 2.
33 See http://www.bvger.ch/publiws/pub/search.jsf.
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the FAC covers the universe of decisions reached by the FAC asylum divisions,
including the unpublished decisions. In total, the dataset spans 41,040 appeals
decided between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2015, of which about 64%
were written in German, 31% in French and 5% in Italian. For the purpose of
this paper, I drop all cases submitted before 2007, because they were assigned to
judges through a system other than the one used since the inception of the court
in 2007. Furthermore, I consider unified cases as one case, because they were
handled by the same judges and received the same verdict. Finally, cases that
were written off are also disregarded, because they did not receive a substantial
decision.34
The appeal verdicts are coded as ‘rejected’ or ‘granted’ if the substantive (con-
tent) part of the appeal was rejected or granted, respectively. In other words,
everything that pertains directly to the asylum seeker’s situation is considered
substantive, while issues that pertain to the procedure, such as questions of legal
aid, are not. For example, if an appeal was rejected insofar as it concerns the
asylum seeker’s asylum claim and protection from having to return to her coun-
try of origin, but was granted insofar as it concerns her request to receive free
legal representation, the case was considered ‘rejected’. The cases in which the
appellant partly won (focusing on the substantive part) are considered ‘granted’,
because partly granted appeals may still lead to an improvement in the asylum
seeker’s situation.35
Along with the information about which judges contributed to a decision (see
above), the dataset also contains biographical information about the judges. For
active judges, this information is available on the court’s web page and includes
characteristics such as date of birth, place of birth, education and previous jobs,
date of election to the court and—most importantly for the purpose of this
34 See Chapter B 1 for further information on the construction of the dataset and the coding
of variables.
35 For example, ‘partly granted’ can mean that an appellant receives temporary protection in
Switzerland, but that the appeal is rejected insofar as it concerns refugee status. Among
other reasons, this situation arises because appellants often appeal different aspects of the
first-instance decision. In the full dataset consisting of over 40,000 cases, this outcome
involves about 2.5% of all cases.
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paper—party affiliation.36
3.4 Empirical Strategy
As discussed in the previous section, drawing on the finding from Chapter B 1—
that the chair judge essentially rules as ‘dictator’—this analysis focuses on the
panel’s chair judge. Accordingly, in the main analysis, I regress the probability
of an appeal to be granted (pii) on the average number of newspaper articles on
asylum and refugee issues published during the appeal’s decision-making period
(Coverage). To model the dichotomous outcome (‘granted’, that is underlying
pii), I use a binary logistic model.37 In a second step, taking into account that
judges’ party affiliation might interact in relevant ways with Coverage (see Sec-
tion 3.2), I regress the probability of an appeal to be granted on the interaction
of Coverage with the chair judge’s party:
logit(pii) = αjCoveragei + Judgej + Languagei +Quarteri + ϵi (3.1)
logit(pii) = βjPartyj + αj(Partyj × Coveragei) + Languagei +Quarteri + ϵi
(3.2)
where Partyj is the party of which the chair judge deciding case i is a member,
Coveragei is the intensity of asylum issue salience of case i and Language and
Quarter are fixed effects for case language and each quarter-year, respectively.
In Equation 3.1, I also include a chair judge fixed effect (Judge). Since judges
do not change party affiliation, no chair judge fixed effects are included in Equa-
tion 3.2. Note that I do not include a constant in order to estimate all Party
fixed effects and also omit Coverage so that I have all interactions between Party
and Coverage in the model (see the following tables).
To quantify media coverage of asylum issues, I use two different measures:
36 See, for example, the judges of Division IV, https://www.bvger.ch/bvger/en/home/about-fac/
judges-and-court-clerks/judges/judges-division-iv.html. Note that in agreement with the court,
none of the research produced with their data will identify judges by name.
37 But see Figure 3.2 for results from a linear probability model.
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i) The circulation-weighted average daily number of articles on asylum issues,
published in a set of Swiss newspapers during the whole period of the asylum
appeal decision procedure. I fix the maximum number of Coverage at 60 in the
main regression to ensure that the results do not depend on outliers with values
over 60 (the maximum average daily coverage is 84). The benefit of averaging
over the whole decision-making period is that it accounts for the fact that it is
unclear at what point in time the decision was actually made. Yet, at the same
time, it is a downside of this measure that only cases that are decided within a
very short period can reach extreme values of Coverage.
ii) The circulation-weighted average daily number of articles on asylum issues
during the last month before a decision was made, i.e., is finalized. Focusing on
the last month before a decision was made provides a lower bound to the effect
of issue salience, because in the absence of the exact date on which a case was
actually, internally, decided, it is possible that the actual decision was reached
before the last month (a fourth of cases take 300 days or more to decide) and
was therefore unaffected by issue salience in the month before the decision is
finalized.
Since both measures have advantages and disadvantages, I will perform the main
analysis for both definitions of Coverage, to indicate—in a sense—a lower and
an upper bound for the effect of asylum issue salience on judges’ grant rates. In
addition, as Appendix Section 3.A discusses in more detail, I perform a variety
of robustness tests, including further transformed versions of Coverage as inde-
pendent variable (see also the estimates in Figure 3.2), to support the validity
of the main results.
I includeQuarter fixed effects, in order to adjust for general changes in the court’s
grant rate over time. There are many sources of potential variation that could
impact on either the average merit of cases or the threshold that judges apply to
decide which case is ‘strong enough’ to be granted (however, not necessarily their
relative threshold): the situation in appellants’ countries of origin, changes in
the SEM’s initial decision making or changes in appellants’ decision making (to
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lodge an appeal or not), among others.38 Language fixed effects for the language
of the asylum appeal decision (which is the same as the language of the decision
against which the appeal is lodged) are employed, because case language affects
the assignment of judges to cases.39 Underlying pii, the probability of a case to
be granted, is whether a case was granted or rejected. As laid out in the previous
section, decisions are coded ‘granted’ if the substantive part of the appeal was
at least partly granted and ‘rejected’ otherwise. Finally, a comment on appeals’
independence is in order. There are cases (usually lodged by different family
members) that keep their unique case number but are unified and receive a joint
decision made by the same panel. I address this challenge in two ways. To
account for possible non-independence between decisions, I treat unified cases
as one single case, and, in addition, estimate all regressions with standard errors
that are clustered on the chair judge level.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Effect of Asylum Issue Salience
This section first presents the results from the main model, as laid out in Equa-
tion 3.1, followed by results from a number of robustness tests. I estimate the
‘overall’ effect—without interacting Coverage with the chair judge’s party—of
asylum issue salience on asylum judges’ grant rates, with Coverage both mea-
sured during the whole decision-making period (Column (1) of Table 3.1) and
the month before the decision was finalized (Column (2) of Table 3.1). The
point estimates indicate that there is a substantial negative effect of asylum
issue salience on an appeal’s probability of being granted. The estimates are
38 An additional robustness test present results from a model that includes month fixed
effects, which allows for a very flexible time trend absorbing these ‘shocks’ to judges’
decision making and a generalized additive logistic model that includes a very flexible
time trend instead of quarter fixed effects. The results remain stable. See Section 3.A for
more details.
39 Judges are assigned to appeals conditional on the complementarity of their language skills
and the language of the initial decision against which the appeal is lodged. If a certain
subset of asylum seekers receive decisions in one language more frequently, this could
influence the set of cases to which a given judge is assigned.
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Figure 3.2:Results
Country of Origin FE
Month After
Without 2015
Month of Decision FE
LPM
Last Month
Whole Period
−0.006 0.000 0.003
Effect of Asylum Issue Salience
High Salience
Medium Salience
Low Salience
−0.04 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 0.00 0.01
Effect of Asylum Issue Salience
Note: The left graph presents estimates for the effect of asylum issue salience from the main model as laid out
in Equation 3.1, with Coverage measured during the whole decision-making period (‘Whole Period’), during
the month before a decision was finalized (‘Last Month’), estimated with a linear probability model instead
of a logistic regression (‘LPM’), with month fixed effects instead of quarter fixed effects (Month of Decision
FE), with Coverage measured during the month after a decision was finalized (‘Month After’), for the period
of 2007 to 2014 (‘Without 2015’) and with an additional control for appellants’ country of origin (‘Country of
Origin FE’). Note that with the exception of ‘Last Month’ and ‘Month After’, all specifications in the graph on
the left-hand side have Coverage measured during the whole decision-making period. All estimates are average
marginal effects with standard errors clustered on the chair judge level and 95% confidence intervals. In the
graph on the right-hand side, Coverage is a categorical variable with low, medium and high coverage during
the whole decision-making period.
average marginal effects and can therefore be interpreted in a straightforward
manner: the coefficient of −0.005 (−0.002) implies that on average, the prob-
ability of a case being granted decreases by 0.5 (0.2) percentage points with
one more ‘article’ published on asylum issues per day during the asylum appeal
decision-making period (the month before the decision). Even though this might
appear to be a small effect, given that mean Coverage is 14 (median: 12), that
is actually a substantial, negative effect: a one standard deviation increase in
Coverage leads to between two and seven percentage points’ decrease in a case’s
probability of being granted, depending on the measure for Coverage used.
In addition to a visualization of the estimates for the effect of asylum issue
salience based on the main specification (with Coverage measured during the
whole decision-making period or the last month before decision finalization),
Figure 3.2 also displays the results from a number of robustness tests. As more
extensively discussed in Appendix Section 3.A, I conduct several robustness tests
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to support the validity of the main results.40 First, to address the worry that
changes in the composition of appellants, their countries of origin or the qual-
ity of their appeals could be different in times of higher issue salience, I adapt
the main specification a) to include month fixed effects (instead of quarter fixed
effects), b) by adding country of origin fixed effects and c) by estimating a gen-
eralized additive logistic model that allows for a very flexible (cross-validated)
time trend.41 Second, to allow for a more flexible relationship between issue
salience and decision making, I recode Coverage to include three categories (low,
medium, high). Third, to get at potential measurement error, I drop the year
2015 from the analysis altogether, because asylum issue salience was dispropor-
tionately high during this year (see Figure 3.1).42 Finally, as a placebo test, I
replace the main independent variable (Coverage) with media coverage in the
month after a decision is reached to show that there is no significant effect of
issue salience in the month following the decision (as we would expect).
As Figure 3.2 shows, the estimates of the effect of issue salience based on these
robustness tests lend credibility to the main results (‘Whole Period’ and ‘Last
Month’ in Figure 3.2). All estimates are negative and statistically significant,
with the exception of the one from the placebo test (‘Month After’), which
should not be significant if the effect of asylum issue salience does not occur by
chance. Finally, the two used definitions for Coverage in the main specifications
do indeed provide a lower and an upper bound of the effect.
3.5.2 Effect of Asylum Issue Salience by Party
I now turn to the results from the specification that takes into account judges’
party affiliations (Equation 3.2). As the coefficients in Columns (3) and (4) in
Table 3.1 show, the effect of asylum issue salience on chair judges’ average grant
rate is largely unrelated to chair judges’ party affiliations. All coefficients of the
Party×Coverage interactions—regardless of the definition used for Coverage—
are substantial, negative and reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
40 Note that for these tests, Coverage is measured during the whole decision-making period.
41 See Figure 3.6 in Section 3.A for the latter.
42 See also Figure 3.10 in the Appendix with estimates on the chair judge party level for the
model that disregards decisions made in 2015.
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Table 3.1:AverageMarginal Effects: MainModel Regression Results
Dependent variable:
granted
logistic
Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage
(whole period) (last month) (whole period) (last month)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coverage −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
GPS×Coverage −0.009∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
SP×Coverage −0.006∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
CVP×Coverage −0.006∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
FDP×Coverage −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
SVP×Coverage −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Indep×Coverage −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Judge FEs ✓ ✓
Party FEs ✓ ✓
Language FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Quarter FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 31,937 31,937 31,937 31,937
Note: Coverage is the average number of circulation-weighted newspaper articles on asylum issues per
day during the whole decision-making period in Models (1) and (3) and during the last month before a
decision is finalized in Models (2) and (4). The unit of observation is the individual appeal case. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the chair judge level in all models and all models either include
judge or party fixed effects, but not both, since judges have not changed parties. The Green Liberal Party
(GLP) is omitted from the table, because this party only has one judge. The cases decided by a chair
judge of the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) were dropped from the analysis entirely since their
judge, who joined the court in 2015, has only decided 47 cases. Levels of statistical significance: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The only exception is the estimate for the effect of issue salience for judges from
the Social Democratic Party, if Coverage is defined as the average daily number
of articles during the month before a decision was finalized.
As the similarity of the estimates suggests, parties are not statistically different
from one another in their reaction to asylum issue salience, with the exception
of SP judges compared to FDP and SVP judges, but again only if Coverage is
measured during the last month before decision finalization.
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Figure 3.3:Appeal Grant Rate by Party and Asylum Issue Salience (Whole Period)
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Note: The graphs show the predicted effect of asylum issue salience on judges’ grant rates by party. In each
graph, Quarter is set to the first quarter of the year 2014 and Language to German. The Green Liberal Party
(GLP) and the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) are excluded, because they each only have one asylum
judge, who joined the FAC in 2013 and 2015, respectively. The black lines just above the x-axis indicate the
distribution of appeals across asylum issue salience, measured as Coverage during the month before a decision
was finalized. To ensure the results are not dependent on outliers, asylum issue salience is restricted to 60,
with the few cases with higher issue salience coded as 60. The shaded areas are 95% confidence bands, based
on standard errors that are clustered at the chair judge level.
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Figure 3.4:Appeal Grant Rate by Party and Asylum Issue Salience (LastMonth)
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Note: The graphs show the predicted effect of asylum issue salience on judges’ grant rates by party. In each
graph, Quarter is set to the first quarter of the year 2014 and Language to German. The Green Liberal Party
(GLP) and the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) are excluded, because they each only have one asylum
judge, who joined the FAC in 2013 and 2015, respectively. The black lines just above the x-axis indicate the
distribution of appeals across asylum issue salience, measured as Coverage during the whole decision-making
period. To ensure the results are not dependent on outliers, asylum issue salience is restricted to 60, with
the few cases with higher issue salience coded as 60. The shaded areas are 95% confidence bands, based on
standard errors that are clustered at the chair judge level.
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The graphs in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 visually illustrate the estimates for asylum
issue salience by party for Coverage measured during the whole decision-making
period and the last month, respectively. As both figures indicate, while parties’
average grant rates correlate in expected ways with parties’ asylum policy prefer-
ences,43 the effect of issue salience is not restricted to either the more right-wing
(such as the SVP) or the more left-wing (such as the SP) judges. The graphs
also visualize the magnitude of the effect of asylum issue salience: with Quarter
set to the first quarter of 2014, Language set to German and Coverage mea-
sured during whole decision-making period (last month), the appeal grant rate
for Christian Democrat (CVP) judges, for example, is predicted to decrease from
26 (25) to 17 (19) percent when moving one standard deviation away from the
median media coverage of 11 (12) articles per day to 19 (20).
In sum, the analysis shows that higher issue salience leads to lower grant rates
among judges of all parties, including non-partisan judges. The magnitude of
the effect depends on the measure used for Coverage, but is estimated to be
between two and seven percentage points for a one standard deviation increase
at median Coverage.
3.6 Discussion
This section discusses the main findings in two respects. First, it partials out two
parts of the effect of asylum issue salience: the part that is related to the number
of arriving asylum seekers and the part that is not. Second, it examines in
more detail the media coverage content and investigates which particular topics
inform the effect of asylum issue salience. Both additional analyses support the
interpretation that asylum judges, despite being expert asylum decision makers,
“are people, too” (Clark et al. forthcoming), who (subconsciously) become more
anti-asylum in times of high asylum issue salience.
43 See Figure 3.9 for an estimation of parties’ ideal points on a pro- vs. anti-asylum spectrum
estimated based on MPs’ votes on asylum issues in the National Council over the study
period. Note that the number of judges from the Green Party (GPS) was very small for
the first few years of the court’s existence and nonexistent for the Green Liberal Party
(GLP) and the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP), which is why the latter two parties
were excluded from the analysis.
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3.6.1 Is It about Asylum Applications?
As strongly suggested by Steinmayr (2016) for Austria, media coverage of asylum
and refugee issues is correlated with the number of asylum requests lodged.
Newspapers write more about asylum seekers when more asylum seekers claim
asylum, and, at the same time, more articles might be written even before asylum
seekers actually apply for asylum in a given country. In order to estimate which
part of the asylum issue effect can be attributed to increasing numbers of asylum
applications, I reestimate the main model, including the interaction with the
chair judge’s party, and control for the average daily number of lodged asylum
applications during the whole appeal period and the month before the decision
was made, respectively.44
Figure 3.5 presents predictions of the part of the effect of asylum issue salience
that is unrelated to asylum application numbers by party, with Coverage mea-
sured during the whole decision-making period. Comparing Figures 3.3 and 3.5
reveals that a significant part of the effect of issue salience—if measured during
the whole decision-making period—is driven by its relation to asylum request
numbers. The magnitude of the ‘overall’ effect (irrespective of party affiliation)
is reduced to a decrease of one percentage point for a one standard deviation
increase of media coverage at the median. Yet, both the part of the effect that is
related to asylum application numbers and the part that is unrelated are statisti-
cally significant and negative for all parties, except for SP judges. Interestingly,
when measuring Coverage during the month before a decision is finalized, the
issue salience estimates remain essentially unaffected by the inclusion of asylum
application numbers during the same period. Indeed, the estimates for the effect
of asylum issue salience (without the part driven by asylum applications) when
Coverage is measured during the whole decision-making period are very similar
to those from the specification that measures Coverage during the last month,
with or without the inclusion of a control for asylum application numbers.45
44 The variable for newly lodged asylum claims uses the official monthly asylum statistics
published by the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration: https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/
home/publiservice/statistik/asylstatistik.html.
45 For a visual illustration of the effect of asylum issue salience that is unrelated to asylum
application numbers by party, with Coverage measured during the last month, see see
Figure 3.10 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.5:Appeal Grant Rate and Asylum Issue Salience (Controlling for Number of AsylumRequests,Whole
Period)
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Note: The graphs show the predicted effect of asylum issue salience on judges’ grant rates by party, controlling
for the average daily number of asylum applications lodged during the decision-making period. In each graph,
Quarter is set to the first quarter of the year 2014 and Language to German. The Green Liberal Party
(GLP) and the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) are excluded, because they each only have one asylum
judge, who joined the FAC in 2013 and 2015, respectively. The black lines just above the x-axis indicate the
distribution of appeals across asylum issue salience, measured as Coverage during the whole decision-making
period. To ensure the results are not dependent on outliers, asylum issue salience is restricted to 60, with
the few cases with higher issue salience coded as 60. The shaded areas are 95% confidence bands, based on
standard errors that are clustered at the chair judge level.
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Assuming that the number of asylum applications actually partly drives asylum
issue salience, what does that say about why judges become more restrictive? On
first sight, the literature offers two different interpretations. On the one hand,
this finding is consistent with an account of judges as strategic actors who aspire
to reduce their workload (see, e.g., Epstein and Knight 2013). From this per-
spective, the above analysis suggests that judges take to rejecting more asylum
appeals in times of high issue salience because they fear that more applications
will result in more appeals. Since rejected appeals are costly for appellants (dur-
ing the study period, there was a fee of at least 600 CHF (∼ USD 600)), a lower
grant rate can be considered a signal to asylum seekers, deterring them from
lodging appeals in the first place.
On the other hand, given that the effect is relatively short-term—the Quarter
fixed effects ensure that only within-quarter variation informs the estimates of is-
sue salience—subconscious rather than conscious (strategic) changes in behavior
might provide a better framework for understanding the effect of issue salience.
It is in this respect that the literature on how citizens’ attitudes toward immi-
grants are affected by immigration offers valuable insights. As Hopkins’s (2010)
study on issue salience and immigration attitudes in the U.S. suggests, issue
salience carries over and amplifies the negative effect of arriving immigrants on
citizens’ pro-immigration attitudes. Hopkins’s finding therefore calls into ques-
tion whether the number of asylum requests directly causes the reduction in
judges’ grant rate. Arguably, it is entirely possible that an increase in applica-
tion numbers impacts on judges’ behavior through an increase in media coverage
and attention devoted to the issue.
In sum, whereas an interpretation of judges’ reaction to issue salience as a strate-
gic attempt to reduce workload presupposes a conscious behavioral change, un-
derlying attitudinal changes could happen both consciously or subconsciously.
While both interpretations find a basis in the literature, the fact that the doc-
umented effects are relatively short-lived is arguably more compatible with a
subconscious account of the behavioral change. In the absence of an empirical
test to distinguish between the two interpretations, the following section ex-
plores the topics covered in the newspaper articles and substantiates the latter
interpretation.
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3.6.2 Which Topics Drive the Effect of Issue Salience?
So far, I have used all newspaper articles that mention asylum and/or refugees
in any context. This section takes a more in-depth look at the content of the
newspaper articles and divides the media coverage corpus into different topics.
On this basis, it investigates which particular topics explain the variation in
judges’ behavior better than others and, by doing so, provides more suggestive
evidence that judges’ reactions are compatible with a subconscious account of
behavioral changes.
I employ a structural topic model (STM) (see, e.g., Roberts et al. 2016) to esti-
mate which topics underlie the newspaper articles. Topic modeling has become
a widely used approach to unsupervised topic estimation and works well with
unstructured corpora, like the media coverage corpus. There are several topic
modeling frameworks, but the STM is particularly suitable for the purpose of
this study because it allows for the incorporation of covariates. For a corpus
that is based on articles from different newspapers, with different regional foci
and over-time variation in the prevalence of topics, covariates that account for
the regional focus of a newspaper as well as the time at which an article was
published help identify meaningful themes. For example, since some newspapers
have a regional rather than national focus, the same topics (e.g., accommodation
of asylum seekers) are discussed with differing region-specific content. Similarly,
topics vary in their prevalence over time (see Figure 3.8 in the Appendix as an
illustration). I estimate 15 topics, thereby allowing for the specific content of a
topic to vary across geographical areas and for the prevalence of topics to vary
by newspaper and date.46 Table 3.2 provides an overview of the 15 estimated
topics, ordered according to their expected proportions in the corpus.
46 To choose the optimal number of topics is not straightforward, and there is no ‘right’
choice (Roberts et al. 2014). There are several possible ways to find an appropriate
number, but the suggested appropriate number for a corpus that is as large as the asylum
articles corpus is in the hundreds. Because the purpose of this approach is to explore
which broader themes inform the effect of asylum issue salience, I rely on a small number
of topics.
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Table 3.2: Topic Proportions andMost ImportantWords
Topic Prop Features
Accomodation 0.13 medel, laaxer, federal_asylum_center, hotel_rustico, municipality,
accommodation_container, civil_protection_shelter
European Cooperation 0.11 frontex, guillotine_clause, easo, mandate_to_negotiate,
eu_commission, rescue_mission, schengen
Stories 0.11 venus_hair_stone, bergier, schischkin, bärfuss, active_service,
schleck, lenin
Elections 0.11 second_seat, guy_parmelin, martullo_blocher, female_voters,
rime, voters, center_party
Crime 0.09 lumengo, snowden, winfrey, bodypacker, chanted, kronospan, riad
(Human) Rights 0.08 human_rights_echr, suspected_case, marriage_of_convenience,
echr, wedding_ban, detention_duration, special_flights
Integration 0.08 scsw, welfare_recipients, welfare_scsw, social_inspector,
social_organization, headscarf_band, gaillard
Civic Engagement 0.08 beans, dalai_lama, pita, wishing_table, tibetans, jackets, celebration
Legislative Politics 0.07 mandatory_international_law, abstention, advisory,
committee_political_institutions, parliamentary_initiative,
time_limit_for_appeal, referendum
Asylum Applications 0.07 previous_year, previous_month, FOM_director, gattiker,
application_numbers, third_quartal, director_mario
Culture (Film) 0.04 opening_movie, lav, fernand_melgar, special, piazza_grande, puertas, lionel
Culture (Exhibitions) 0.01 solo_show, artistic, artists, exhibits, gallery_owner, art_museum, museums
Culture (Music) 0.01 concert, cut, music, jazz, latin, charts, swing
Local Activities 0.01 steiger, ka, rorschacher, wyler, dumoulin, tsch, weber
Church Activities 0.00 bishops_conference, catholic_church, theology, parishes, ecumenism, diocese
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There are several topics that directly allude to the political relevance of asylum
and refugee issues: Elections, Legislative Politics and European Cooperation
have relatively large proportions. Furthermore, topics such as Accommodation,
Crime and Integration highlight some of the substantive issues that are debated
with regard to asylum seekers and refugees. Although the five least-frequently
covered topics (Culture (Film), Culture (Exhibitions), Culture (Music), Local
Activities and Church Activities) are reflections of the salience of asylum issues—
it is likely that there are more exhibitions that take up asylum and refugee issues
in times of high asylum issue salience—they do not cover substantive themes and
will therefore be excluded from further analysis.
Beyond providing insights as to which broader themes are covered in the news-
paper articles that mention asylum and refugees, I extract the proportion of
each topic in each article and use these proportions to reweight Coverage. The
reweighted versions of Coverage will then allow me to explore which topics do a
better job of explaining the observed variation in judges’ behavior. To do so, I
refit the main model as laid out in Equation 3.1 with the topic-weighed versions
of Coverage separately for the media coverage during the whole decision-making
period and the last month before the decision; I then compare the log likelihood
of the different models.47 I thereby focus on the substantively interpretable top-
ics. The model fits for the different versions of Coverage are shown in Table 3.3.
The differences between the log likelihoods are relatively small and depend on
whether Coverage is measured as average daily number of articles during the
whole decision-making period or only the month before the decision. How-
ever, articles on where and how asylum seekers are accommodated—or will be
accommodated—explain more of the variation in judges’ behavior than articles
pertaining to policy-making processes (Legislative Politics) and human rights
questions. At the same time, the overall measures of issue salience do compara-
tively well at explaining judges’ behavior.
What differentiates the topics that appear to play a larger role from the ones that
do relatively worse at explaining judges’ reactions? While articles pertaining
47 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a positive correlation between topics: even though the
estimated coefficients for Coverage cannot be compared directly due to the weighting
procedure, all coefficients with the exception of the ones for (Human) Rights are negative
and statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.3:Model Fit
Coverage Whole Period LL
Coverage -10919.28
German Coverage -10921.65
Accommodation -10932.03
European Cooperation -10932.62
Integration -10939.12
Asylum Applications -10953.73
Elections -10953.93
Civic Engagement -10960.25
Legislative Politics -10965.57
Crime -10970.96
(Human) Rights -10976.87
Coverage Last Month LL
Accommodation -10891.26
Civic Engagement -10894.16
German Coverage -10897.01
Crime -10897.55
Coverage -10897.65
European Cooperation -10899.87
Asylum Applications -10901.48
Integration -10901.65
Elections -10901.80
Legislative Politics -10902.25
(Human) Rights -10902.25
to topics such as Legislative Politics, Elections and (Human) Rights often do
not directly voice citizens’ views, articles about the accommodation of asylum
seekers frequently feature citizens’ concerns. The search for accommodations
for asylum seekers has caused very heated debates and local reactions in the
past in a number of municipalities across Switzerland.48 Taking these insights
to imply that the most relevant aspect of asylum issues with respect to asylum
judges’ behavior is the salience of asylum issues among citizens, it is plausible
that judges—consciously or subconsciously—react to asylum issue salience in
the same way as many of the citizens do: they become more restrictive.
In sum, the additional analyses in this section shed light on what about asylum
issue salience leads to changes in judges’ behavior. Judges’ reactions are, at
most, partly driven by asylum applications, and media coverage that features
contested issues appears to be more strongly related to judges’ reactions than the
coverage of other topics, such as asylum and immigration policy-making. Even
though this paper cannot determine empirically exactly why judges react to issue
salience, the additional analyses provide insights that are at least compatible
with an account of judges as experiencing a short-lived, possibly subconscious,
hardening of asylum attitudes in times of high issue salience.
48 For example, in Aarburg and Bettwil in 2014, see https://bazonline.ch/schweiz/standard/Der-
gespaltene-Kanton/story/19896889.
154
3.7 Conclusion
In recent decades, asylum and refugee issues have frequently been highly salient
among both citizens and political elites in many countries across the globe. Par-
ticularly in 2015, during the refugee protection crisis, an unprecedented level
of media attention was devoted to asylum and refugee issues and, both vot-
ers and politicians were concerned about the arrival of asylum seekers (Bansak
et al. 2017). Given that research has shown that political elites respond to
issue salience (see Epstein and Segal 2000) and that citizens become more anti-
immigrant in times of increasing numbers of immigrants, particularly when issue
salience is high (Hopkins 2010), the present study addresses the question whether
expert decision makers, such as asylum judges at the Swiss FAC, also react to
issue salience.
By law, judges are required to decide cases in an independent and impartial
manner, treating all appellants equally. In addition, the FAC Judicial Code of
Conduct explicitly states that
Judges shall not allow their judgments to be influenced by pressures
exerted by the general public, by litigants or by third parties. They
shall also avoid any appearance of being influenced in any way.49
While these rules imply that judges should not be affected by the variation in
asylum issue salience, past research has also shown that judges are frequently
influenced by factors that are beyond the merit of cases. This paper contributes
to the literature by showing that when newspapers report more on asylum and
refugee issues, asylum appeal judges become more restrictive in their decision
making. Comparable cases that are decided in times of high asylum issue salience
are more likely to be rejected than those decided in times of low asylum issue
salience. These effects are robust across many model specifications and are not
restricted to judges affiliated with right or left-wing parties.
Why exactly judges become more restrictive in times of high issue salience cannot
be determined empirically in this article. However, the short-lived nature of the
effect of issue salience on judges’ decisions analyzed here is most compatible with
49 See https://www.bvger.ch/dam/bvger/en/dokumente/2016/05/ethikcharta.pdf.
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a subconscious account of judges’ behavioral changes. As additional analyses
indicate, the effect of asylum issue salience is at most partly driven by increasing
asylum applications, and it is the topics that are most salient to citizens (as
opposed to political elites), such as the accommodation of asylum seekers, that
best explain the variation in judges’ behavior.
The effect of issue salience on judges’ behavior has to be carefully interpreted
in its institutional context. Swiss asylum judges are informally required to be
affiliated with (or explicitly support) a political party and at least initially need
the support of their party to get elected. Most judgments are publicly available
and specify the names of the judges on the panel, but (media) attention toward
individual asylum appeal decisions is low. Furthermore, because the FAC is the
first and last instance in asylum appeal decision making in Switzerland, reversals
are extremely rare. Thus, while the particular institutional and political context
certainly facilitates the formation of an effect of issue salience, that is not to say
that these findings bear no relevance beyond Switzerland. Asylum issues have
been politically salient and divisive in many countries around the world, and
judicial selection systems are frequently in some way politicized (see Chapter A
1). It is essential, therefore, that further research explores the relevance of the
judicial selection system in the emergence of the effects of issue salience.
These findings are particularly important in times when both the number of
arriving asylum seekers and the level of asylum issue salience are high. If, as is
implied in the FAC’s judicial code of conduct, issue salience should not matter for
asylum appeal decision making, there are arguably appeals that are inaccurately
rejected simply because they are handled in times of high asylum issue salience.
Therefore, beyond revealing a further source of inconsistency in asylum appeal
decision making, these findings highlight and problematize the potential power
of the media and the public to influence asylum appeal decisions.
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Appendix
3.A Robustness
This section provides more information about the robustness tests of the main
results, of which the results are displayed in Figures 3.2 and 3.6. First, I fit
the main model as outlined in Equation 3.1 with different versions of the main
independent variable Coverage. I consider the following variations:
- Throughout the paper, I use both the circulation-weighted number of ar-
ticles on asylum issues per day during the whole decision-making period
and during the month before the decision is finalized. I do so because the
duration of an asylum appeal is not completely unrelated to the case’s
merit—the shortest decisions are usually single-judge dismissals. On aver-
age, the longer the case duration, the higher the grant rate. Accordingly,
only shorter cases with a lower probability of being granted can reach ex-
treme values (both low and high) of issue salience. Therefore, to address
the worry that this correlation drives the result, I also perform the main
specifications with a version of Coverage that only takes into account issue
salience during the month before a decision is made. The last month was
chosen for two reasons. First, because it is reasonable to assume that the
judge worked on the appeal at some point during that time and second,
because many cases (the median duration is about 38 days) last less than
30 days. At the same time, it should be noted that taking the last month
of issue salience instead of the whole duration might provide a lower bound
of the effect, since it is possible that a decision in longer cases has already
been reached before the last month.
- To rule out that a few cases handled in times of very high issue salience
drive the results, I use a categorical version of Coverage instead of the
continuous one in the main models. The mean average number of arti-
cles published during the decision-making period is 8.1 (‘low’ salience), 12
(‘medium’ salience) and 20 (‘high’ salience).
- In another test aimed at ruling out that only the cases decided in times of
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extremely high issue salience are responsible for the documented effect, I
disregard all cases decided in the year 2015, a year with disproportionately
high asylum issue salience.
- Finally, I perform a placebo test in which I use asylum issue salience during
the month after a decision was made as the main independent variable
Coverage. If the results from the main model are not a spurious correlation,
asylum issue salience during the month after should not have an impact
on a case’s probability of being granted—which is what I find.
Figure 3.6:Robustness Tests II
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Second, to address the worry that the measure of asylum issue salience also
captures other, time-variant changes and not only issue salience, I conduct the
following tests. Note that if not explicitly specified otherwise, Coverage is mea-
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sured during the whole decision-making period, because only this definition of
coverage allows for the inclusion of very flexible time trends.
- Instead of employing fixed effects of the quarter-of-year in which the deci-
sion was reached, I use month fixed effects. This allows me to account for
more variation in the grant rate potentially caused by changes in asylum
seekers’ countries of origin, first-instance decisions or anything else.
- For the same reason, instead of performing a logit regression, I used a
generalized additive logistic model with a very flexible spline for the time
trend (UBRE-minimizing k=105) instead of quarter or month fixed ef-
fects. The results are very similar to those from the main specification
(see Figure 3.6).
- In another test, I include a control for appellants’ country of origin to
account for the fact that the composition of asylum seekers is not stable.
In addition, since I realize that one might worry that the coefficients shown
in Table 3.1 could be misleading (because as Ai and Norton (2003) show that
coefficients for interaction terms in logit and probit models are frequently misin-
terpreted), I not only directly present the average marginal effects in regression
tables and plots, but also show that a linear probability instead of a logistic
model—an approach frequently advocated for the analysis of judicial decisions
(see, for example, Kastellec (2010))—produces very similar results.
Finally, I show that the results also hold up in a plausibility test. One way to test
the plausibility of the results is to think through which cases would be decided
differently if judges do indeed become more restrictive in times of high asylum
issue salience (see Figure 3.7 for an illustration of the following). Conceiving
of a judge’s preference as a threshold that separates the cases that are strong
enough (and will be granted) from the cases that are not strong enough (and
will be rejected),50 higher issue salience leads judges to change the location of
their threshold. As a consequence, a case has to be stronger in times of high
asylum issue salience in order to be granted than in times of low issue salience. In
other words, if judges’ preferences change in response to issue salience, we would
expect to see that cases just above the threshold in times of low salience are the
50 For a more detailed description of this framework, see Chapter B 1 and Kornhauser (1992)
on judges’ ideal points and case facts in a one-dimensional case-space.
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Figure 3.7: Illustration Plausibility Test
Note: Assuming that i) the average judge decide cases ‘correctly’ (i.e., according to their merits) under low
issue salience and ii) cases’ merits are stable, this graph illustrates what happens when issue salience increases.
The black line (‘granted’) is an illustration of judges’ average grant rate if partly granted cases are considered
‘granted’, while the black dashed line is the grant rate if partly granted cases were considered ‘rejected’.
ones that fall below the threshold and are rejected in times of high asylum issue
salience.
To indirectly test this notion, I change the coding of the dependent variable
‘granted’ that underlies pii. Whereas in the main model, partly granted appeals
are considered granted,51 Model (2) of Table 3.4 displays results in which I
focus on a case’s probability of being partly granted. Thus, if judges are indeed
exhibiting a change in their preferences, i.e., they apply a ‘higher’ threshold
as to how strong a case has to be to be granted in times of higher asylum
issue salience, we would expect that the effect of coverage on judges is most
pronounced when looking at whether a case is partly granted as opposed to
either completely rejected or completely granted. As the results in Column (2)
of Table 3.4 corroborate, the probability of a case’s being partly granted rather
than fully granted or rejected decreases with higher issue salience. Since the
probability of a case’s being partly granted is very small to begin with—only
about 1.8% of all cases in the sample—, a decrease of −0.2 percentage points for
an increase of one in the measure of issue salience is an 11% reduction. Dropping
51 As illustrated in Section 3.3.2, that is reasonable because appellants win at least in one
substantial aspect.
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Table 3.4:AverageMarginal Effects: Focus on Partly Granted Appeals
Dependent variable:
granted + partly granted
partly granted
logistic
Model (1) Model (2)
Coverage −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
Judge FEs ✓ ✓
Language FEs ✓ ✓
Quarter FEs ✓ ✓
Observations 32,385 35,839
Note: Coverage is the average number of circulation-weighted newspa-
per articles on asylum issues per day during the whole decision-making
period. In model (1), partly granted appeals were coded 1, together
with fully granted appeals, and rejected appeals were coded as 0. The
dependent variable in model (2) is ‘partly granted’, where partly granted
appeals were coded as 1 and both rejected and granted appeals were
coded as 0. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the chair
judge level in all models. The cases decided by a chair judge of the
Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) were dropped from the analysis
entirely since their judge, who joined the court in 2015, has only decided
47 cases. Levels of statistical significance: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
all cases that were partly granted from the analysis, the estimate for the effect
of Coverage is reduced to −0.0037 (from −0.0051).
In sum, I perform a variety of robustness tests and a placebo check, of which
the results are displayed in Figures 3.2 and 3.6. As discussed in Section 3.5,
they indicate that the findings are robust and support the conclusion that the
negative effects of asylum issue salience on a case’s probability of being granted
is valid.
3.B Media Coverage Corpus
This section describes in more detail the corpus that is used to measure asylum
issue salience and to perform the structural topic model analysis in Section 3.6.
As outlined in Section 3.3, I searched the online data repository Factiva with the
string ((‘asylum*’ OR ‘refuge*’) AND ‘Swi(tzerland|ss)’ OR ‘canton’)) in Ger-
man, French and Italian and downloaded all articles that contained that string
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and were published in Swiss newspapers between January 1, 2007 and December
31, 2015.52 Except for a small number of newspapers from unrelated fields such
as finance, I applied essentially no restrictions other than i) the newspapers had
to be Swiss and ii) available on Factiva over the whole study period.53 The final
dataset covers eighteen newspapers, of which five are in French and thirteen are
in German. Among them are seven of the ten most widely circulated daily news-
papers, the three most widely circulated Sunday newspapers and two influential
weekly news magazines. Finally, to really focus on articles, I excluded–to the
greatest extent possible–lists of events, agendas and reader’s letters. Yet, as the
estimated topics suggest, I did not succeed completely.
For the topic analysis, I focus entirely on German-language, which reduces the
number of articles by about 27%. I also drop articles that were shorter than 100
words. These restrictions leave me with a corpus of just above 25,000 German-
language newspaper articles on asylum issues published between January 2007
and December 31, 2015 (see Figure 3.8 for an illustration of the top features
in the German-language corpus grouped by year). For the compilation of the
document-feature-matrix (dfm), I exclude three sets of words: i) words that fre-
quently occur in published articles (‘Keystone’, ‘Page’ and a few more), ii) a
list of words that appeared frequently and do not contribute to the understand-
ing of the topics (the names of the newspapers, a number of verbs like ‘said’,
numbers, time-related words like ‘year’ and single letters) and iii) a shortened
version of quanteda’s German ‘stop words’. Because asylum and refugee issues
are frequently connected to discussions about in- and out-groups, I keep words
that describe groups of people or interpersonal relationships, such as ‘us’, ‘them’,
‘everyone’ and ‘against’. In addition, the thousand most frequent collocations
are added as tokens.
52 See, for instance, on http://factiva.com/sources/factivasearch/index_cs.aspx.
53 A complete list of (excluded) newspapers is available upon request.
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Figure 3.8:Comparison Plot of Frequent Features by Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
flüchtlinge
sa blocher
schweizsvp
si
e
sommaruga
min
asylbewerber
in
iti
at
ive
eu
asylsuchende europa
italien
mi
di
mehr
flüchtlingen
widmer
nordafrika
asylsuchenden
usa
sem
menschen
nationalrat
schlumpf
bfm
prozent
galerie
syrien
basel
do
uns
bund
mo
ausstellung
bern
franken
sp
n
o
th
ilfe laax
ecopop
christoph
simonetta
dublin
bilder
m
ig
ra
tio
n
verfahren
sollen
fd
p
partei
volkswahl
bremgarten
the
referendum
eritrea
viele
abaton
deutschland
kantone
ja
schmid
museum
ausländer
tel
zuwanderung
ge
ge
nv
o
rs
ch
la
g
arthouse
schengen bundesrat
ständerat
calvin sonntag
müssen
schweizer
kommen
revision flüchtlingskrise
familie
arena
ca
lm
y
kanton
nein
staatssekretariat
libyen
tunesien
hollenstein
wahlkampf
bundesamt sans
müller
justizministerin
bundesrätin
keller
guantánamo
vo
lk
grüninger
zürich
sutter
minarett
rey
lumengo
bi
la
te
ra
le
n
snowden
vbs
nigerianer
papiers
eucharistiefeier
kandidaten
erhalten
wahlenebola
geht
nigeria
20h
asylverfahren
ge
ge
n
bois
gemeinden
zürcher
tägl
cvp
frauen
land
juni
uiguren
ausschaffungsinitiative
polizei
ko
so
vo
leben
geschichte
reymond rütli
zentren
parteien
mann
personenfreizügigkeit
unterkunft parlament umsetzung
kirche
integration
politiker
sozialhilfe
is
probleme
system
neuen
frau
gemeinde
film
braucht
ch
gesuche
kontingente
schon
amden
tunesier
wer
blochers
kommission
masseneinwanderungsinitiative
gottesdienst
genf
personen
immer
muslime
st
situation
ausschaffung
februar
härtefallkommission
la
tib
et justizminister
kinder
ihre
urteil
valzeina
samstag
bundespräsidentin
wikileaks
ägypten
guisan
n
e
u
e
riffraff
bild
mittelmeer
deza
millionen
bereits
gestern
dafür
eritreer
seien
grenze
politik
dj
de
rz
e
it
gattiker
landegg
unsere
gobbi
asylbewerbern
unterkünfte
stadt
pr
äs
id
en
t
merkel
eveline
e
u
ro
pä
isc
he
n
a
sy
lg
es
et
zr
ev
is
io
n
jährige
grenzen
so
n
de
ra
u
ss
te
llu
ng
bevölkerung
art
unterbringung
asylgesetzes
brunner
köppelrund
migranten
philipp
re
gi
ss
eu
r
pro
häftlinge
laut
asylpolitik
oktober
wirtschaft
party
syrerrustico
kopp
aufnehmen
grünen
hätte
untergebracht
lösung
ag
einwanderung
gd
bdp
kosten
brand
bul
helfen
a
a
rg
au
verschärfungen
asylgesuche
wichtig
stimmen
thun
armee
schloss
österreich
ungarn
aliaddin
entwicklungshilfe
arbeit
plätze
türkei
könnten
vorlage
tod
geschlossen
gemäss
a
sy
lze
n
tru
m
aarburg
bundes
vv
künftig
kesb
hans
sis
sri
us
roma
konnte
fa
rc
behörden
durchgangszentrum
kunst
blu
a
bk
o
m
m
e
n
de
ut
sc
he
n
brüssel
eidenbenz
etwa
zahlen
iv
so
m
a
lia
theater
abschaffung
lage
re
gi
er
u
n
g
länder
djs
geld
de
Note: Comparison plot shows the top features (relative frequency indicated by font size) of the corpus grouped
by year.
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3.C Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table 3.5:AverageMarginal Effects: Regression Results by Gender and Seniority
Dependent variable:
(partly) granted (partly) granted
logistic
(1) (2)
Coverage −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
Female × Coverage −0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
Male × Coverage −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
High Seniority × Coverage −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
Low Seniority × Coverage −0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
Language FEs ✓ ✓
Quarter FEs ✓ ✓
Observations 32,385 32,839
Note: Coverage is the average number of circulation-weighted articles on
asylum issues per day during the whole decision period. The unit of obser-
vation is the individual appeal case; standard errors are clustered on the
chair judge level in all models. Levels of statistical significance: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 3.9: Party Aggregates ofMPs’ Preferences on Asylum Issues, 2007–2015
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Note: The graph displays item response theory (IRT) estimates of parties’ ideal points on a pro- vs. anti-asylum
spectrum estimated based on MPs’ votes in the National Council over the study period.
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Figure 3.10:Appeal Grant Rate and Asylum Issue Salience (Controlling for Number of AsylumRequests, Last
Month)
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Note: The graphs show the predicted effect of asylum issue salience on judges’ grant rates by party, controlling
for the average daily number of asylum applications lodged during the last month. In each graph, Quarter
is set to the first quarter of the year 2014 and Language to German. The Green Liberal Party (GLP) and
the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) are excluded, because they each only have one asylum judge, who
joined the FAC in 2013 and 2015, respectively. The black lines just above the x-axis indicate the distribution
of appeals across asylum issue salience, measured as Coverage during the month before decision finalization.
To ensure the results are not dependent on outliers, asylum issue salience is restricted to 60, with the few cases
with higher issue salience coded as 60. The shaded areas are 95% confidence bands, based on standard errors
that are clustered at the chair judge level.
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